

THEY ARE STILL AT THE FIGHT

Child recruitment and exploitation by parties to the conflict in Yemen





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JUNE 2023

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How We Are

An independent, non-profit human rights organization located in Geneva, started its activities in January 2016

It obtained a work permit in December 2017. It seeks to defend human rights in the Middle East and Yemen in particular, and to communicate human rights violations to decision-making institutions, and effective and influential international organizations. It has been subjected to many campaigns of distortion and incitement, as well as hacking of its platforms by the parties to the Yemeni war due to Expose them for the crimes they committed. It issued dozens of reports in Arabic and English and human rights statements documenting violations of the war and human rights in Yemen

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GENERAL CONTEXT

Yemen has been witnessing a war since September 2014, due to the coup and rebellion that was led by the Houthi group that calls itself "Ansar Allah" in alliance with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, and the pace of violations continued after the military intervention led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the country since the late March 2015, when the scene is dominated by a climate of impunity for war crimes and violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law by various parties to the conflict.



Violations related to children were the forefront of those violations that have surfaced, foremost of which is the recruitment of children as actual or auxiliary soldiers in the ongoing Yemen war, which is one of the most serious developments in the conflict since its first outbreak in 2014. As this war pushed thousands of children to the front lines due to the machinations of the investing leaders, financial need, tribal solidarity, and other reasons, and the children paid a heavy price, a price that will affect the entire Yemeni society as it accumulates for years to come.

Apart from being a war crime under international law, using the children of Yemen as fuel for an endless war will deprive them and their country of the opportunity to build a modern economy that can guarantee a decent standard of living and a state that preserves the rights of its people.

This phenomenon began to grow since the legitimate government entered into a struggle against the Houthi rebels in 2014, when thousands of children were involved in direct hostilities, beginning with the war waged by the Houthi group against the Hajur al-Sham tribes in Hajjah governorate in early 2012, and then its war on the Dammaj area in Saada governorate during the year 2013, and then increased at a greater pace in 2014, After its control of the capital, Sana'a, and the expansion of its battles in the rest of the provinces,

the group used complex patterns aimed at compensating for the human losses of its members who were killed during confrontations with the Yemeni government forces, in order to forcibly recruit these children and use them in hostilities, and later in confronting the Arab coalition forces led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Child recruitment became worse and more dangerous in 2014, when the Houthi militia led a coup against the legitimate government. Where thousands of children were subjected to the worst forms of violence and extortion. Some of them left schools and were forced to either flee or seek refuge and emigrate, but the most serious repercussions are the recruitment of children by the Houthis and the militia of the Southern Transitional Council. These militias are setting up camps to recruit children, and this has been documented by the media and reports submitted by Security Council envoys. Moreover, "children are used by the Houthi militia and forced to participate in hostilities where they were trained to fight or transport weapons and war equipment, and they are also used to collect information about opponents in exchange for their Elementary needs such as clothing, shelter and food.



WORK METHODOLOGY

In the context of documenting human rights violations, SAM relied in this report titled «They Are Still at the Fight» to shed light on the phenomenon of child recruitment in Yemen during the ongoing conflict in Yemen that began in September 2014 on a clear methodology for accessing and investigating information, including transparency. Neutrality, integrity and objectivity.

The organization's team used reliable open sources, such as reports issued by international organizations and human rights reports considered in this report, in addition to a number of means to obtain information and reach the victims. The organization also used the available means of communication, and received many communications, and obtained many televised clips of the stories of the victims, and transmitted some of what was broadcast by the media of the parties to the conflict.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The Fourth Geneva Convention stipulates that "the compulsory or voluntary recruitment of children into armed forces or groups is a war crime in any armed conflict." It prohibited the involvement of children under the age of fifteen in wars, and this point was also mentioned in the Statute of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The minimum age for recruitment and direct participation in conflicts was raised to 18 under the Optional Protocol on the Rights of the Child in 2000. Since 2002, the number of countries that have ratified the Charter has reached 123. However, progress has been slow. UN Security Council Resolution 1612, which establishes a mechanism for follow-up, reporting, and compliance, indicates that this agenda still needs a lot of work - especially since most of the egregious violations are committed among non-state actors.

In May 2000, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict. This protocol is considered one of the most important texts guaranteeing the protection of the right of children from being forced to participate in armed conflicts. It is also considered the culmination of the efforts made throughout the 1990s to raise the minimum age for a child prohibited from being recruited from fifteen to eighteen years.

The protocol discussed many important provisions, specifically the age of compulsory, voluntary or voluntary recruitment, as well as dealing with the issue of recruiting children into armed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of the state. The armed forces of any state shall not, under any circumstances, recruit or use persons under the age of eighteen in hostilities. 2-The States Parties shall take all feasible measures to prevent such recruitment and use, including the adoption of the necessary legal measures to prohibit and criminalize these practices.

Article 77 of the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention stipulates that "the parties to the conflict shall be obligated to put in place all possible measures to ensure that children who have not reached the age of fifteen do not participate directly in armed conflicts, and these parties in particular must refrain from recruiting these youngsters into their armed forces." The Parties to the conflict, when recruiting those who have attained the age of fifteen but have not attained the age of eighteen, shall endeavor to give priority to those who are oldest. In the case of internal armed conflict, the Second Additional Protocol stipulates that "children under the age of fifteen may not be recruited into armed forces or groups, nor may they be allowed to participate in hostilities.



This prohibition includes states and armed groups that are distinct from the national forces of the state, as the protocol prohibits these forces from recruiting or using, under any circumstances, those under the age of eighteen in hostilities, and this prohibition applies to all armed groups. Countries in which such groups exist must take all feasible measures to prevent such recruitment or use, including adopting the necessary legal measures to prohibit and criminalize these practices. This Optional Protocol also requires states to take all measures to ensure the release of children from the ranks of the armed forces. It stipulates that "States Parties shall take all possible measures to ensure the demobilization of persons recruited or used in hostilities within the scope of their jurisdiction in a manner not inconsistent with this Protocol.

In both international and non-international armed conflicts, "forcing or conscripting children under the age of 15 into armed forces or armed groups or using them in conflict is a war crime" (Articles 8-2b (vi) and 8-2e (vii) < of the Statute of the International Criminal Court). Under certain circumstances, the Court has jurisdiction to try the perpetrators of these crimes (Articles 8-2-b-26 and Articles 8-2-e-7). According to the Statute of the International Criminal Court issued on July 17, 1998, which entered into force on July 1, 2002,

In 2000, specifically on the twenty-fifth of May, the United Nations General Assembly adopted an optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict. This raises the age at which participation in the armed forces is permitted from 15 to 18 and places a ban on conscription

under the age of 18. The Optional Protocol also requires that states, upon ratification or accession, make a declaration as to the age at which voluntary recruitment into the armed forces will be permitted, and specify the steps they will take to ensure that such recruitment is not forced or compulsory

The Paris Principles emphasize preventing the recruitment and exploitation of children in wars, and this is what is happening in the Yemeni conflict, as children are exploited by armed forces or groups, and it is necessary to free these children from any association with armed forces or groups in Yemen.

According to the Yemeni Child Law No. 45 of 2002 of Article 149, it is prohibited for any person under the age of 18 to participate in any armed conflict, or to join any military party to participate with him in a war, and a report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations indicated in April 2012, In part, it is about Yemen, indicating that Yemeni law is clear in the necessity of refraining from recruiting children in military conflicts. An in its statements and speeches, and in all of that it has confirmed from sources, and relied on what it was reassured of after examination, analysis and conformity.

This organization asserts that this report does not cover all the facts, but rather it reveals the extent of human rights violations for a short period, i.e. the period of writing this report, as this report tried to be brief and commensurate with the International Day to Combat Child Soldiers, it includes statistical numbers and names of training camps and places Mobilization for summer centers, in addition to the names of those involved in this crime.

Hajjah governorate comes at the forefront of the governorates with (1875), followed by Sana'a governorate with (1734), then Dhamar governorate (1585), and Taiz governorate, which is divided between the parties to the conflict, comes in fourth place with (1124) then the capital's secretariat with (1097).

According to the analyzes conducted by the organization, the economic factor is the most important factor in the process of involving children in hostilities, as it was found that 6,126 children who were recruited are children of low-income families, 3,194 children are children of low-income families, and 1,990 children are from middle-income families.

The Houthi group topped the list of party groups in recruiting parties with (10,649) recruited children, while the legitimate government and its allies recruited (507) children, while (54) children were recruited by an extremist group "such as Al Qaeda."

The process of recruiting children in Yemen is not limited to the Houthi group, as several UN and local reports found that the Yemeni government and the Arab coalition forces are also involved in the process of recruiting children, taking advantage of their need for money, although the Yemeni government signed an agreement to chart a way towards stopping the recruitment of children in Yemen. 2018. In late September of 2020, a team of international experts monitored the recruitment of children within the Special Security Forces camp in Shabwa governorate, where the report was presented to the Human Rights Council, which is the third report.

Where the Shabwa governorate belongs to the Yemeni government, and these children were exploited in hostilities in the «Abyan» governorate during the month of May of 2020, and these children were captured by the forces of the Southern Transitional Council, which is supported by the UAE government. The report stated that forces loyal to the Yemeni government, the Arab coalition, or brokers are carrying out large-scale recruitment operations for children in the governorates of Taiz, Lahi, and Abyan, and transporting them for training in Saudi camps in order to defend Saudi Arabia>s borders from Houthi ground attacks.

During the period from June 2015 to February 2020, children under the age of 7 were recruited from all Yemeni governorates by the Houthi group, according to the information contained in the report of international experts. These children were recruited from schools, poor and urban areas, and detention centers from Through rationing lessons and seducing them financially or by kidnapping them, to be used after that in the fighting, which led to the death of some and the injury of others.

The recruitment of male children did not stop, as the Houthi group recruited 34 girls (between the ages of 13 and 17), from June 2015 to June 2020, to use them as informants, recruits, guards, medics, and members of what is known as "Zainabat", who are entrusted with the tasks of searching women and homes, indoctrinating women with the ideas of the group, as well as maintaining order in women's prisons.



∠ **J** number of camps



211

The number of summer centers allocated to the crowd



195

recruiting officials



1,990
A recruited child from middle-income families

3,194
A recruited child from low-income families

6,126 child soldier from destitute families






Classification table for recruited children from the beginning of the period to the end of the year 2022 AD:

Governorate	From 12 - to 14 years old	From 15 - to 17 years old	From 8 - to 11 years old	Total
lbb	31	215	236	482
Al-Amanah	47	391	659	1097
Al-Baydaa	10	82	145	237
Al-Jouf	6	53	32	91
Al-Hadaydah	34	243	240	517
Al-dh'ale'	6	31	42	79
Al-Mahwait	22	121	90	233
Ta'z	45	363	716	1124
Hejjah	34	276	373	683
Demar	80	643	862	1585
Remah	17	24	36	77
Sa'daa	54	426	567	1047
Sana'a	120	754	860	1734
Emran	49	679	1147	1875
Ma'reb	19	49	48	116
Adan	2	68	94	164
Shabwah		9	34	43
Abyan	2	18	34	54
Lahj	2	16	54	72
Total	580	4461	6269	11310





MANY REASONS AND THE SAME RESULT

There are many reasons for the growth of the phenomenon of child recruitment in Yemen during the war



The parties to the conflict, such as the Houthi group, led to exploiting children and turning them into fuel for war, as the Houthis recruit children to fight with them on the various fronts of war to push them to the holocausts of death, and the militia operates on the basis of a long-term survival plan. This indicates that the recruitment of children in Yemen is an assassination of their future. According to the "Taylor and Francis Group," the main reasons for the involvement of Yemeni children in the ongoing war may include: ideological background, cultural, social, financial, educational, and political factors, but the factors differ in terms of strength and influence, and these reasons can be summarized as follows:

Before the start of the Yemeni crisis and during the rule of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, the recruitment of children was an essential thing in the government forces, and in those days, the defense sector was one of the most stable state institutions, as it provided fixed salaries. For this reason, many Yemeni families were changing the birth certificates of their children to be over the age of 18, so that they could register in the army and receive salaries, yet the children at that time did not engage in any hostilities.

Weak laws put in place to prevent child recruitment - such as the aforementioned Juvenile Welfare Law and the Child Rights Law - have failed to deter perpetrators by imposing and enforcing concrete penalties.

The war caused the destruction of vital infrastructure, which led to the destruction of livelihoods, including those that depend on agriculture and fishing systems, which worsened the economic situation, and for this reason the war economy and industries related to this field became one of the most important sources of income in Yemen. That is why the majority of child soldiers in Yemen come from poor families and areas and are lured with money. Through a mixture of coercion, solicitation of salaries and propaganda, children are recruited, easily lured through the promise of a salary of 20,000 Yemeni riyals (about \$80), accommodation, and daily supplies of "QATT" (a stimulant when chewed), tobacco and other benefits. The salary makes the child feel that he will be in a better economic position and will be able to transfer some money to his family and thus improve his economic situation as well.

In addition to the cultural traditions and norms that associate carrying arms with prestige and power even when it comes to children, there is also a tendency in Yemeni culture to perceive a 15 or 16-year-old as an adult and no longer a child, at which age individuals are expected to work, especially if they are already married, and were victims of the practice of child marriage.

The great collapse of the education system, the suspension of hundreds of schools, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of students from them due to the war, and the forced thousands of families to accept the conscription of their children as a way to improve their lives and secure new sources of income in light of the high rates of poverty and unemployment and the increase in the number of displaced persons to more than 3 million people, most of whom are children and women who are missing for the family and source of livelihood.

The tyranny of violent and hateful discourse, the infatuation of adolescents in and outside schools with death and killing, the glorification of war and fighting through chants and school cultural programs, the introduction of classes that glorify war slogans and symbols, the dissemination and consolidation of convictions and ideas that undermine peace and coexistence and destroy common denominators.

The overall results showed that among the five categories of factors influencing the armed recruitment of children, educational factors were the most effective and received the highest scores. It has been found that economic factors have a significant impact on the entire country and have achieved the second most effective factor in child recruitment. It was also revealed that the three influencing factors were politically oriented. The social factor played a vital role due to the absence of family, society, agencies and human rights organizations to warn the innocent and fight for their rights. The destruction of the tribe>s structure made the children easy prey for the militia. The culturally oriented factor proved that the Yemeni tribe was used to carry weapons for the activities of the tribe and conflicts. Consequently, the militias were forcing innocent people to participate in the war, and then the overall results of the data analysis revealed that a combination of factors led to the armed recruitment of children in the ongoing war in Yemen. However, it was finally concluded that education-related factors have greatly affected children who are recruited into armed conflicts and wars.

Another factor that influenced this recruitment is that Yemeni social customs and traditions associate carrying arms with prestige and power, including when it comes to children. There is also a tendency in Yemeni culture to consider someone who is 15 or 16 years old as an adult and is no longer a child. At this age individual are expected to work, especially if they

are married (victims of the practice of child marriage). Laws put in place before the conflict to prohibit child recruitment, such as the aforementioned Juvenile Welfare Act and the Child Rights Act, have been found to be very weak because they fail to deter perpetrators by imposing and enforcing concrete penalties.

Journalists in Yemen have reported in recent months seeing boys between fourteen and sixteen with rifles and pistols fighting for the Houthis and other armed groups. One of them described seeing a seven-year-old boy carrying a military assault rifle at a Houthi checkpoint in Sanaa. Two local activists following the case in Amran city told Human Rights Watch that, 50 kilometers northwest of Sanaa, they saw up to 30 child soldiers. In one of the Houthi centers there, among them are some boys as young as 12 years old.

In March in Amran, Human Rights Watch interviewed the two activists, a Houthi recruiter, and seven boys, the youngest of whom was 14. The boys said they had fought or performed other military missions for the Houthis over the previous year. The boys agreed that they had volunteered, but four of them then left the Houthis for various reasons. Two of them were wounded in the fighting.

The recruiter, who was in his late 30s, told Human Rights Watch that he had been active in recruiting children for the Houthis in Amran for over a year. He said children without military training do not participate in actual fighting, but rather take on guard roles or carry ammunition and food to front-line fighters. They also return dead and injured fighters and provide first aid.

The recruiting official said he had intended to return to the front with two of the child soldiers, one 14 years old, the other his nephew. The nephew told Human Rights Watch that he joined the Houthis in May 2014 and is currently an armed guard. He was wounded in the chest last July during fighting between the Houthis and the 310th Yemeni Army Brigade, but the wound has healed.





authority, so it appointed the brother of the group's leader, Hussein al-Houthi, as Minister of Education. It is on educational activities. According to the 2019 report of the Group of Experts, witnesses provided additional information on the Houthis> recruitment methods as well as their indoctrination methods in schools. The report added that another method used to recruit children is "indoctrination." In public and private schools, officers give regular lectures to children about "the lieutenant."

One mother told the Group of Experts that she had nightmares about the future of her son, who saw with other children in his class in Sana'a pictures of dead children, dismembered, who used to encourage them to fight.

The Group of Experts received a first-hand account of a former teacher who was arrested because he refused to mobilize youth and cooperate in a campaign to recruit children in Amran. According to the witness, the Houthi armed group has 2028).

Since 2016, and specifically after cuts in teachers' salaries in September 2017, the Houthi Mobilization Committees at the governorate level worked with officials of the Ministry of Education to pressure school principals and teachers and oblige them to integrate the Houthi ideology and propaganda activities for recruitment in schools in the governorates of Sana'a, Raymah, Dhamar, Sa'ada, Amran and Hajjah with the appointment of Houthi volunteer teachers and mobilization committees strengthened their control over schools. Recruitment and propaganda activities took place more regularly. It includes manifestations of weapons and speeches by al-Houthi, including members of the mobilization committees or an official of the Ministry of Education who referred to the «duty and responsibility of students to participate in the war.» It turned out that the recruitment messages were gendered with boys being exclusively targeted rather than girls as future front line fighters.

SUMMER CENTERS ARE A GROTESQUE EXPLOITATION OF CHILDHOOD INNOCENCE

 The Houthi group announced, through the statement of the leader, Hussein Al-Ezzi, that it took over the policy of mobilizing children in summer centers, as the number of recruits reached 620,000 youth and children. Al-Ezzi confirmed that the number of enrollments exceeded the expected by 220,000, and that the capacity of the summer centers is 720,000.



The Houthis have set up summer camps to spread their religious culture and fighting beliefs to enlist boys. Where these camps are established in areas controlled by the Houthi group in complexes around schools and mosques in northern and central Yemen and in the capital, Sana>a. Where four workers in different relief organizations commented that they noticed that the Houthi group intensified its recruitment campaigns in recent weeks. The Houthi ranks were thinned by losses on the battlefield, especially during a nearly two-year battle for control of the important city of Marib. Aid workers spoke on condition of anonymity, fearing for their safety, and said their groups might be prevented from operating in Houthi-controlled territory. Where the rebels put pressure on the children's parents to send their children to these camps, where the focus is on teaching them how to deal with weapons and plant mines, in return for obtaining services, including food rations, from international organizations. One aid worker working in the remote northern regions described seeing children as young as 10 at checkpoints along the way, Kalashnikovs slung over their shoulders. Others are sent to the front line. He said the children had returned injured from the fighting in Marib.



- Human Rights Watch conducted a number of interviews with a number of those who
 joined the Houthi camps and confirmed that the beginning of recruitment centers on
 teaching children the «Zaidi Shiite» doctrine for a period of no less than a month,
 followed by joining a combat training camp in one of their bases scattered around
 the country. The children confirmed that they did not receive any wages, but they did
 receive food and Qaat, a plant commonly used by the right as a stimulant. Most had
 brought their own weapons—military firearms are common among Yemeni families—
 but they were supplied with ammunition.
- Sameer, 15 years old, told his family that he would join the fighting fronts months after he joined the summer centers organized by the Houthi group, only to be received by his family after a short period of time as a lifeless body. Recruitment campaigns continue in most parts of the right, as all parties to the Yemeni conflict are involved. In his interview with DW Arabia, Samir>s father who preferred not to reveal his identity explains that the beginning was with the family>s approval for her son to join the «summer centers» during the annual school vacation period, to learn religious lessons and other courses and activities that attract the interest of boys, and upon his return to his family. The influence of the concepts and lessons he received was evident in his behavior, leading to his expressing his desire to join the «front», for «jihad for the sake of God» and «defending the homeland».
- Although Samir>s father and mother refused at first to recruit him, with the passage of time, his poor family>s anxiety subsided, as he would return to them every few months and give them money to help them provide some household needs. This situation did not last long, as the last time he returned to his family dead, and with his body was a picture in a frame on which his name was written as a «martyr», so that his family would hang it on the walls of the house.
- The Iran-backed Houthis organized a huge graduation party for thousands of children who joined the summer camps on August 17 of 2021, as the party was organized in densely populated areas under their control. The largest celebration was held in Sana>a, where hundreds of children, their relatives and Houthi officials came to watch the graduating children show off their skills.
- For 45 days, the Houthis claim, children were taught, trained and «immunized from false cultures.» But Yemeni government officials and rights activists have accused the group of using the camps to indoctrinate Yemeni children with sectarian ideologies and anti-Semitic propaganda, before sending them to the battlefields. "These camps prepare children and adolescents to be part of the war machine," Mr. Ahmed Al-Qurashi, Director of the SEYAJ Organization for the Protection of Children, told Arab News: These camps prepare children and adolescents to be part of the war machine." During the ceremonies held in Sana>a, Saada, Hajjah, Hodeidah and Al-Bayda, children in military uniforms showed their fighting skills and chanted slogans condemning the United States and Israel, and taking responsibility for starting the war on Yemen.

COERCION AND KIDNAPPING

The Houthi group forced tribal elders who have social influence to mobilize children to participate in summer camps in order to prove their loyalty to the group in areas under Houthi control. In many cases, children were kidnapped without their parents knowing, as the team of experts confirms in the report that the children were kidnapped and forced to join the Houthi fighters, and in other cases the group of experts noted that the children either followed their fighting family members or individuals associated with the forces, after training programs ideology. In other cases, children were participating with the Houthis to help their families financially, as witnesses confirmed that in every neighborhood there are people working to lure children to join armed groups. In Sana>a, these people are members of the popular committees or claim to be members of the popular committees, which the de facto authorities have reported are officially part of the Houthi armed group. According to the report of the Group of Experts for the year 2020, paragraph (262), in poor areas in Sana>a and provincial capitals such as the city of Dhamar, kidnapping was a way to recruit some boys by Houthi supervisors. In some of the 11 verified cases, boys were kidnapped. For those who joined after accepting financial offers, their families, unaware of their whereabouts, considered the children kidnapped.

Peers and Friends

According to many sources, the Houthis were exploiting their children or relatives> children to recruit other children of their age, and cases of recruitment continued for the recruited boys> brothers or their cousins, one after the other, to avenge the death of one of his relatives, or to earn a similar salary. In an interview conducted with (A.N.), a 15-year-old from Al-Hawk District in Al-Hodeidah Governorate: where he said: The Houthis were active in schools, including my school, where Houthi educational supervision department used to come frequently to the school to attract students and recruit them. They also participated in the events organized by the school, such as celebrations of support for the Houthi group and the birth of the Prophet Muhammad, and many other events. I was one of the participants in these activities, which prompted a member of the Houthi group to approach me and try to recruit me, as this person was called «Abu Qaher», where he recruited me in the Directorate's Security Department, where he told me that he admired me for my enthusiasm while chanting the group's slogans.

The child added: I continued to go to the Houthi Security Department in the region, where I worked as a special escort for the supervisor in all his security campaigns, as I recently obtained a military number, which is a chain bearing a specific number that is linked in the palm of those who join the Houthi group., In addition, they gave me What is known as the «certificate of entering heaven». After I was given a military number, I initially dropped out of school, and became a recruiter of wishes despite my young age, as that was in March 2020. And he continued, "After that, I joined the training, where I was trained to carry weapons and use them, and how to attack, withdraw and storm, as I was one of the initiators in carrying out the tasks assigned to us, and I took the initiative to perform the cry and announce it in any place or occasion, even in mosques after the prayer, or before and after the sermon. Not only did I work in Al-Amniyat and the protection of points, but I also participated in military operations on the fronts of the governorates of Al-Jawf, Al-Hodeidah and Marib, until I was captured by the Yemeni army. My family was able to get me out of captivity, and now I live with my family in one of the displacement camps in Marib Governorate."

EVERYONE IS INVOLVED

The long period of time of the war led to the participation of all parties in the recruitment of children in varying proportions, as most of the military formations in Yemen became operating within an illegal framework, and sought to recruit the largest number of participants for their benefit in order to achieve their goals by any means possible, even if those methods were illegal, and reports have been documented These experts share their reports as follows:

1. The Houthi group

Experts note that the recruitment of children by the Houthis continues from the period covered by the report (September-September 2014 until June 2019). Where the team of experts monitored 12 cases of child recruitment under the age of twelve, as the Houthi group recruited children and involved them in fighting operations at checkpoints and planting explosive devices and mines in the governorates of Aden, Amran, Saada, Sana>a and Taiz in the period from 2015-2018. According to the information received, at least four of these children, aged 14-16 years, participated in hostilities, and one child at the age of 12 was used as a laborer in lifting materials. The report confirmed that of the 3,034 children who were recruited during the war in Yemen, 1,940 (64 percent) were recruited by the Houthis in May 2019. During the Battle of Aden in 2015, eyewitnesses reported seeing child soldiers with the Houthis in and around Aden. For example, one of the witnesses said that children were guarding checkpoints in the areas of Al-Houta and Zanzibar, and according to the sources, some children were recruited from the same areas. In 2016, in Taiz, Houthi fighters were reportedly recruiting and using children on the battlefield. For example, a 13-year-old child recruited in Amran was arrested by pro-government forces in Taiz.



In December 2017 and through 2018, the Houthis used children during battles in the Bayhan (Al-Bayda) region, in Shabwa and in Al-Dhalea. In December 2017, the Houthis withdrew from the Bayhan region, and children were among the victims, and dozens of children were arrested. In another case documented by the Panel, a child porter under the age of 15 who supported the Houthis was arrested by the Yemeni armed forces and transferred to Marib.

During this report and its previous reports, SAM documented dozens of incidents confirming the use of children by children during the battles they fought against government forces, including:

The child Saif (a pseudonym), 13 years old, "We were in the school (Al-Ghadeer School). The Houthis came to the school and told us that they would show us a demonstration against Salman and ISIS on Al-Masirah TV, so we went with them, but they took us a long distance to an area called Al-Nagfa in Saada. There we were trained to bear arms and to do strenuous physical exercises for a long period of about 7 months, when we were 25 children. After that, I returned to my family for a week, and at the end of the week the Houthis came again and took me to the Nehm front. There I worked supplying the fighters with ammunition and food. We used to climb the barricades, hide behind them, and crawl down. One day, my 15-year-old colleague, Ali, wanted to get off the barricade. He stood up and received a direct bullet in the forehead. and fell dead in front of me. After three months on the Nehm front, I returned

home, and my family sent me with my brother, bride to Marib, and I did not return after that.

The child Abd al-Malik (a pseudonym), 15 years old, from Ibb Governorate / Al-Sabra, says, "My friends (Saadoun) and I used to go daily to eat Qaat with a group of Ansar Allah fighters, and when Ramadan came, we stopped going for the first three days. On the fourth day, the Houthis came to the shop where we were and took us against our will and brought us to Camp Hamza, and there they trained us to carry weapons and do many physical exercises, and if we were late or short they would beat us or shoot us near us, and after training they transferred us to the Hamak front between Ibb and Al-Dhalea, and there I fought for five months. After that, I returned to my village armed, and no one could beat me as it was before. They began to fear me." He added, "I remember from the front, we killed a lot of donkeys, the resistance used to put a lamp on the donkey and shoot it in the valley, and we used to seize any light, and whenever the morning came, we discovered that we had killed a donkey, after the killing of the leader, my big brother took me against my will and brought me to Marib, I am now in the line Ninth, the school year will end soon and I will return to fight with the Mujahideen of Ansar Allah.

The child Mujahid (a pseudonym), who is 12 years old, was displaced from Saada Governorate to Amran Governorate in the second war that took place between the Yemeni army and the militias, as the father of the child was sick and disabled due to a mine explosion that caused him to lose his

leg and arm. The militias attracted many children when they took control over Amran Governorate, The child "Amjad" was affected by seeing other children carrying weapons, so he wanted to follow the example of these children and told his mother that he had found a job and that he would start working from tomorrow, but his mother raised her doubts and was not reassured and said I work instead of you, but he chose the time of dawn to flee from the house with Children who had been persuaded of the necessity of jihad and weapons, his mother and his family woke up to the news that he had gone with the Houthi group, as he joined the Houthi militia in January 2020, only to return dead in May 2020, amid grief for his family and neighbors.

The child Saad (a pseudonym), 17 years old, from the village of Bani Hour, Maswar Amran district, is an orphan whose father and his family consist of a mother, a brother and two sisters. He left school in the ninth grade, his mother cried of grief when she learned that her son had left them and gone with the Houthi group. She went to look for him in the Houthi centers in the city of Amran and did not find him, and she cried more when Saad>s colleagues came with his seat number to prepare for the ministerial exams in August 2020, but they did not find him, as they told his mother this is your son's seat number for the exams a week later. On the second day, specifically on August 16, 2020, the news of her son's death spread, confirming his mother's intuition that he would not return home and would not be tested in the Elementary certificate.

The child Sakhr (a pseudonym), 14 years old, from the governorate of Ibb / Al-Hazm, was recruited by the supervisor of the Houthi group (Jamal Al-Hamiri) and sent to the battle fronts, where he was taken and lured with a pension and weapons while he was still studying in the sixth grade. He was taken with three other children They were taken to Dhamar in preparation for their transfer to the battle fronts as part of the Houthi group's ongoing campaign to recruit children. According to the witness, Hussain (a pseudonym) for the "SAM" organization, he testified that "he saw them taking the child Sakhr to be recruited by the Houthi group, and he and a group of his sons were taken. The region to supply the fighting fronts in Dhamar.

The child Hamza (a pseudonym), 12 years old, from the Al-Asakrah region - Jabal Ras - Al-Hodeidah, was recruited by the supervisor of the Houthi group called "Muhammad Abdul Hafez Al-Ghabban" (Abu Najran), the deputy supervisor of the directorate, nicknamed (Abu Karbala), where the victim and his brother Saif were recruited by the Houthi supervisor, Muhammad Abdul Hafez Al-Ghabban, nicknamed (Abu Najran), among the many children who were recruited, whether by enticement, as part of promises to

pay monthly salaries or intimidate the victims and their families under the name of fighting ISIS, as they promote. The victim was forcibly recruited without the permission of his parents, and he received training and preparation in one of the militia training camps, and the victim is still present at the Dabbas front. He was taken by the deputy general supervisor of the Houthis, and he was trained with the militias and brought him to the battle fronts in the Dabbas front to fight ISIS, as they say, because of poverty, need, fear and terrorism on the other hand."


The child Ali (a pseudonym), 15 years old, from the Soudin - Kushar - Hajjah neighborhood, who was recruited by the supervisor of the Houthi group in the region and called «Jalal Muhammad Daakum» (Houthi Mobilization), In the details of the kidnapping of the child «Qassam», according to the testimony of the two witnesses to the incident, the child is studying in the eighth grade and has left the village to work and help his parents. When he crossed from the first Houthi military point, they disembarked him from the car and took him to an unknown location. After a follow-up by his family, they discovered that he was in a prison, the room inside it contained dozens of prisoners, after which he was released for a short period, then they took him again to sectarian courses, and he is still kidnapped by al-Houthi. The witness, «Abdul-Khaleq», a pseudonym, told the «SAM» team that «while he was passing through the Sudin checkpoint of the Houthi group, he saw a group of passengers aboard a Helix car, and the point intercepted them and took the child (Qassam) off the car and took him with them.»

The child Qasim (a pseudonym), 15 years old, from the village of Al-Makharesha Bani Nof, Al-Modan District, M. Imran, left the classroom at Al-Jeel Al-Jadeed School in Al-Modan and went to attend a cultural course after receiving temptations and promises of employment in the Central Security Forces. This was on 12/18/2017, and he sat in Sana>a for about a week and did not communicate with his family, then he moved to Dhamar Governorate for training and was promised that he would not go to the front. After a week of training in a deserted and unknown place, he was sent with about 15 children and a group of young people to Sana>a Governorate (Dabua, Nihm district), After that, he was removed from the confrontation and sent to the rear, so that he could then flee and escape until he returned to his country and decided not to believe any Houthi or supervisor and returned to his study seat. He was threatened not to speak or disclose the secrets of Ansar Allah, and if he did, he would be killed.

2. Government forces are complicit in the crime

- Despite the difference in the use of children in military actions by the
 parties, where the Houthi group leads the list in terms of the percentage
 and number of recruited children, government forces with all their
 factions participated in this crime, and the Group of Eminent Experts
 documented a number of incidents committed by government forces, as
 stated in the report of the Committee of Experts prominent of the year.
- In 2015 and 2016, the southern resistance recruited dozens of children in Aden. A former child soldier told the Group of Experts that groups recruited him at the age of 12. The child said that his father only allowed him to work at a checkpoint, and not to join the battle. The child said, "The checkpoint was located behind the front line, the front line is no more than 200 meters away from Agaba Road, where 10 of my friends took turns patrolling. On the same front line, 200 meters away, another 10 children have been deployed. Regarding his role, the child added, "My role was to search people's clothes and bags, especially women. Every day I heard shooting and felt explosions, but our checkpoint was not directly targeted. It was my responsibility to find collaborators and Houthis. On one occasion, a woman searched and found money and bombs, and the report adds that the team of experts received compelling evidence about the "forced" and "voluntary" recruitment of at least 27 children under the age of 13 by the Yemeni Armed Forces as well as by the UAE-backed Security Belt. the United Arab Emirates, the Giants Brigades, and the Shabwani Elite Forces, since 2017. Among these children are at least 22 children - some as young as 13 years old.
- They were recruited by the Security Belt and the Giants Brigades and were used in combat roles throughout the military campaign in Hudaydah in 2018. According to information gathered by the Group of Experts, five children died and five others were injured. Among the five children killed, a child was recruited at the age of 16. He was about to return home by the end of December 2018 as he received his salary and the parties agreed to a ceasefire, but the father of the child received his son's body on December 24. He was wounded with a 23 mm bullet in the stomach. The father told the team of experts about this experience: "My son was a dead body. The Tenth Brigade brought him to the hospital. I collapsed when the officer told me, "We belong to God and to Him we shall return, entrails (outside his stomach). It was December 24, 2018, and they were only able to retrieve the bodies on the third day, December 23, and only after the coalition had intensified airstrikes. He told me that my son died

- of bleeding and lack of attention. My son's fault was that he was born in a backward country, a country that does not know the value of children and does not respect their feelings. He was born in a country with militias and a corrupt government.
- Three child soldiers, aged 14, 15, and 17, were interviewed and recruited by the Security Belt and Giants Brigades as they reported that they participated in the attack in Macha, and then in the Hodeidah offensive. One of the interviewees mentioned the following: I never imagined that I would join the armed forces or the army. My dream was to become a teacher. When the Houthis fell, I decided to look for a job in any way to help my family with household expenses, prices rose, and my father>s salary was not enough. At the beginning of 2016, i decided to join, and my relatives helped me because most of them were in the army, and I was about 15 years old, i joined the army and went to training in Aden for 4 months.
- One of the victims, who was recruited in Abyan, at the age of 15, explained that the recruitment was done mostly by a person in the village responsible for such matters (who was not named), but he was also "urged to join the forces" by friends and relatives. The child was taken directly to the front line. He remembers it because it was his «first battle» and he saw many deaths.
- The Group of Experts interviewed three witnesses who told of the recruitment of a 14-year-old boy by the Shabwa Elite Forces in Shabwa in September 2018 as part of a conscription campaign. The child was killed in January 2019 during a raid on a village in Al Hajar, Shabwa Governorate. Sources reported that at least four children under the age of 16 were recruited by the Shabwa Elite Forces in January 2019.
- In February 2019, a 17-year-old boy, who was recruited early in 2018 in Taiz, was killed by a landmine near the northern border between Yemen and Saudi Arabia. His family told the Group of Experts that he was recruited through the Resistance Forces/Yemen Armed Forces, which he joined from Al-Hawban. The family informed the Group of Experts that the boy>s identity card clearly showed his age. Other sources told the Group of Experts that identity cards and birth certificates are being checked by the Yemeni armed forces.



The following are the locations of the camps according to the governorates, and a description of the work in which they are practiced:

Locality	Specialization
Farms in Al-Arj area, Al-Duha district, north of Al-Hodeidah governorate	Training of the naval forces (frogs), whose mission is to manufacture naval boats and booby-trapping sea lanes and coasts. It is used as a storehouse for naval missiles and Scud missiles. Training children to use weapons and perform combat missions.
Farms in the Ebal area in the Bajil district, east of Al Hodaydah Governorate	A camp dedicated to pedestrians to train children coming from some governorates, namely; Sana'a, Al-Raymah, Dhamar and Al-Mahweet. It is used as a weapons storage and missile launch bases. There is a room for operations and information gathering.
Bura Reserve, east of Al Hodaydah Governorate	Training children coming from the various directorates of Hodeidah. It is used as a storehouse for weapons and missiles, and contains a missile launch base.
Al-Mowasalat Street in Al-Hodeidah Governorate	Training children coming from other camps to reinforce the fronts at home.
Camp 48 in Al-Sawad district in the capital, Sana'a	Training for children from the areas around the capital, Sana'a, or those coming from other governorates. Strengthening the fronts, especially the border front.
A camp in the Al-Naqfa area of Saada governorate	Training children alongside other recruits. Doctrinal educational courses. Supplying the fronts with fighters.
Al-Hamza camp in lbb governorate	Training children alongside other recruits. Doctrinal educational courses. Supplying the fronts with fighters.
Al-Iman University in Sana'a	Receiving recruits, including children. strengthening the fronts.
The sports stadium in the city of Dhamar	Receiving and training recruits. Doctrinal educational courses. Support the fronts.
Shaoub Hosh Political Security + Shaoub area, next to the military police headquarters in the capital, Sana'a	Training and educational courses. Distributing them to Dhamar governorate for courses and training for a period of two months, and then distributing them.



Harf Sufyan area + Shawaba area towards Al- Jawf in Amran Governorate.	Reception and training. Distribution on fronts according to demand.
"Qaa al-Haql Dawran Anas" camp, west of Dhamar, in the Dawran district. On the borders of Sana'a governorate. (It is a large valley that was disputed between the tribes before it was seized by a group group led by Major General Abd al-Latif al-Mahdi al-Mu'een who sells the fourth military region under the authority of the Houthi group.	Reception and training distribution on the fronts
Al-Sammad Brigade in the Al-Hada district, east and north of the city of Dhamar, the outskirts of the Al-Hada district from the eastern side, in the Bani Saba region, which belongs to the fourth district of the Houthi authorities.	Reception and training. distribution on the fronts.
The site of Bani Asaad is located in the Jabal Al Sharq district, Anas, the isolation of Bani Asaad, west of the governorate, Madada Al-Haimah and Bani Matar. Sana'a Governorate	Reception and training. distribution on the fronts.
Dharan camp, west of the governorate (a valley located between Jabal al-Sharq and Atma). Beside Al Madbaa Village.	Reception and training. distribution on the fronts.
Hammam Ali, the center of Al-Manar Anas Directorate, located to the west of the provincial capital, highlighting the supervisors of child recruitment in Dhamar Governorate	Reception and training. distribution on the fronts. Recruits mobilized.
Jairah camp is located in Jabal Al-Sharq district, Anas, west of the governorate, between Al-Sharq city and Bajil, Al-Hodeidah governorate	Reception and training. distribution on the fronts. Recruits mobilized.
Riyam camp in Rada'a, Riyam area is several villages whose residents are all from families loyal to the Houthi group, and it is considered the human stock of the Houthis in Rada'a	Reception and training. distribution on the fronts. Recruits mobilized.

These camps, which are established successively by the Houthi group, contribute to training children in field fighting, booby-trapping operations, and all types of weapons used in wars.


THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR RECRUITING

It is not possible to talk about a lasting and sustainable peace in Yemen without looking at accountability, including the Elementary principles of accountability and respect for the rights of victims to truth, justice and reparation.

Yemen desperately needs to activate this principle in accordance with the various legal and judicial mechanisms, in order to provide justice to the victims and prevent the recurrence of these atrocities in the future. This applies to the crimes of child recruitment in Yemen during the conflict period.

according to the legal description that applies to the recruitment of children, which is described as amounting to a war crime, with the availability of a number of circumstances surrounding these attacks, such as their systematic nature, in addition to the desire for intentionality and mobilization in their practice, and the presence of many indications of orders to be committed by senior leaders and those in command, combatants, and provide the conditions, places and means for their commission.







Abd al-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi, leader of the Houthi group (Ansar Allah)

He was born in the Dahyan region of Saada Governorate in 1979. He is the youngest son of the spiritual leader of the Houthi movement. Badr al-Din al-Houthi, who was one of the most prominent jurisprudential references in the Zaydi school of thought in Yemen before the man converted to the Jarudi school of thought. It is not mentioned that he obtained a scientific degree in formal education in its three stages, as he received religious education from his father. He worked as a personal companion to his brother Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi during his membership in the House of Representatives, and after the killing of his brother Hussein on September 10, 2004 during the Houthi war with the Yemeni army during the rule of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Abd al-Malik assumed the leadership of the group, and his name was mentioned in this capacity during the rounds of war in Saada.

He continued to lead his group in multiple wars in Al-Jawf, Amran, and Hajjah, and he practically directed the fighters of his group to invade the capital, Sanaa, and take control of state institutions in September 2014, and he is primarily responsible for all sectors of his armed group, and all leaders receive orders directly from him, as he actually leads his group in Its armed conflict with the government forces, and in the northern Yemeni borders with the Saudi forces. According to all the data studied by SAM, he is primarily responsible for the attacks committed by snipers against civilians. His television speeches often include support, guidance, and motivation for fighting and military mobilization against what he describes as mercenaries, in reference to government forces fighters and civilians residing in areas under the authority of the Yemeni government.



Muhammad Ali Abdul Karim al-Houthi, head of the Supreme Revolutionary Committee

This committee issued the so-called Constitutional Declaration of the Houthi group in February 2015, four months after the group took control of the capital, Sanaa, and its





Stability. Muhammad al-Houthi manages the Revolutionary Committee, from which revolutionary committees branch out in the governorates headed by supervisors, and these are the ones who actually control all military and security arrangements in the governorates controlled by the Houthi forces. Muhammad al-Houthi is actually responsible for the sniper attacks committed by the Houthi forces, where the man meets with the military leaders He visits military areas and gives orders and directions.

Abu Ali al-Hakim (Abdullah Yahya al-Hakim) is the head of the Intelligence Service at the Houthi Ministry of Defense

Field commander of the Houthi forces since early during the six Saada wars, and led the Houthi forces to invade the capital, Sana>a. The Houthi group appointed him in December 2015 as the commander of the fourth military region, under which a number of governorates fall, including the governorates of Aden and Taiz, and in August 2017 he was appointed chief of intelligence in the Ministry of Defense. Al-Hakim is considered responsible for the sniper attacks committed by his group>s forces, especially the attacks launched against civilians in Taiz, especially since he acted as the de facto commander of the military operations in Taiz.

His name was included in the sanctions list imposed by the UN Security Council in April 2015 for his major role in the invasion of the capital, Sana>a, and the control of state institutions.

Mahdi Al-Mashat, head of the Supreme Political Council

He hails from the Haydan district of Saada governorate. He worked close to the leader of the Houthi group in managing military affairs, and was the leader of his office. After the invasion of the capital, Sanaa, he represented the Houthis in a number of negotiations. A few days after the killing of Saleh al-Samad, the group appointed him head of the Supreme Political Council on April 23, 2018. He is He continues to lead him until now. He has great authority in managing the military affairs of the Houthis and is responsible, ex officio, for sniper attacks committed by his group's fighters.



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Al-Mahdi hails from Saada Governorate and participated with the Houthis in fighting government forces since the six Saada wars. He commands and manages military operations in Taiz Governorate, where Taiz is located within the framework of the military region led by Al-Mahdi. The Supreme Political Council appointed him as commander of the fourth military region, as a successor to Abdullah Yahya. Governor in April 2017.

He is considered primarily responsible, by virtue of his military position, for the attacks launched by his fighters against civilians in Taiz Governorate, especially the sniper attacks.

Hmmoud Ahmed Dahmash, Staff of the Fourth Military Region War

He worked as a commander of the 22nd Mechanized Brigade since 2013 by a decision issued by Yemeni President Hadi, and after the Houthis invaded Taiz, he continued his work as a commander of the brigade, receiving his orders from the leadership of the Houthis and Saleh forces. The forces of the 22nd Mechanized Brigade actively participated in the fighting in Taiz. He was appointed by the Political Council as Staff of the Fourth Military Region in April 2017. Hmmoud is considered responsible ex officio for the sniper attacks committed by the Houthi-Saleh coalition forces, and subsequently by the Houthi forces, against civilians in Taiz.

Muhammad al-Sharafi is a leader in the Houthi group

He is responsible for attracting children in the old quarters of Sana'a, especially in the neighborhoods of: Al-Fulaihi, Al-Alamy and Dawood, where he continues to attract children and school students and deceives them and sends them to fight in the ranks of the group, where he lured children with fake promises such as registering them in social care, and paying an amount of 15 thousand riyals for each child send them to the fronts.

Aidaroos Qassem Al-Zubaidi (member of the Presidential Leadership Council, head of the Southern Transitional Council)

Appointed on April 7, 2022 as a member of the new Presidential Leadership Council, Vice President Abd Rabbo







Mansour, and he is still the head of the Transitional Council that was formed in May 2017 with Emirati support, after the decision to remove Al-Zubaidi from his position as governor of Aden. The Security Belt forces are considered the military arm of this council to achieve the goals it set. He is responsible for the independence of southern Yemen from its north, and he is de facto responsible for the sniper attacks launched by the security belt forces against civilians, especially in the clashes that took place between these forces and government forces in the city of Aden during the year 2018, as well as the attacks launched by his forces during their ongoing war with Government forces in Abyan Governorate.

Ali Mohsen Saleh al-Ahmar (Yemeni Vice President)

The former Vice President of the Republic was appointed by the Yemeni President as his deputy in April 2016. The man enjoyed wide influence in the military establishment, and also enjoyed the support and approval of Saudis, which enabled him to win the loyalty of most government military leaders, and he actually handles the military file related to the fighting and the battles waged by the forces. government, especially in the governorates of Marib, Al-Jawf, Saada, Shabwa, Taiz and Al-Bayda. He is considered responsible for recruiting a number of children into the ranks of the forces by virtue of his job and the actual influence he enjoys in the government forces.

Muhammad Ali al-Maqdashi (former Minister of Defense)

The former Minister of Defense was appointed to his position in March 2018, more than three years after the Houthis detained former Defense Minister Mahmoud Al-Subaihi, as the position of the Ministry of Defense remained vacant until the appointment of Al-Maqdashi filled it. Prior to his appointment to this position, he had been the Chief of Staff of the Yemeni Army since May 2015. The man commands the Ministry of Defense, and he is responsible by virtue of his position for issuing directives related to managing battles for government forces, and the commanders of government military regions are under his authority. With his





executive function in the leadership of the government forces, he is responsible for the sniper attacks launched by his forces against civilians.

Taher al-Aqili and Sagheer Hammoud bin Aziz (Chiefs of Staff of the government forces)

Chiefs of Staff of the Yemeni Army since September 2017 Taher Al-Aqili and Sagheer Hammoud bin Aziz; Where Taher Al-Aqili was appointed Chief of Staff of the Army and continued in his position until November 8, 2018, and Abdullah Al-Nakhai was appointed in his place, who continued in this position until February 28, 2020, and Sagheer Hammoud bin Aziz was appointed, as he is still in his position at the time of writing the report. The army staff official is considered the second man in the Ministry of Defense, and he is the actual commander of the military forces, and they enjoyed great powers in directing the battles, and by virtue of their position they are responsible for recruiting children into the ranks of the government forces.

Abdul Rahman Sheikh Al Yafei

A Salafist cleric, he was entrusted with the task of establishing the security belt forces in the city of Aden, and he is considered the actual leader of these forces. He is a member of the Supreme Council of the Southern Transitional Council, and he was chosen as part of the delegation of the Transitional Council in the Riyadh negotiations with the Yemeni government. He often works in the shadows, and had prominent roles in the armed clashes that his forces fought with government forces in 2018, and he is considered the actual engineer of the fighting that is currently taking place between his forces and government forces in Abyan governorate since early 2019, and he is responsible for recruiting children into the ranks of the forces Security belt.

Wadah Omar Abdul Aziz Al-Subaihi

He is considered the field commander of the security belt forces in the city of Aden since their formation until September 2019, when those forces made changes in their leadership, so he was appointed commander of the security belt forces in Lahj governorate. He is considered responsible for the sniper attacks that his forces committed against civilians, especially in the fighting that broke out between them and between government forces in Aden in 2018.

SIDE EFFECTS OF CHILD RECRUITMENT

The repercussions of child recruitment, if not dealt with carefully and comprehensively, will negatively affect the psychological, intellectual and educational future of children in Yemen, especially in the absence of rehabilitation centers, and the continuation of the rhetoric of mobilization and mobilization by the parties to the conflict, and it has been observed that many child soldiers return again and again to fight, Local media groups claim some of them have returned three times. The increasing militarization of Yemen's youth in the context of the conflict may become one of the factors affecting the possibility of conflict erupting again in the future, even if peace is achieved in the short term. However, comprehensively addressing child recruitment today will help reduce the chances of a return to conflict.



On the other hand, the war contributed to a serious deviation in the psyche of children, and caused the emergence of serious crimes in some areas such as Amran, Dhamar, Ibb, and Hajjah. The organization keeps a number of them, especially after the children return from the combat fronts, and their absence for months in internal camps receiving intensive intellectual courses.

The recruitment of children in the war in Yemen is not only a Elementary human rights issue; It is also a profound peace issue. No society can achieve peace by turning its children into soldiers. Therefore, any potential political agreement or negotiation to end the conflict in Yemen must include a clause prohibiting the recruitment and use of children in any form of hostilities. The UN and other stakeholders should then establish monitoring procedures to identify individuals and groups that violate such an agreement. The international community needs to play a more proactive role by imposing sanctions against officials and individuals responsible for child recruitment.

All armed groups in Yemen should refuse to send children into combat or use them to support the fighting, says Fred Abrahams, Special Adviser at Human Rights Watch, because the price these youngsters pay "trauma, injury and lost education" is enormous, equal to the price cut from Yemen's future.

The recruitment of children in Yemen left many serious and gross violations against children, represented in killing and maiming, as the use of children in fighting at the hands of armed forces or groups left many children killed on the battlefields, although there are no accurate figures for the number of children killed in battles. However, a UN report showed grim statistics that the number of child victims of the Yemen war rose to 11,000, including more than 3,700 dead, while the number of child soldiers increased to about 4,000, including 91 girls. "For children, life has become a struggle for survival," said Kathryn Russell, Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), after a visit to Yemen this month. "Thousands of lives have been lost, and hundreds of thousands more are still at risk of death."

Kidnapping of children, or deceiving them to fight without the knowledge of their families, is one of the cases that were monitored in the Yemeni war, especially by the Houthi group, where cases of kidnapping of children were investigated by supervisors affiliated with the Houthi group or tribal sheikhs, and their parents were not cursed for it until after they were killed On the battle fronts, where the facts indicate that kidnapping was used as a Houthi tactic to force children to join their fighting forces.

The child Osama, 12 years old, from a village in Sana'a governorate, was recruited by Houthi activists from his village, who lured him with weapons and money, and incited them to fight the Americans. The child confirms to Sam that they were trained in camps, mostly for children.

Training camps are located on farms and mountain reefs. SAM says: "When we reach the coast, our eyes are covered and they take us to the headquarters of the Houthi supporters, and from there they take us to farms, where we receive educational courses, and during the session no one can go out, and whoever wants to go out or contact his family threatens him with what is called "pressure" It is a closed room in a house used to punish offenders.

The child Saleh, a 14-year-old pseudonym, from Sana'a governorate, was recruited by the Houthi group. His father says:

"My son was captured by the Houthi militia without my knowledge, after they lured him with weapons and took a training course, but he was thrown into the battle front in Ma'rib Governorate in July 2015. I searched for him everywhere, but unfortunately I did not find him, and I asked everyone I knew from the Houthi Supervisors but no one answered me, and after his capture, about five months, I heard the news of his killing, I asked them to bring his body, and I did not get it, and I wished to see my son's body, but the answer was: It was buried in the Jihana cemetery of the Houthis."

The child Saif, "a pseudonym," 15 years old, from Al-Hodeidah Governorate, western Yemen, was recruited by the Sharia forces. One of his relatives tells SAM:

"The child Talha is one of the victims of recruitment carried out by the legitimate forces in February 2016, in Ma'rib governorate, after they took him from his home and among his mother and brothers. His father died while fighting on the side of legitimacy against the Houthi militia in AlJawf Governorate in 2014, and after Talha received some training in Marib Governorate, he was transferred to the border directorate of Midi, within the force of the 82nd Infantry Brigade, where he moved with two of his

cousins. In September 2016, the Houthi and Saleh militias attacked the sites where this brigade is stationed in the Midi district, and they captured Talha and one of his cousins and killed the other. Talha was tortured and his confessions were recorded and published on the Houthi-affiliated Al-Masirah channel, then the Houthis transferred him to the central prison in Sana'a, and on 29/8/2017, Houthi soldiers severely beat him because he asked for water for ablution, and Talha is still languishing in one of the cells of the central prison in Sana'a".

The participation of children in wars also contributed to violent psychological trauma that caused them to drop out of education, or some suffered from psychological conditions and diseases from which they suffered from lack of sleep and seeing nightmares that needed treatment in the absence of psychological rehabilitation centers for children for the post-war period.

One of the relatives of the 16-year-old child, "J-Q-M" from the Al-Daber area in the city of Amran, has passed away. He is studying in the eighth grade, Al-Fouz Elementary School, in Al-Daber, Amran District. was «c. S «who gave birth to students and excelled in his studies and organized and morally, With the passage of days, his level of education began to gradually decline, and it was also noted that he was absent from school until the day came when he stopped attending school completely. After that, Jaber's mother came to school crying bitterly because her son was absent from home for more than a month and that she learned after This is because he went with the Houthi group to the fronts. She said that her son had poisoned his thoughts and confused his mind, and he is the eldest of her children, and he helped her a lot because his father was incapacitated and bedridden. Jaber's disappearance continued until the date of the first semester exams for the academic year 2021/2022, as Professor "SH-F" one of the teachers at the school that «he saw Jaber on the first day of exams at the end of the year on Saturday, March 19, 2022 AD. It was remarkable that the student, Jaber, attended the exams after an absence of more than two months on the front lines, but he was completely different without passion or conversation with his colleagues".

In another interview with "A. D." 15 years old, from the Nehm district in Sana'a governorate, said: "My father belongs to the Houthi group, and he used to involve me in intellectual sessions with him, which made me influenced by the group's thought, as that was in 2018. After attending a number of intellectual and cultural courses for the group, the last of which was in February 2020, a person called "Abu Al-Karrar", who is from the same area as us in the Nehm district, took me to a special military course, where I learned how to disassemble and assemble weapons and use them, and plant mines and flight camouflage methods. He added, "They gave us

many intellectual and ideological lectures, which lasted for 5 months, and they took us to the group's celebrations in Sana'a, and we also discovered that they put pills in our soft drinks that we do not know what they are, but we felt energy when we consumed them, which prompted us to create chaos, because of our fear of the nature of these pills, which led to the expulsion of the supervisor who was supervising us. On one occasion, they gave me a financial reward of 20,000 riyals, equivalent to 25 dollars, and then they sent me to another educational course for 15 days, in which they taught us many "lieutenant" lessons, and they also took me to visit the graves of leaders of the Houthi group. And he continued, "After that, I returned to the "Al-Harib" front in a thirst for fighting. Our supervisor was "Abu Al-Karrar", where I fought for two full months without rest. In the end, I managed to escape from them through a relative of mine, and I returned to the home of my family, who had smuggled me for treatment to Hadramout, where I was suffering from nightmares and anxiety, and then they left me with my uncle in Ma'rib governorate.

In an interview conducted by the Euro-Med Monitor and SAM with Saeed Saleh Ali Falah, 15, from the Khawlan district in Sana'a governorate, he said: "In December 2019, while the educational process was suspended due to the interruption of salaries for teachers, some people affiliated with the Houthi group came to our house and told my family that they wanted to take me to take educational courses. I went with them and started taking courses that talked about fighting "aggression and mercenaries" (the forces of the Yemeni government and the Arab coalition), which I did not understand anything about, as it lasted for 10 days until I managed to escape. He added, "The Houthis were able to reach me again, as I was taken this time to the battle front and transport supplies and supplies." Being diligent in performing the tasks that were entrusted to me, the front supervisor "Abu Jihad" gave me a motorcycle, which I learned to drive quickly, and through which I transported food and "Qat" to the fighters on the fronts. The period of my conscription lasted for 5 months. My mission, morning - and evening, was to transport supplies, until one time I was involved in a traffic accident that led to the overturning of the motorcycle I was driving, which caused me injuries (fractures) at the level of the foot, as a result of which I underwent three surgeries in a hospital in Sana'a governorate. He continued, "After my treatment period ended, I returned home, but my family smuggled me to Ma'rib Governorate so that I would not be recruited again by the Houthis."



REHABILITATION PROGRAMS

The establishment of the King Salman Center, a center for the rehabilitation of children recruited and affected by the armed conflict in Yemen, according to the center's definition of the program, which is a qualitative Saudi humanitarian project, launched from the Ma'rib governorate in September 2017. It focuses on rehabilitating children recruited and affected by the armed conflict, returning them to their normal lives, and providing them with social support. Work on the project started on Saturday 9/9/2017, and the implementation of the project is still ongoing. According to the statistics published on the center's website, 530 children benefited from the project directly, and 60,560 children indirectly.

The team visited a center for the rehabilitation conflict-affected of children in Marib, which is the only center of its kind in Yemen and is provided only to boys. The team reported that between December 2019 and February 2020 the center hosted 20 children between the ages of 12 and 16 who had been recruited by Houthi forces in Saada, Amran, Ibb, Taiz, Sana>a, Hajjah, Raymah and Dhamar. The Houthis used these boys to bring supplies to the fighters, and some of them were directly involved in the fighting, and not all of them received a salary while working for the Houthis (Paragraph 149, p. 51, 2021 report of the Security Council's Yemen team)

RECOMMENDATIONS

First, the Houthi group

- 1. Immediately stop recruiting children and exploiting them in hostilities, as this poses a great danger to their lives and future, and a gross violation of their rights guaranteed in relevant local and international conventions and norms.
- 2. Close all camps and mobilization centers that are used to mobilize children intellectually and motivate them to fight.
- 3. Stop the media discourse and educational institutions, whether in school curricula or activities that glorify fighting and call for it.
- 4. Take responsibility for all crimes committed against children due to recruitment.

Second, the legitimate government

- 1. Immediately stop recruiting children and exploiting them in hostilities or security activities, as this may constitute a serious violation of international human rights law.
- 2. Issuing legislation that increases punishment for those involved in recruiting children and using them in hostilities.
- 3. Opening rehabilitation centers for children involved in the fighting before returning them to their families and reintegrating them into society.
- 4. Investigate all those involved in child recruitment crimes.

Third, the international community

- The Security Council should refer the issue of child recruitment in Yemen to the International Criminal Court, as it is a war crime under the Rome Statute governing the court.
- 2. We call on the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict to conduct a comprehensive first-hand assessment of child recruitment.
- 3. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights should take mandatory measures to stop the recruitment of children in Yemen by strengthening the role of its field offices.
- 4. The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child should take appropriate measures to ensure the implementation of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which is related to the involvement of children in armed conflict, which Yemen has ratified.
- 5. The Yemeni government should treat child prisoners in accordance with relevant international protocols, involve them in special rehabilitation programs to get rid of the effects of the war, and facilitate their integration into society.



REPORT APPENDICES



Administrators Appendices

Name	Characteristic
Abdul Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi	Houthi leader in Yemen
Muhammad Ali Al-Houthi	Member of the Supreme Political Council
Muhammad Badr al-Din al-Houthi	The most prominent founders of the believing youth movement
Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-Houthi	Reserve Commander
Abdullah Yahya Abdullah al-Hakim	Head of the Military Intelligence Authority
Mahdi Muhammad Al-Mashat	Chairman of the Supreme Political Council
Yahya Badr al-Din al-Houthi	Minister of Education
Ali Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi	Rescue Forces Commander
Mohammed Saleh Al Nuaimi	Member of the Supreme Political Council
Ahmed Ghaleb Al-Rahwi	Member of the Supreme Political Council
Youssef Hassan Ismail Al-Madani	Commander of the Fifth Military District
Abd al-Latif Hammoud al-Mahdi	Commander of the Fourth Military Region and Head of the Joint Operations Room
Muhammad Nasser Al-Atifi	defense minister
Muhammad Abdul Karim Al-Ghamari	Chief of Staff
Abdul Karim Akbar Al-Din Hussein Al- Houthi	Interior Minister
Ahmed Dirham Houria Almoayyed	President of the Islamic Forum
Abdul Majeed Abdul Rahman Hassan Al- Houthi	Chairman of the General Authority for Awqaf, Secretary General of the Islamic Forum
Abdullah El-Shazly	Assistant Secretary General of the Islamic Forum
Kahlan Al-Sadh	Undersecretary of the General Authority of Awqaf for the financial sector
Mohammed Jahaf	Undersecretary of the General Authority for Awqaf
Qassem Al-Hamran	Deputy Minister of Education
Jalal Ali Al-Ruwaishan	Deputy Prime Minister for Defense and Security Affairs
Ahmed Mohamed Hamed	Director of the Office of the President of the Republic
Abdul Mohsen Abdullah Qassem Tawoos	Secretary General of the Supreme Council for Coordination and Management of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooper- ation
Shamsan Abu Nashtan	Chairman of the General Authority for Zakat
Mohammed Al-Ayani	Undersecretary of the General Authority for Zakat
Ali Al-Saqqaf	Undersecretary of the General Authority for Zakat
Abdul Salam Hashulzabia	Vice President of the House of Representatives
Abdullah Al-Kibsi	President of the People's Foundation
Ahmed Magali	Undersecretary of the Zakat Authority for the awareness and rehabilitation sector
Khaled Yahya Mohammed Al-Madani	Member of the Shura Council



Name	Characteristic
Muhammad Hussein Abdul Rahman Muhammad al-Houri	Member of the Shura Council
Ahmed Mohamed Hazaa Baalawi	Member of the Shura Council
Ahmed Al-Hassan bin Al-Hussein, the prince	Member of the Shura Council
Muhammad Hussein Majd al-Din al-Muayyidi	Minister of Tourism
Yahya Muhammad Ali Al-Mahaqri	Minister of Youth and Sports
Abdul Majeed Al-Murtada	Ansar Allah Political Bureau
Amer Ali Amer Al-Marrani	Deputy Minister of Interior
Ibrahim Ahmed Ahmed Al-Houthi	Minister of Transport
Hashem Muhammad Hashim Al-Shami	Chairman of the Board of Directors of CAC Bank
Dr. Abdullah Muhammad Muhammad Al-Shami	Deputy Minister of Communications
Abdul Hamid Al-Moayad	Member of the Political Bureau of Ansar Allah
Ahmed Mohamed Hussein Al-Zakari	Inspector General of the Ministry of the Interior
Hussein Hammoud Dirham Al-Ezzi	Former Adviser to the Ministry of Awqaf
Haneen Muhammad Abdullah Saleh Qattina	Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Aziz Al-Hatfi	Governor of Al Mahwit Governorate
Ahmed Yehia Madas	First Undersecretary of Al-Mahweet Governorate, supervisor of the Houthis in the governorate
Ibrahim Al-Zain	Director of Security in Al-Mahweet Governorate, Director of the Education Office in Al-Mahweet Governorate
Faisal Ahmed Qaid Haider	Governor of Al-Jouf Governorate
Abd al-Latif al-Mahdi	Commander of the Fourth Military District
Saleh Al-Hajeb	Assistant commander of the 4th military district, deputy
Muhammad Abdullah Abu Mahdi	Commander of the Central Military District
Ali Muhammad Al-Kahlani	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Human Resources
Riyad Balthy	Director of Intelligence in the Fifth District
Hilal Muhammad Al-Shami	Head of the Division of Orientation in the Fifth District
Muhammad Ali Qadri	Director of the Naval College
Hashem Ismail Ali Ahmed	Central bank governor
Ahmed Muhammad Ali Al-Shutari	Head of the IRS
Mahmoud Abdel-Qader Abdullah Al-Ju- naid	Deputy Prime Minister
Hamdan Ahmed Al-Shami	Former Deputy Minister of Education
Yahya Abdullah Aida Al-Ruzami	Commander of the Hamedan Axis
Abdul Karim Yahya Abdullah Al-Haifi	Advisor to the Ministry of Education
Ghada Muhammad Ali Ahmed Abu Talib	Chairman of the National Women's Committee
Saleh Al-Khawlani	Undersecretary of the Ministry of Endowments and Guidance
Magdy Abdo Ismail Al-Hasani	Hodeidah Governorate Deputy

Name	Characteristic
Fadel Abu Talib	Member of the Political Bureau of Ansar Allah
Hezam Muhammad Yahya al-Assad	Member of the Political Bureau of Ansar Allah
Abdul Wahab Al-Washli	Member of the Political Bureau of Ansar Allah
Ali Al-Qahoum	Member of the Political Bureau of Ansar Allah
Abdullah Hashem Al-Sayani	Member of the Political Bureau of Ansar Allah
Muhammad Shoukah	Member of the Political Bureau of Ansar Allah
Abdullah Al-Nawari	Houthi supervisor in Taiz Governorate
Salah Abdul Rahman Abdullah Bagash	First agent, Taiz governorate
Ali Al-Ezzi	Head of the Mobilization and Mobilization Committee, Taiz
Ahmed Al-Masawy	Director of the Humanitarian Affairs Council
Hilal Abdo Ali Hassan Al-Sufi	Taiz, Governor of Hajjah Governorate
Brigadier General Naef Abdullah Abu Kharfasha	Houthi supervisor in Hajjah
Yahya al-Khashab	Deputy Superintendent of Hajjah Governorate
Abdul Malik Abdullah Nasser Jahaf	Hajjah Governorate Deputy
Muhammad Ali Ghalib al-Qadi	Hajjah Governorate Deputy
Emad Al-Qadi	Commander of the Najda Branch Forces, Hajjah Governorate
Abdo Amer	Deputy Director of Hajjah Governorate Security
Nabil Hussein Ahmed Al-Jarb	Hajjah Governorate Deputy for the Tihama Districts Sector
Ibrahim Ahmed Abdullah Al-Hamli	Hajjah Governorate Undersecretary for Security Affairs
Brigadier General Saleh Al-Qadi	Chairman of the Mobilization and Summons Committee, Hajjah
Taha Abdullah Muhammad Ahmed Al- Hamzi	Hajjah Governorate Deputy
Mutahar Safieddine	Director of the Martyrs Foundation Hajjah branch
Qassem Ali Kawara	Assistant Director of Hajjah Governorate Security
Muhammad Ayash Qahim	Governor of Al Hudaydah Governorate
Ahmed Mahdi Al-Bishri	First Undersecretary of Hodeidah Governorate
Hadi Al-Kahlani	Director of Security, Hodeidah Governorate, Director of the Hodeidah Martyrs Foundation Branch
Ali Al-Shathami	Director of the Humanitarian Affairs Council Branch, Hodeidah
Jaber Al-Razhi	Director of the Hodeidah Zakat Authority Branch, Mufti of Hodeidah Governorate
Jamal Abdul Wahid Al-Hamiry	Director of the Education Office, Al-Hadidah
Muhammed Muhammed Mari	Vice President of Dar Al-Uloom Al-Sharia University
Omar Bahr	Governor of Dhamar Governorate
Ali Adabi	First Undersecretary of Dhamar Governorate
Muhammad Nasir Qaid Al-Bukhaiti	Dhamar Governorate Security Director
Fahd Abdul Hamid Al-Marwani	Commander of the Rescue Forces Branch, Dhamar Governorate
Ahmed Abdullah Al Sharafi	Secretary General of the Capital Municipality
Essam Al-Ghaili	Security Director of the capital, Sana'a
Hammoud Muhammad Hammoud Abbad	Governor of Saada Governorate



Name	Characteristic
Ali Al-Saqqaf	Saada Governorate Deputy
Mohamed Harash	Saada Governorate Security Director
Muhammad Jaber Awad	Governor of Amran Governorate
Yahya Al-Hamran	Director General of the Health Office Imran
Aziz Garaab	Director of the Branch of the Council for Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation, Omran
Faisal Jamaan	Amran Governorate Deputy
Mohammed Mujahid Al-Houthi	Security Director of Amran Governorate
Hameer Al-Sa'ar	Commander of the Central Security Branch, Amran Governorate
Abdul Aziz Abu Kharfsha	Head of the Military Intelligence Division Imran
Abdullah Hussein Al-Khudair	Governor of Sana'a Governorate
Hussein Ahmed Al-Nimri	Sana'a Governorate Security Director
Nayef Al-Wari	Director General of Youth and Sports, Sana'a
Abdul Basit Al-Hadi	Houthi supervisor in Ibb Governorate
Yahya Almoayyed	President of the Ibb Governorate Court of Appeal
Abdul Mohsen Al-Sharif	Commander of the Najda Branch Forces, Ibb Governorate
Al-Qadi Abdul Aziz Al-Sufi	Director of the Zakat Authority Branch, Ibb Governorate
Yahya Mohammed Al Hayas	Houthi supervisor in Dhamar Governorate
Majid Al-Tineh	Executive Director of the Bonyan Development Foundation
Fadel Al Sharafi	Deputy Executive Director of the Bonyan Development Foundation

Crowd centers in summer centers

#	The name of the place	The district	The directorate
1	Imam Ali bin Abi Talib School	Al-Qal'aa	Razih
2	Abdullah bin Rawaha School	Shaaban	Razih
3	Al-Hassan bin Ali School	west of Al-Azd	Razih
4	Al-Hurriyya Complex	Al-Madinah	Haydan
5	Al-Fath School	Bani Amr	Saqin
6	Al-Fouz School	Al-Madinah	Saqin
7	Al-Wadi School	Wadi Al-Hubbal	Saqin
8	Imam Ali bin Abi Talib School	bin Humaidan	Al-Hashwah
9	Al-Hurriya School	Al-jarasheb	Al-Hashwah

8	Sooq Al-Khamees school	Al- Khamees		Arhab	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
9	Abu Nashtan Center	Bawsan	Shaker	Arhab	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
10	Al-Khadraat School in Makareeb	Al- Makareeb	Shaker	Arhab	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
11	Al-Thawrah School	Bait Al- Rameem	Bni Suliman	Al-Hemah Al-Dakhilyah	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
12	Al-Falah School in Wadi Al-Ma'enah	Al- Ma'enah	Bni Suliman	Al-Hemah Al-Dakhilyah	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
13	Al-Najah School	Al-Sabt	Bni Bajeer	Al-Hemah Al-Dakhilyah	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian women's summer centers
14	Al-Nasser School	Bni Dahman	Bni Suliman	Al-Hemah Al-Dakhilyah	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
15	Tariq bin Ziyad School	Bait Abdul- Haq	Al- Mekhlaf	Al-Hemah Al-Dakhilyah	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
16	Al-Furqan Center - Bani Walid	Bani Waleed	Bni Waleed	Al-Hemah Al-Dakhilyah	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
17	Aldar Center	Al-Daar	Bni Yousef	Al-Hemah Al-Dakhilyah	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
18	Al-Hussein Bin Ali School	Zabeen	Bni Al- Nemri	Al-Hemah Al-Dakhilyah	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
19	Al-Nahzah School	Al-A'ar	Al-Hadb	Al-Hemah Al-Dakhilyah	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
20	Bahkah & al-Sharaf School	Bahkah	Bni Al- Nemri	Al-Hemah Al-Dakhilyah	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian women's summer centers
21	Center Imam Zaid bin Ali in Al-Said	Bait Al- Khetabi	Bni Amr	Al-Hemah Al-Dakhilyah	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
22	Imam Hassan bin Ali Center in Al-Nakhlah	Alnkhlah	Bni Amr	Al-Hemah Al-Dakhilyah	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
23	Al-Fouz Center, Beit Al-Ghaithi	Bait Al- Ghathi	Bni Amr	Al-Hemah Al-Dakhilyah	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
24	Beit Al-Dheeb Centre	Bait Al- Deeb	Bni Amr	Al-Hemah Al-Dakhilyah	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
25	Martyr Leader Center in Douqur	Dawqar	Bni Amr	Al-Hemah Al-Dakhilyah	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
26	Imam Hussein Center in Yaar	Ya'er	Bni Amr	Al-Hemah Al-Dakhilyah	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
27	AL-Hajar Center	Al-Hajar	Bni Al- Seyagh'	Al-Hemah Al-Dakhilyah	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
28	Imam Hussein Bin Ali School			Belad Al- Rous	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
29	Asaad Al Kamel School	Ghayman	Wadi Al- awast	Bani Bahloul	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers



#	The name of the place	The district	The directorate
10	Wantta Dayiqat Alhazzam Forum	Dayiqat Alhazzam	Al-Hashwah
11	Al-Falah School	Dahyan	Majz
12	Al-Zahraa School	Dahyan	Majz
13	Al-Saeed Complex	Al-Madinah	Al-Madinah, Saada
14	The Headquarters	Qern Al-Beir	Saqin
15	The seat of Al-Marazem	Al-Marazem	Saqin
16	The seat of Al-Talahum	Qahza	Al-Madinah

Recruitment sites for the Houthi group Al-Bayda Governorate

1	Khawla Bint Al-Azwar School	Al-Arsh	Al-Baydaa	Centers for mobilizing and recruiting children and holding courses
2	Abu Al-Rejal School	Rade'	Al-Baydaa	Centers for mobilizing and recruiting children and holding courses
3	Al-Methaq School	Al-Reyashiah	Al-Baydaa	Centers for mobilizing and recruiting children and holding courses
4	Omar bin Abdul Aziz Secondary School	Thi Na'em	Al-Baydaa	Centers for mobilizing and recruiting children and holding courses

Sana'a Governorate

#	Summer center name	The village		Directorate	Governorate	Violation type
1	College of Education - Arheb	Sooq Al- Jame'a	Shaker	Arhab	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
2	Al-Soudah School			Arhab	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
3	Al-Fateh School, Beit Al-Ward	Bait Al- Worood		Arhab	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
4	Al-Fateh Qatwan School	Qatwaan		Arhab	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
5	Al-Nour School	Bait Al- othri	Sha'eb	Arhab	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
6	Bani Azzan School	Bni Azan		Arhab	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
7	Bait al-Jarrah School	Bait Al- Jarrah		Arhab	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers

52	Martyr Muhammad Hussein Fara School			Bni Matar	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
53	Martyr Samad School	Khrrabat Maheeb		Bni Matar	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
54	Abbas School			Bni Matar	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
55	Martyr of Al-Wehdeh School	Bait AlTaweel		Bni Matar	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
56	Al-Rasoul Al-A'zam School	Al- Masajed	Shehab Asfal	Bni Matar	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
57	Martyr Leader School	Bait Kahen		Bni Matar	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
58	Matnah center	Matnah		Bni Matar	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
59	Da'er Martyrs School	Da'er		Bni Matar	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
60	Martyr Mutahar Al- Mistaa School	Bait Asllah		Bni Matar	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
61	Al-Jawazah School	Al-Jawzah	Wadi Al- Ajbar	Sanhan	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
62	Al-Siyani School	Seyan	Al-Sharqi	Sanhan	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
63	AL-Methaq School	Dar Selm		Sanhan	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
64	Bait Mas'oud School	Mas'oud	Al-Sharqi	Sanhan	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
65	Wadi Al-Fourat School		Wadi Al- Fourat	Sanhan	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
66	Ali bin Abi Talib School	Hazeer		Sanhan	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
67	Al-Falah School	Bni Me'sar	E'yal Mansour	Naham	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
68	Abi Al-Hassan Al- Hamedani School	Dala'		Hamdan	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers



30	Budaiya School	Bait Watr		Bani Bahloul	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
31	AL-Salam School	Anaqah	Wadi Janah	Bni Bahloul	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
32	Al Samh Bin Malik School	Bahran	Wadi Al- awast	Bni Bahloul	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
33	Martyr Saleh Hamedan School	Ghayman	Wadi al- Ajbar	Bni Bahloul	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
34	Al-Falah School	Dajjah	Wadi Janah	Bni Bahloul	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
35	Al-Lajjam School	Al-Lajjam	Wadi al- Ajbar	Bni Bahloul	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
36	Bait Al-Hamami School	Bait Al- Hamami		Bni Bahloul	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
37	Saif bin Dhi Yazan School	Bait Aqeb	Wadi Janah	Bni Bahloul	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
38	Omar bin Al-Khattab School	Bait Aqeb	Wadi Janah	Bni Bahloul	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
39	Anaqah School	Anaqah	Wadi Al- awast	Bni Bahloul	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian women's summer centers
40	Wadi Janah School	Sarfah	Wadi Janah	Bni Bahloul	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
41	Al-Hussein Bin Ali School	Al-Rawnah	Al- Rawnah	Bni Hashesh	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
42	Ali bin Abi Talib School	Al-Sharyah	Thi Marmar	Bni Hashesh	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
43	Zaid Bin Ali School		Thi Marmar	Bni Hashesh	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
44	Al-Wehdah School	Bait Radm		Bni Matar	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
45	Al Salam Complex, Al Jadbi House	Bait Al=- Ja'dabi		Bni Matar	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
46	Health Center in Waqsh	Waqsh		Bni Matar	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
47	Martyr of Al-Harf School			Bni Matar	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
48	Al-Saloula Martyrs School			Bni Matar	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
49	Zine El Abidine Ben Ali School	Sooq Al- Amaan		Bni Matar	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
50	Hadran Martyrs School			Bni Matar	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers
51	Martyr Tariq Salman School			Bni Matar	Sana'a Governorate	Establishing sectarian summer centers

#	School Name	Stage	Directorate	Region
27	Al-Eman	Elementary	Hubur Zalimih	Al-Madinah
28	22 May	Secondary Elementary	Hubur Zalimih	Al-Madinah
29	Al-Tadamun	Secondary Elementary	Harf Sufyan	Al-Madinah
30	Al-Nahdah	Elementary	Harf Sufyan	Al-Madinah
31	Ali Bin Abi Talib	Secondary Elementary	Harf Sufyan	Al-Madinah
32	Al-Hasan Al-Hamdony	Secondary	Ridah	Al-Madinah
33	26 September	Elementary	Ridah	Al-Madinah
34	Om Salamah	Secondary Elementary	Khamr	Al-Madinah
35	Muhamad Ajlan	Elementary	Khamr	Al-Madinah

Saada Governorate

#	Name of the Place	Region	Directorate
1	Imam Ali bin Abi Talib School	Al-Qal'a	Razih
2	Abdullah Bin Rawaha School	Sha'ban	Razih
3	Al Hassan Bin Ali School	Gharbi Al-Azd	Razih
4	Al-Horyyah Complex	Al-Madinah	Hedaan
5	Al-Fateh School	Bni Amr	Saqeen
6	Al-Fawz school	Al-Madinah	Saqeen
7	Al-Wadi School	Wadi Al-Habbal	Saqeen
8	Imam Ali bin Abi Talib School	Bin Hmaidan	Al-Hashwah
9	Al-Horyyah School	Al-Jarasheb	Al-Hashwah
10	Wantah Deqat AL-Hezam Forum	Deqat Al-Hazem	Al-Hashwah
11	Al-Falah School	Dahyan	Majz
12	Al-zahraa School	Dahyan	Majz
13	Al-Saeed Complex	Al-Madinah	Saada
14	Headquarters	Qern Al-Beir	Saqeen
15	Headquarters	Al-Marazem	Saqeen
16	The seat of tribal cohesion	Qahzah	Al-Madinah



Amran Governorate

#	School Name	Stage	Directorate	Region
1	Alkhayr	Elementary	Amran	Bait alfaqih
2	Alarshad	Secondary Elementary	Amran	Al-Makhabi
3	Bakri Martyr	Elementary	Amran	Jawlah Al- Masana'e
4	Alhamza	Secondary Elementary	Amran	Harat Al-Sultan
5	Harab Martyr	Elementary	Amran	Al-Jabubah
6	Shura	Elementary	Amran	Al-Jabubah
7	Al-Hussein Complex	Secondary Elementary	Amran	Harat Al-Husayn
8	Al-Methaq	Elementary	Amran	Al-Hadbah Al- Sharqia
9	Al-Farouq	Secondary Elementary	Amran	Hejaz
10	Al-Salam	Elementary	Amran	Amran
11	Al-Nahzah	Secondary Elementary	Jabal Yazeed	Al-Ashmur
12	Al-Sedeeq	Secondary Elementary	Jabal Yazeed	Bait Badi
13	Al-Abbas	Secondary Elementary	Jabal Yazeed	Al-Khadrah
14	Al-ershad	Elementary	Thala'	Al-Abraq
15	Al-Qadesiah	Secondary Elementary	Thala'	Bait Alman
16	Al-Naser	Secondary Elementary	Thala'	Bni Al-Abas
17	Al-Ta'awn	Elementary	Ashmor	Halmlam
18	Zain Al-Abedeen	Elementary	Ashmor	Al-Shahel
19	Al-Shahid Al-Sammad	Secondary	Maswar	Bait Ath'aqah
20	Th'i Al-Nuwryen	Secondary Elementary	Eial sarih	Sahab
21	Al-Fateh	Elementary	Eial sarih	Bni Maymon
22	Ali Nahshal	Secondary	Eial sarih	Qahal
23	Al-Nour	Secondary Elementary	Alquflah	Al-Madinah
24	Al-Hikma	Elementary	Alquflah	Al-Madinah
25	Al-Emam Ali	Secondary	Alsuwdah	Al-Madinah
26	Al-Nahdah	Secondary Elementary	Hubur Zalimih	Al-Madinah

School of Imam Ali bin Abi Talib in Ozlaat Al-Wasat
Al-Ashtar Center in the Educational Complex in Al-Mawah
Zahraa Center generation school
September 21 Center, Al-Hada School
Martyr Al-Sammad Center in the complex
Summer Hajf Center in Nimrah
Haffash Directorate
Martyr Sammad School
Al-Huda School
Al-Sumoud Braud School
Zahra Center
Malhan District
Martyr Commander Hussein Bin Badr Al-Din Al-Houthi Center in Qazafa
Al-Imam Al-Hadi Center in Ozlaat Al-Rawdah
Al-Rajem Directorate

Amran

Names of summer centers in Amran Governorate for the year 2020			
School name	Stage	Directorate	Region
Alkhayr	Elementary	Amran	Bait alfaqih
Alarshad	Elementary - secondary	Amran	Al-Makhabi
Bakri Martyr	Elementary	Amran	Jawlah Al-Masana'e
Alhamza	Elementary - secondary	Amran	Harat Al-Sultan
Harab Martyr	Elementary	Amran	Al-Jabubah
Shura	Elementary	Amran	Al-Jabubah
Al-Hussein Complex	Elementary - secondary	Amran	Harat Al-Husayn
Al-Methaq	Elementary	Amran	Al-Hadbah Al-Sharqia
Al-Farouq	Elementary - secondary	Amran	Hejaz
Al-Salam	Elementary	Amran	Amran



Al-Mahweet Governorate

Shibam Directorate
Aisha Center In Ta'ziah
Resalty Center in Salaa
Al-Salam School in Al-Sarha.
Summer Center at Al-Majd School in Al-Aara
Center in Al Wahda Complex- Nata'
Center in (7) July School, Beit Qira
Center at (7) July School, Beit Qira
Center at Khaled Beit Mufreh School
Center at Al-Mithaq School, Wadi Ghazwan
Center at Al-Nour School, Beit Khamis
Imam Al-Qasim Al-Rassi Center, Al-Fateh School, Duqa
Imam Ali bin Abi Talib Center, Ozlat Al-Ahjar, Al-Mahjar Center
Imam Zaid bin Ali Center, peace be upon them, in Abu Nashwan Complex
Imam Hassan bin Ali Center, peace be upon them both, in Al-Awael School
Imam Hassan Center, Al-Badr School
The school of Mrs. Zainab, peace be upon her
Martyr Leader School in Ozlat Al-Arqoub
Imam al-Hadi- Ozlat Al-Gharbi Al-Ala
Al-Madinah Directorate
Imam Zaid bin Ali Center, peace be upon them both, in Al-Nour School, Hijrat Al-Dawaer
Martyr Ammar Ibrahim School
Al-Durra Martyr Center
Al-Khabt Directorate
A center at the 21st September school in Ozlaat Abs
A center at the Martyr Abu Haider Al-Hamzi School in Ozlaat Jaba'

#	Directorate	The name of the person responsible for recruiting	Function
2	Al-Hawk Al-Hali	1- Khaled Sereen 2- Ahmed Al-Rabsi 3- Ali Baaleh -¹ Muhammad Youssef Ghallab -ˇ Ali Baghawi -ˇ Salem Fetini -ʻ Nabil Al-Jabri -° Abdullah Al-Badj	Citizen of the village of Rabsa Citizen of the village of Rabsa Citizen of the village of Rabsa The son of Saddam's village servant Servant of Al-Najdeh village Servant of Al-Khamseen village Al-Najdah Village Al-Najdeh Village
3	Al-Mena'	Ayman Salah	Officer at the Naval College
4	Al-Merwa'ah	Saif Yahya outside	Republican Guard officer
5	Bajel	-\ Muhammad Ali Musa -\ Ali Abu Talib -\ Abdul Rahman Hebatallah Al-Rami -\ Muhammad Bari Qayyim -\ Muhammad Asiya -\ Sheikh Hussein is miserable -\ Ali Muhammad Qudam -\ Salem Fetini -\ Abdul Karim Al-Ansi -\ Muammar Yassin Al-Ghariqi -\ Khaled Al-Yamani -\ Yahya Al-Yamani -\ Abu Saddam	Village servant Ex-Central Security officer Naval officer Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of the Houthi group in the district A village servant and an employee of the water corporation Clan leader Teacher School manager Teacher Teacher School manager Teacher A former soldier, a servant of the village
6	Al-Hajelah	- \ Abdul-Majeed Al-Habri - \ Abdullah Muti'in - \ Abdu Haija Khouzam	
7	Bare'	1- Muhammad Yaghnem 2- Ali Yghnem	
8	Al-Dahi	1- Sheikh Muhammad Ibrahim Al-Qadimi	Clan leader
9	Al-Zaydeiah	- ¹ Abu Ashraf - ¹ Mujahid Ali Sagheer Shuail - ՞ Ayesh Hebah - ٤ Abu Yassin	Houthi leader from Hajjah governorate citizen citizen Houthi group supervisor from Hajjah governorate



Names of summer centers in Amran Governorate for the year 2020			
School name	Stage	Directorate	Region
Al-Nahzah	Elementary - secondary	Jabal Yazeed	Al-Ashmur
Al-Sedeeq	Elementary - secondary	Jabal Yazeed	Bait Badi
Al-Abbas	Elementary - secondary	Jabal Yazeed	Al-Khadrah
Al-ershad	Elementary	Thala'	Al-Abraq
Al-Qadesiah	Elementary - secondary	Thala'	Bait Alman
Al-Naser	Elementary - secondary	Thala'	Bni Al-Abas
Al-Ta'awn	Elementary	Al-Ashmor	Halmlam
Zain Al-Abedeen	Elementary	Al-Ashmor	Al-Shahel
Al-Shahid Al-Sammad	secondary	Msour	Bait Ath'aqah
Th'i Al-Nuwryen	Elementary - secondary	E'yal Sraih	Sahab
Al-Fateh	Elementary	E'yal Sraih	Bni Maymon
Ali Nahshal	secondary	E'yal Sraih	Qahal
Al-Nour	Elementary - secondary	Al-Qaflah	Al-Madinah
Al-Hikma	Elementary	Al-Qaflah	Al-Madinah
Al-Emam Ali	secondary	Al-Sawdah	Al-Madinah
Al-Nahdah	Elementary - secondary	Habour Dolaimah	Al-Madinah
Al-Eman	Elementary	Habour Dolaimah	Al-Madinah
22 May	Elementary - secondary	Habour Dolaimah	Al-Madinah
Al-Tadamun	Elementary - secondary	Harf Sofiyan	Al-Madinah
Al-Nahdah	Elementary	Harf Sofiyan	Al-Madinah
Ali Bin Abi Talib	Elementary - secondary	Harf Sofiyan	Al-Madinah
Al-Hasan Al-Hamdony	secondary	Reedah	Al-Madinah
26 September	Elementary	Reedah	Al-Madinah
Om Salamah	Elementary - secondary	Khomor	Al-Madinah
Muhamad Ajlan	Elementary	Khomor	Al-Madinah

10	Al-Meghlaq	Ghaleb Hamzeh	A leader in the General People's Congress Party
11	Al-Monerah		
12	Al-Qanawes	Ali bin Ali Al-Qawzi	Secretary General of the Local Council in Al Hudaydah Governorate
13	Al-Zahrah	Muhammad Hazaa	Houthi leader
14	Al-Lehyah	Muhammad Hazaa	Houthi leader
15	Al-Saleef		
16	Kamran		
17	Al-Dryhemi	1-Abdullah Asily 2-Shoaib Hammoud 3-Abdul Karim Muhammad Omar Maq-bool 4-Mohamed Ahmed Makresheb 5-Muhammad Jaber Obaid	Deputy Director of the Education Office in the Directorate Head of the Training Department in the Education Office in the Directorate Head of the Human Resources Department in the Education Office in the Directorate citizen
18	AL-Sokhneh	1-Muhammad Muhammad Ibrahim Al-Ahdal 2-Muhammad Omar Ghalain 3-Muhammad Hussain Sagheer Aqari	All of them are citizens who joined the Houthi group
19	Al-Mansoryah	Abdul-Razaq Qadeebah	Educational teacher
20	Bait Al-Faqeeh	1- Muhammad Mansur Abdullah 2-Ali Fatini Ghalib 3- Muhammad Muhsin Ghallab 4-Muhammad Ahmed Sagheer 5-Fadl Ajili 6-Mahmoud Ayash Ajili 7-Muhammad Omar Maqbool	The son of a member of Parliament in Abbasi Member of Parliament in Al-Sa'eed A relative of the Member of Parliament citizen citizen citizen citizen
21	Zbaid	1- Yahya Ghaleb Abbad 2- Bader Fahd Dahshush	
22	Al-Jarahi		
23	Hees	1- Muhammad Suleiman Hulaisi 2- Thabet Mohieddin	Member of the local council in the governorate A relative of Al-Halisi



24	Jabal Ras	1- Hassan Abdel-Alim Al-Malesibi 2- Abdo Daoud Al-Naddaf 3- Bahauddin Ali Hizam Al-Amrani 4- Muhammad Ahmad Quraiba
25	Al-TahtiYa	1- Mutahar Yahya Hussain 2- Ahmed Kenaid
26	Khawkhah	

Responsible for child recruitment during 2020 to 2022		
Governorate	Directly responsible for recruiting	
Hodeidah	Ahmed Razzaz Abdel Wahhab	
Omran	Ahmed Mohammed Al-Ghalisi	
Omran	Abu Tayour Muhammad Sah Noman	
Saada	The security official - Abdullah Nasir Naji	
Saada	Ali Gibran Farasha	
Saada	The crowd official in the region, Sadiq Hassan Al-Gharibi	
Нејја	Ali Nasser Jaber Al-Derini	
Hodeidah	Houthi supervisor Ahmed Razzaz Suhaib	
Hodeidah	Houthi supervisor Bahaa Ahmed Ali Hizam (Abu Karbala)	
Hodeidah	Houthi supervisor Muhammad Abdul Hafez Abu Najran	
Omran	Turki Salih al-Adani	
Hejja	Ali Abdullah Al-Qutib	
Mahwit	Abu Hussein Atef Al-Dhamari and Abu Ibrahim, Acting Director General of the Directorate	
Dhamar	Saleh Saleh Al-Khalqi	
Omran	Abu Salama al-Amdi	
Saada	Dhafer Muhammad Ali Gomaa	
Saada	Ibrahim Shaif Abokhalil	







THEY ARE STILL AT THE FIGHT

CHILD RECRUITMENT AND EXPLOITATION BY PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT IN YEMEN

JUNE 2023

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