



**SAM**  
Rights & Liberties



[www.samrl.org](http://www.samrl.org)

[info@samrl.org](mailto:info@samrl.org)

APR 2026

# The Cost of Stagnation

## 2025



**SAM**  
Rights & Liberties

About Us

## SAM Organization for Rights and Liberties

---

SAM is an independent, non-profit Yemeni human rights organization that began its activities in January 2016 and obtained a license to operate in December 2017. The organization aims to document human rights violations in Yemen, work to stop violations through advocacy in partnership with local and international organizations, raise human rights awareness through societal rights development, and hold human rights violators accountable in Yemen in collaboration with international mechanisms and human rights organizations.



<b>No.</b>	<b>Section / Sub-section</b>	<b>Page No.</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Executive Summary</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>Methodology</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>3.1</b>	Framework: Evidence-Based Monitoring	9
<b>3.2</b>	Data Collection Sources	9
<b>3.3</b>	Verification Mechanisms and Quality Control	9
<b>3.4</b>	Classification Standards and Legal Alignment	9
<b>3.5</b>	Constraints and Documentation Limits	9
<b>4</b>	<b>General Context</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>4.1</b>	Political Context	10
<b>4.2</b>	Security Context	11
<b>5</b>	<b>Geographic Focus Areas</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>5.1</b>	Distribution of the Most Affected Governorates (Table)	13
<b>5.2</b>	Capital Secretariat (Sana'a): Profile of Prevailing Violations	14
<b>5.3</b>	Ibb Governorate: Patterns of Killings, Property Violations, and Raids	14
<b>5.4</b>	Dhamar Governorate: Arrests and Detention Campaigns	14
<b>5.5</b>	Saada Governorate: Enforced Disappearance and Shelling/Field Impact	14
<b>5.6</b>	Al-Bayda Governorate: Blowing Up Houses and Intimidation	14
<b>5.7</b>	Taiz Governorate: Injuries, Sniping, and Landmines	15
<b>5.8</b>	Al-Hudaydah Governorate: War Remnants and Protracted Threats	15
<b>5.9</b>	Amran and Sana'a (Rural): Patterns of Local Militarization	15
<b>6</b>	<b>The Temporal Trend of Violations During 2025</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>6.1</b>	General Fluctuation and Monthly Peaks	16
<b>6.2</b>	Reading the Implications of "Seasonality" and Its Timing	16
<b>7</b>	<b>Affected Groups</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>7.1</b>	Civilians as a Proportion of Total Incidents	16
<b>7.2</b>	Children and Women: Indicators and Scale of Targeting	16
<b>7.3</b>	Notes Related to Gender and Age	16
<b>8</b>	<b>Classification of Violations</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>8.1</b>	General Introduction: Total Documented Incidents and the Cleaned Database	17
<b>8.2</b>	The Right to Life and Physical Integrity	17
<b>8.2.1</b>	Killing	17
<b>8.2.2</b>	Injuries	17
<b>8.2.3</b>	Shelling/Sniping/Landmines and Explosives	17
<b>8.3</b>	Assassinations and Torture	17
<b>8.3.1</b>	Assassinations	17
<b>8.3.2</b>	Torture Inside Places of Detention	17
<b>8.3.3</b>	Deaths in the Context of Detention	17
<b>8.4</b>	Arbitrary Arrest and Enforced Disappearance	17
<b>8.4.1</b>	General Characteristics and Method of Execution	17
<b>8.4.2</b>	Geographic Distribution and Indicators of Concentration	17
<b>8.5</b>	Public and Civil Freedoms	17
<b>8.5.1</b>	Raids and Storming Operations	17
<b>8.5.2</b>	Restrictions on Expression and Organization	17
<b>8.5.3</b>	Coercive Measures Inside Institutions	17

<b>8.6</b>	Economic and Social Rights and the Right to Property	18
<b>8.6.1</b>	Looting	18
<b>8.6.2</b>	Confiscation and Seizure	18
<b>8.6.3</b>	Closures and Extortion	18
<b>8.6.4</b>	Total/Partial Destruction and Blowing Up Houses	18
<b>9</b>	<b>Analysis of Patterns of Violations</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>9.1</b>	From Incidents to Trends	19
<b>9.2</b>	Qualitative Characteristics of the Most Serious Violations	19
<b>9.3</b>	The Implications of Repetition and Its Link to the Environment of Impunity	19
<b>10</b>	<b>Media Freedoms Violations (Detailed Section)</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>10.1</b>	The Journalistic Working Environment and Fragmentation of Authority	20
<b>10.2</b>	Patterns of Violations Against Journalists and Institutions	20
<b>10.3</b>	Censorship, Bans, Prosecution, and Defamation	20
<b>11</b>	<b>Arbitrary Arrest and Enforced Disappearance (Detailed Section)</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>11.1</b>	Scale of the Phenomenon and Its Operational Characteristics	22
<b>11.2</b>	The Shift from Arrest to Disappearance: Characteristics and Risks	22
<b>11.3</b>	Targeting UN Personnel and Humanitarian Organizations (Chronology of the Waves)	22
<b>12</b>	<b>Assassinations and Torture (Detailed Section)</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>12.1</b>	Assassinations: Context and Characteristics	25
<b>12.2</b>	Torture: Patterns and Mortality Indicators	25
<b>12.3</b>	The Closed Detention System and Its Risks	25
<b>13</b>	<b>Targeting Civilians (Detailed Section)</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>13.1</b>	Direct and Indirect Killing	26
<b>13.2</b>	The Impact of Airstrikes/Military Operations According to the Recorded Documentation	26
<b>13.3</b>	Landmines and War Remnants as an Ongoing Threat	26
<b>13.4</b>	Supporting Data on the Impact on Civilians (As Stated)	27
<b>14</b>	<b>Violations Against Property (Detailed Section)</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>14.1</b>	Raids and Storming Operations and the Damage Resulting from Them	31
<b>14.2</b>	Blowing Up, Destruction, and Social Consequences	31
<b>14.3</b>	Looting, Confiscation, Closures, and Extortion	31
<b>14.4</b>	Economic Impact, Livelihoods, and Displacement	31
<b>15</b>	<b>The Humanitarian Situation</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>15.1</b>	The Funding Gap and Its Impact on Response	32
<b>15.2</b>	Food/Health/Water/Protection: Features of Deterioration	32
<b>15.3</b>	Internal Displacement and the Continued Obstacles to Return	32
<b>15.4</b>	Child Protection	32
<b>15.5</b>	Education: Needs, Dropout, and Children Leaving School	32
<b>16</b>	<b>The Political File</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>17</b>	<b>The Military File</b>	<b>37</b>
<b>18</b>	<b>Responsibility and Accountability</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>18.1</b>	Methodology for Determining Responsibility (Direct/Omission to Protect)	43
<b>18.2</b>	De Facto Authorities in Sana'a	43
<b>18.3</b>	International Parties Connected to Air Operations (As Stated)	43
<b>18.4</b>	The Internationally Recognized Government and Allied Entities	44
<b>18.5</b>	Command Responsibility and Institutional Responsibility	44

<b>19</b>	<b>Judicial Response and National Mechanisms</b>	<b>45</b>
19.1	Complaint and Redress Pathways and Their Limits	45
19.2	Politicization/Obstruction of Justice and Its Impact on Victims	45
19.3	The National Commission of Inquiry: Role and Constraints	45
19.4	The Widening Gap of Impunity	45
<b>20</b>	<b>The Impact of Impunity on the Repetition of Violations</b>	<b>46</b>
20.1	How the Absence of Accountability Fuels Repetition	46
20.2	Requirements for Breaking the Cycle: Guarantees, Reforms, and Accountability Pathways	46
<b>21</b>	<b>Documented Cases: How a Pattern Turns into Policy</b>	<b>46</b>
21.1	Cases That May Amount to Extrajudicial Killings and Indiscriminate Attacks (1–6)	46
21.2	Deaths in Detention Potentially Linked to Torture or Ill-Treatment (7–8)	49
21.3	Arbitrary Arrest, Arbitrary Detention, and Enforced Disappearance (9–15)	49
21.4	Destruction of Property, Places of Worship, and Forced Displacement (16–18)	52
21.5	Collective Restrictions and Punitive Measures of a Collective Nature (19)	52
21.6	Assassinations and Extrajudicial Liquidations (20–21)	53
<b>22</b>	<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>23</b>	<b>Recommendations (By Responsible Party)</b>	<b>55</b>
23.1	De Facto Authorities in Sana’a (the Houthi Group)	55
23.2	The Internationally Recognized Yemeni Government, Local Authorities, and Security Services	55
23.3	The United Nations, Its Agencies, and International Humanitarian Organizations	56
23.4	The Security Council and International Partners	56
23.5	External Parties Carrying Out Airstrikes/Military Operations	57
23.6	Local Human Rights Organizations, Civil Society Organizations, and the Media	57



## Introduction

At the end of 2025, Yemen seemed to be emerging from a long year without emerging from its crisis. The loud voices receded, but the impact did not; the rhythm changed, not the direction. Year after year, layers of reality accumulated: a fragile economy, exhausted institutions, and a society searching for a minimum degree of stability, only to find it only temporarily, before it slipped from its grasp at the first turn.

The scene throughout this year could not be read from a single angle. The paradox is that a drop in the temperature of confrontation does not necessarily mean a drop in cost; rather, it may mean that the cost has shifted into spaces that are less visible and more closely bound to people's lives. In an environment where authority overlaps with influence, and where the logic of force prevails over the logic of rules, small details—the road, the school, the workplace, and the home—become keys to understanding the larger picture.

Hence the importance of documentation and analysis: not as a form of intellectual luxury, but as a necessity to protect meaning from being lost, to give incidents a context that explains them, highlights the dynamics behind them, and places them within a framework that helps assess the scale of risks and the limits of what is possible. When the gap between texts and reality widens, monitoring reality becomes a first step toward restoring a minimum measure of truth, in preparation for any serious course capable of halting deterioration and preventing its recurrence.



## Executive Summary

The report documents the outcome of 2025 as a year in which the crisis continued without a political breakthrough proportionate to the scale of suffering, and during which growing indicators of the deterioration of the general protection environment became visible. The data show that civilians remained the most affected group, whether through direct violations affecting life and safety, or through prolonged harms affecting family and economic stability and the ability to live in safety.

The findings indicate that the violations were not recorded as scattered incidents, but as trends showing a relative regularity in their temporal and geographic distribution, allowing what happened to be read as recurrent forms of practice rather than separate coincidences. A striking concentration also emerges in certain governorates in terms of density, with differences in the nature of the prevailing violations from one area to another, reflecting the diversity of patterns of control and local contexts.

The report records a dual impact of the crisis: an immediate impact evident in human losses and material damage, and a structural impact manifested in the erosion of trust, the decline in the sense of safety, the growing fragility of civic space, and the shrinking ability of individuals to access effective redress. The overall reading concludes that the absence of effective accountability remains a decisive factor in reproducing violations, and that any sustainable path toward reducing the human cost requires measures that go beyond temporary response toward protection guarantees and accountability mechanisms that prevent the recurrence of harm.



## Methodology

The report adopted an “evidence-based monitoring” methodology that combines field documentation and statistical analysis to ensure accuracy and consistency, based on the work carried out by the field monitoring team at SAM/SAM team through successive phases of operation. Data were collected through direct monitoring via a network of observers and collaborators in multiple governorates, from the testimonies of victims and witnesses interviewed in person or remotely in high-risk areas, and from available medical and legal reports such as hospital notifications, diagnostic reports, and supporting images, in addition to drawing on open sources in the media and social media within a strict verification mechanism.

Given the sensitivity of the human rights file, a three-tier verification system was applied to every incident, beginning with temporal and geographic matching, followed by corroboration from at least two independent sources before an incident was approved, while excluding any case that lacked the minimum essential data such as the name, location, or type of violation, in order to preserve the integrity of the indicators. After incidents were approved, violations were classified according to relevant international standards (the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions, and the Rome Statute), digitally categorized into groups (killing, injury, arrest, looting, etc.), and then distributed geographically and temporally in order to derive patterns, trends, and proportions of responsibility.

The report covers the period from 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2025 across Yemen’s governorates, with special focus on conflict hotspots and major administrative centers. The report also acknowledges the existence of security constraints that prevented full access to some areas, and that the risks faced by monitors affect the ability to document comprehensively, which means that the figures presented represent the minimum that could be documented.



# General Context

The political scene during 2025 was marked by chronic deadlock, as the state of “neither war nor peace” continued without any practical translation into a settlement that would restore rights and guarantees. Features of a closed political environment emerged, one that narrows public space and redefines it as a space of “control” rather than “participation.” This was reflected in the repeated raiding of schools, universities, markets, and mosques, the conversion of some of them into security facilities, barracks, or police headquarters, and the arrest of students over peaceful protests, indicating the targeting of peaceful expression and the rights to association and peaceful protest.



In this context, practices recur that constrict civic space and forcibly reshape it, through the storming of educational and civil institutions and the conversion of some of them into security, military, or coercive administrative structures, as stated in incidents related to Hajjah University and the National Institute of Administrative Sciences in Ibb, in addition to the storming of schools and the arrest of students over peaceful protests, reflecting a closed political environment based on weakening the right to peaceful expression and occupying institutional spaces through the instruments of force.

Linked to this trajectory is what SAM documented regarding the subjection of employees and civilians to “cultural courses” with ideological content, turning educational and work institutions into spaces of political mobilization rather than neutral public service. The incidents also reveal the presence of forced recruitment, including child recruitment, as an extension of the politicization and militarization of society. This is understood as part of a mobilizational project that prioritizes loyalty to the group over the rule of law and individual rights, turning political affiliation into an implicit condition for safety or continued existence within society and its institutions.

From the angle of the relationship with civil society, the data show that the restrictions were not limited to suppressing political action, but extended to the very core of public life, through the raiding of markets, mosques, universities, and schools, and the cumulative effect this produces in the erosion of trust in institutions and the weakening of the ability to organize socially in an independent manner. In this sense, 2025 presents a picture of a political environment in which instruments of coercion are expanding, procedural guarantees are receding, and public space is being redefined as a field subject to control rather than a sphere of rights.

From a security perspective, the incidents documented by the field monitoring SAM team show the continuation of the armed conflict in terms of its impact on civilians, even amid a discourse of de-escalation, with extensive use of armed means inside populated areas. This is reflected in the use of sniping, landmines, artillery shelling, improvised explosive devices, home raids, and large-scale military campaigns, turning residential areas into high-risk environments for civilian men, women, and children.

At the field level, a pattern of large-scale military campaigns against villages and tribal areas emerged, such as in Hanka Al Masoud in Al Qurayshiyah in Al-Bayda and the Al-Dhالفan area in Al-Jawf, where records documented the use of heavy weapons, tanks, armored vehicles, and indiscriminate shelling, accompanied by incidents of field executions, the siege of villages, and the total destruction of homes, mosques, and facilities. This pattern reflects the use of excessive force as a tool for subjugating local communities, going beyond the logic of “engagement” to the logic of “security punishment” with wide-ranging impact.

The incidents also reveal the continuation of collective punishment policies through the siege of populated areas, such as the Al-Ghoula tribes in Rida in Amran Governorate, the “Afi” area in Bart Al-Anan in Al-Jawf, and Al-Hafrah quarter in Radaa in Al-Bayda. The siege took the form of encircling neighborhoods and villages, restricting the entry of essential goods, gas, and medicine, and deploying military vehicles to impose a suffocating security cordon, turning the tools of security into a means of collective pressure and retaliation rather than a means of protecting social peace.

In a parallel context, the incidents showed a state of organized or tolerated security disorder in some areas, where killings, armed tribal disputes, and murders over land and road disputes were recorded, along with the inability or refusal of the authorities in control to carry out their duty of protection, investigation, and accountability. This deepened security fragility and increased civilians’ exposure to violence and the misuse of weapons.

The danger of the security environment is also evident in the storage of weapons inside residential neighborhoods and the disasters resulting from it, as in the incident of exploding weapons depots inside Sana’a in the Khashm Al-Bakrah area of Bani Al-Harith, in addition to the spread of war remnants and landmines in displacement areas and agricultural villages in Abyan, Taiz, Al-Hudaydah, and Marib, which led to casualties among families, children, and women. These incidents indicate that the security threat in 2025 was not only a front-line threat, but a chronic daily threat pursuing the population in homes, on roads, and in places of livelihood.

In general, the documented incidents reflect that 2025 unfolded in a security environment marked by the erosion of the rule of law, the expansion of siege practices and excessive force, and the widening of spaces of disorder and armed conflict, leaving civilians in wide areas caught between the pressure of armed authority on the one hand and the absence of an effective protection system on the other.

## Geographic Focus Areas

Data from the field monitoring team at SAM/SAM team show that violations during 2025 were concentrated in specific governorates, with qualitative variation in density and patterns, as follows:

Governorate	Total Violations	Most Prevalent Patterns
Sana'a	442	Arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearance, raids
Ibb	417	Killings by gunfire, arrests, looting
Dhamar	339	Abductions, killings under torture, raids
Saada	229	Shelling, enforced disappearance, arrests
Al-Bayda	194	Blowing up houses, killings by gunfire, arrests
Taiz	128	Sniping, indiscriminate shelling, landmine injuries

Distribution of Violations by the Most Affected Areas (2025)



### **1) Capital Secretariat (Sana'a): "Center of Political Repression"**

The Sana'a Capital Secretariat topped the list of the most affected governorates with (442) incidents according to what was documented by the field monitoring team at SAM/SAM team. The prevailing pattern of violations there is political in nature, linked to the management of public space through the tools of arrest and disappearance, as arbitrary arrest and enforced disappearance were repeatedly used as a means of controlling social movement and targeting activists and influential figures. In addition, the Secretariat recorded the highest rate of torture cases, at (32) cases, indicating the presence of a central detention network in which coercive interrogation procedures are conducted outside legal oversight, making the capital a focal point for violations directly connected to civil and political rights.

### **2) Ibb Governorate: "Property Violations and Direct Killing"**

Ibb ranked second with (417) incidents, and SAM's data show that the prevailing pattern there goes beyond a state of "disorder" to a recurring structure of raids, looting, and killing with live ammunition. The governorate recorded (117) incidents of raids and looting, the highest national rate in this category, revealing systematic targeting of private property and restricting residents' ability to protect their resources and belongings. This is accompanied by the spread of killings by gunfire in the context of armed disputes and local tensions, making Ibb a model of compound violation that combines forced impoverishment with the generation of fear through direct violence.

### **3) Dhamar Governorate: "Capital of Abductions"**

Dhamar recorded (339) incidents, and stands out in the data of the field monitoring SAM team as the governorate that witnessed the highest number of arbitrary arrests, at (258) cases. Collective arrest campaigns recur in Dhamar as a tool for controlling society and preventing any movement, and a number of victims are often transferred to detention facilities outside the governorate, multiplying families' suffering and complicating legal tracking processes and knowledge of fate. In this context, Dhamar appears as a space in which arrest is used as a coercive policy to reshape public space.

### **4) Saada Governorate: "Disappearance and Field Shelling"**

Documented incidents in Saada reached (229), and the prevailing pattern of violation there is characterized by "secrecy" associated with enforced disappearance, as high rates were recorded in this area, amounting to (123) cases. In addition, Saada witnessed victims linked to shelling and military operations, adding a security/military dimension to the violation and placing civilians before dual risks: risks linked to field violence, and others linked to a closed detention system in which opportunities for redress are weakened.

### **5) Al-Bayda Governorate: "The Doctrine of Demolition and Intimidation"**

Al-Bayda recorded (194) incidents, and stands out—according to the characterization of SAM’s data—with a recurring pattern represented in blowing up houses as a tool of collective punishment against local environments that oppose or refuse submission. The incidents show that this pattern is not limited to the material effect represented in the destruction of property, but extends to a broader social effect represented in forced displacement and the dismantling of family stability, making Al-Bayda a model of intimidation policies used to forcibly re-subjugate local space.

### **6) Taiz Governorate: “The Siege of Snipers and Landmines”**

Although Taiz ranked sixth numerically with (128) incidents, it leads in the file of injuries with (53) cases, which shows that the criterion of danger is not measured by number alone but by the nature of the violation and its cost to physical safety. The data show the continuation of sniping and the targeting of residential neighborhoods, in addition to shelling and landmines around contact lines and suburbs, making residents’ daily life governed by the logic of “permanent danger” and turning ordinary movement into a risk.

### **7) Al-Hudaydah Governorate: “Victims of the Sea and War Remnants”**

Al-Hudaydah recorded (71) incidents, and war remnants and land and sea mines stand out there as a principal cause of killing and injury, especially in agricultural areas and coastal zones. Al-Hudaydah also appears—according to SAM’s data—among the governorates that witnessed the impact of airstrikes attributed to international parties, which adds another layer of risk for civilians and reinforces the need to address the file of landmines and war remnants as an ongoing threat beyond the moment of direct engagement.

### **8) Amran and Sana’a (Rural): “Tribal Militarization”**


The governorates of Amran and Sana’a (rural), taken together, recorded more than (280) incidents according to the documentation. The prevailing pattern there is the use of security and military tools to subjugate tribal groupings, through the siege of areas, the imposition of extortion, recruitment, and raids, linking the violation to the logic of control over resources and movement. A pattern of coercive courses and camps also recurs, reflecting systematic pressure on young people and educational groups, and reproducing militarization within local social structures.

The reading of the field monitoring SAM team shows that violations of a political nature (arrest/disappearance) are clearly concentrated in Sana’a, Dhamar, and Ibb, while violations of a field/war nature (sniping/shelling/landmines) are concentrated in Taiz, Al-Hudaydah, Marib, and Al-Jawf, whereas retaliatory violations linked to property (blowing up houses/looting) appear sharply in Al-Bayda and Ibb. It should be noted that Taiz and Al-Hudaydah remain governorates of high danger from the angle of physical safety even though their total numerical ranking is lower than the top three. By contrast, some governorates such as Abyan and Shabwah appear lower in number, which may reflect

relative stability or difficulties of access and documentation, without meaning the absence of violations.

### The Temporal Trend of Violations

Throughout the year, a fluctuating temporal trajectory appears that ends in a sharp peak. September recorded a striking rise reaching around (480) incidents, which is consistent with the pattern of wide arrest campaigns used as a preventive tool to prevent any social expression at politically sensitive times. January also witnessed a violent beginning at a rate approaching (400) incidents, reflecting the entry of the year under high security tensions. The figures then declined relatively in the middle of the year before rising again in the last quarter, reinforcing the idea that violations do not move randomly, but are linked to recurring political/security rhythms at specific times.



### Classification of Affected Groups

The data reveal that civilians were the most frequently targeted group; out of (2421) recorded incidents, (2025) incidents directly targeted civilians, approximately 83% of the total. In the details of the categories, SAM documented (122) incidents involving the targeting of children, and (93) incidents targeting women through direct violations. The data also show a gender gap among victims in favor of males, which is linked to the nature of political arrests and prosecutions affecting the youth and male category as the most frequently targeted in security-control contexts.

## Classification of Violations

Field monitoring and documentation during 2025 reveal the broad scope of violations and the multiplicity of their patterns in a way that directly affects fundamental rights. According to what was documented by the field monitoring team at SAM/SAM team, a total of (2661) violation incidents were recorded in the monitored registers during the year, while the executive summary relied on a “cleaned/verified” documentation database amounting to (2421) incidents after applying verification, exclusion, and cleaning standards (such as excluding cases lacking essential data or failing to meet the requirement of source corroboration).

Within the axis of the right to life and physical integrity, 2025 appears as a year of severe cost for civilians; the report recorded the killing of (280) people and the injury of (170) others as a result of direct and indirect targeting. The “gunshot” stands out as a principal killing tool in (107) cases, with notable concentration in the governorates of Ibb, Dhamar, and Sana’a. In parallel, indiscriminate and systematic shelling contributed to the killing of (71) civilians and the injury of (22), with Taiz and Marib the most affected by this pattern as a result of shells and drones. Landmines and explosives remain a silent, extended form of killing beyond the moment of engagement; SAM documented (40) killings and (49) injuries, with concentration in the coastal areas of Al-Hudaydah Governorate and Al-Jawf Governorate. As for sniping, (14) killings were recorded, with the majority of victims being women and children in Taiz, reflecting that the targeting is not limited to battlefields but reaches the details of daily life.

In the axis of assassinations and arbitrary arrests, the data show that 2025 witnessed the political and security use of arrest and enforced disappearance as two means of pressure and of reshaping public space. The report documented (671) cases of arbitrary arrest outside the law, led by the Capital Secretariat and Dhamar, in addition to (354) cases of enforced disappearance in which the victims’ fate was not disclosed, making the crime “ongoing” by virtue of the absence of information and concealment of fate. The report also documented (8) assassinations targeting influential figures, which is an indicator of the fragility of the security environment and the overlap of organized crime with armed disorder. This category becomes even more serious with what the data recorded of (68) torture cases inside prisons, (36) of which ended in death, a pattern that places the issue of detention centers at the forefront of the files of qualitative violations.

As for the axis of public and civil freedoms, the year was marked by severe restrictions on public space and the targeting of manifestations of organization and expression. SAM documented (244) incidents of raiding and storming homes and institutions, and the intimidation of residents and confiscation or destruction of property that resulted from them. There were also (59) recorded cases of forcing employees to engage in coercive programs of a “sectarian and military” content, according to the descriptions of victims and their testimonies, which affects labor rights, freedom of belief, and human dignity. Although some incidents of repressing protests and targeting activists may appear fewer

in the official record, their intimidating effect was broad by virtue of the message they produce: narrowing public space and weakening the ability to express oneself peacefully.

In the axis of violations of the rights of vulnerable groups, the incidents show that women and children paid a doubled price. Children were mentioned in (122) different violation incidents, including killing, injury, and sniping, and the report also documented (9) overt cases of “child recruitment,” a figure reflecting the persistence and seriousness of the phenomenon even when not all cases are amenable to public documentation. Likewise, the report recorded (93) female victims exposed to direct violations ranging from killing and physical assault to arrest, confirming that the most vulnerable groups were not spared from targeting.

In the axis of economic and social rights and the right to property, the data show the use of looting, confiscation, and closure as tools of pressure that deepen the livelihood crisis. The report recorded (51) incidents of looting of private property, and (18) incidents of systematic confiscation and seizure, in addition to the total destruction of (43) facilities/homes and the partial destruction of (17) others. SAM also documented (19) cases of closing facilities and (10) cases of imposing unlawful extortion, the impact of which is not limited to immediate loss, but extends to undermining sources of livelihood and widening circles of poverty and forced dependency.



## Analysis of Patterns of Violations

SAM's data show that the pattern of violations of the right to life reached (316) killing incidents, with clear concentration in the Capital Secretariat (87), then Ibb (42), then Al-Bayda (30). In areas under Houthi control, the prevailing pattern is killing by gunfire in the contexts of checkpoints or raids, while airstrikes attributed to Israeli and American aircraft contributed to the toll of victims in specific governorates such as Al-Hudaydah and Sana'a. In the distribution of responsibility, (205) killing incidents were attributed to the Houthi group, compared with (44) incidents attributed to Israeli aircraft according to the recorded documentation.

As for arbitrary arrest and enforced disappearance, this constituted the most widespread and organized pattern, amounting to (1025) incidents, with Dhamar leading (258), then Ibb (202), then Saada (123). In the method of execution, armed force appears as the principal tool through crews that raid homes and workplaces, with a large proportion of detainees turning into forcibly disappeared persons for long periods without their families being enabled to know or communicate. The data attribute the majority of this pattern to the Houthi group, amounting to (1016) incidents, reflecting a systematic policy of silencing public space.

In qualitative violations, the file of assassinations and torture stands out as an indicator of the "professionalization of violence," not its randomness. The report documented (8) assassinations concentrated in Taiz and Amran, often through ambushes or targeting by gunfire by unknown or tribal gunmen, while the Capital Secretariat recorded (32) torture cases out of a total of (68), with (36) deaths under torture, all of them in records attributed to the responsibility of the Houthi group.

In the file of violations against property and freedoms, amounting to (379), a strategy of impoverishment and material intimidation becomes clear, with Ibb leading (117) in raids and looting followed by the Capital Secretariat (83), along with the continued blowing up of homes as collective punishment, especially in Al-Bayda and Ibb. As for injuries, amounting to (170), Taiz led with (53) amid the continuation of sniping and shelling, while landmines and war remnants remained a prominent threat in Al-Hudaydah and Al-Jawf.

The following detailed sections address central files that emerged during 2025 as the most consequential for civilians' lives and the trajectory of the crisis, reviewing each file in its specific context in terms of the circumstances of its occurrence, the mechanisms of its implementation, its social and humanitarian ramifications, and the recurrent patterns it reveals that go beyond the limits of the individual incident. Through combining quantitative indicators and qualitative evidence, these chapters illuminate the gap between the event and its repercussions, and clarify how the violation is formed within structures of control and institutional dysfunctions, and the resulting extended effects on social security and possibilities of recovery.

## Media Freedoms Violations

The defining feature of 2025 was the erosion of the “safe operating space” for journalism, such that the journalist no longer faced a single risk that could be guarded against, but rather a chain of simultaneous risks that shifted depending on the controlling authority, the region, and the subject matter.

During 2025, the reality of the “fragmentation of authority” in Yemen continued as a determining factor for media freedoms: local media outlets are effectively pushed into aligning with the forces controlling their areas, while independent work remains fragile and under threat. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) [describes](#) the scene as an environment in which it is difficult to produce independent news, with close surveillance and the risk of arrest because of posts or media activity, along with the blocking of access to online media outlets since the Houthis took control of the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology.

In the 2025 World Press Freedom [Index](#) issued by RSF, Yemen ranked 154th out of 180, with a score of 31.45 (with detailed sub-indicators including a low “security indicator,” for example, down to 26.15), reflecting the continuation of a “high-risk” environment for journalists and media workers during 2025.

The report of the Media Freedoms Observatory in Yemen [revealed](#) a grim picture of the condition of journalism during 2025, documenting 108 violations affecting journalists and media institutions in various areas, in a context marked by the continuation of armed conflict, the multiplicity of centers of authority, and the deterioration of the professional working environment. The violations varied between killing, injury, arrest, arbitrary detention, and enforced disappearance, all the way to unfair trials and interrogations outside legal frameworks, in addition to threats, prosecution, prevention of coverage, incitement, defamation, and the blocking, storming, and shelling of media institutions.

The report indicates that the use of security and judicial bodies as tools of pressure, in addition to strict administrative restrictions and the requirement of prior permits on a political basis, contributed to deepening media polarization, the decline of professional journalism, and the spread of inflammatory rhetoric, along with the erosion of independence and the shift toward self-censorship. It also highlights the geographic and responsibility-based disparity in violations—with the Yemeni government leading in the number of cases, and the near-total absence of independent journalism in areas under Houthi control—showing that the risks are no longer confined to one specific area.

According to what the SAM Organization for Rights and Liberties documented during 2025, a recurring pattern emerges in violations related to journalists, consisting of three interconnected layers: (1) direct field violence affecting the journalist during work or in his surroundings (assault/home raid/abduction), (2) security and administrative pressure

that creates an environment of intimidation preventing coverage and pushing toward self-censorship, and (3) the politicization of justice through referral to judicial tracks presented as “state security/specialized criminal courts,” with the prolonged detention and restriction of the right of defense that accompanies this—thus turning the law from a tool of protection into a tool of silencing.

Among the striking features of 2025 is the fading of the line separating direct violation from indirect deterrence. Instead of relying on arrest alone, the use of less noisy but more impactful tools in the medium term expanded, such as public incitement against journalists, undeclared threats, prevention from coverage, and the closure of work pathways (institutions, platforms, resources). This pattern aims not only to silence an individual voice, but to dismantle media networks and turn journalistic work into an activity of high psychological and professional cost, pushing toward voluntary withdrawal or self-censorship without the need for direct security intervention every time.

From a rights perspective, the practices of 2025 reveal a gradual hollowing-out of the principle of legality in dealing with the press. Even when “legal” tools such as interrogation or trial are used, they are deployed beyond their original legal purposes, making the procedure itself—not only its outcome—a punishment. This procedural use of the law produces a continuing state of uncertainty: the journalist does not know when his case will end, nor whether any subsequent activity may be used to expand or reopen it. In this context, justice becomes a tool of control, not a guarantee, and freedom of expression is redefined as a withdrawable exception rather than an inherent right.

The most dangerous feature of 2025, however, is that risks are no longer divisible geographically or politically. A journalist is no longer necessarily safer in one area than in another, and the content of coverage alone is no longer the determinant of risk; rather, the very identity of the journalist—as an actor who conveys information—has become sufficient to place him within the circle of targeting, whether through local repression or violence linked to the broader conflict context.



## Arbitrary Arrest and Enforced Disappearance

This pattern is the most widespread and the most organized during 2025, with SAM documenting (1025) incidents, making it a structural rather than incidental practice. At the geographic distribution level, Dhamar ranked first in a striking manner with (258 cases), followed by Ibb (202), then Saada (123). The method of implementation shows that arrests are often carried out by force of arms and through armed crews that raid homes or workplaces, undermining the standard of procedural legality and turning arrest into a means of intimidation and social control.

What is even more serious in this pattern is the recurring shift from arrest to enforced disappearance; the data indicate that a large proportion of victims are immediately transferred into closed detention tracks and their fate is concealed for periods extending beyond months, without families being enabled to know or communicate.

The data record near-total responsibility by the Houthi group, amounting to (1016) incidents, which reinforces the reading that arrest and disappearance are no longer merely random security practices, but a political tool for managing society, silencing independent voices, and creating a climate of permanent fear.

In this context, the file of Houthi arrests of UN workers stands out, having entered a phase of escalating intensity in the form of successive waves, beginning early in the year with the direct targeting of UN employees, then later expanding to include raids on UN premises and larger-scale detentions, ultimately leading to public UN and international measures linking these arrests to restrictions on the ability to deliver humanitarian assistance.

On 23-25 January 2025, a new wave of arrests was carried out, including at least 8 UN staff members, according to a joint [statement](#) cited by Human Rights Watch. Amnesty International also [confirmed](#) that the Houthis had “arbitrarily detained eight UN staff members” during the same period, linking this to the broader wave of arrests that began in 2024. At the level of official reaction, the United Nations [announced](#) on 24 January 2025 that it had suspended all staff movements within Houthi-controlled areas after the detention of “a number of” its personnel, according to Reuters. The Associated Press also reported on the same day that the [decision](#) came after the detention of “7 additional staff members,” and that the total number of UN personnel detained by the Houthis had then reached 23, according to what it cited from the United Nations.

The escalation then turned into a direct impact on the work of humanitarian organizations in the north; Reuters [reported](#) on 10 February 2025 that the United Nations had suspended all operations in Saada Governorate after more of its staff had been detained, quoting UN Deputy Spokesperson Farhan Haq as saying that this measure was linked to safety concerns. On the following day, Reuters [announced](#) that an employee of the World Food Programme had died while in detention in northern Yemen, and that he

had been detained on 23 January 2025 along with others, in an incident described as having aggravated the crisis of security trust with the de facto authorities.

The Associated Press also [reported](#) that the employee's death came three weeks after his detention, and that the United Nations had suspended its operations in Saada in light of these developments. The European Union [supported](#) this characterization by stating that the deceased employee had been "arbitrarily detained since 23 January 2025," and that the death occurred on 10 February 2025.

By the end of the summer, a larger [wave](#) had begun, taking the form of raids on UN premises. On 31 August 2025, the UN Secretary-General condemned "the arbitrary detention of at least 11 United Nations personnel," and also condemned "the forced entry into the World Food Programme premises, the seizure of UN property, and attempts to enter other UN premises in Sana'a."

Reuters' account aligned with this framework, [reporting](#) that the Houthis had "raided UN premises" and detained "at least 11 people," and that UN Envoy Hans Grundberg indicated that these individuals had been detained in Sana'a and Al-Hudaydah, and that this came "in addition to 23 UN personnel who had already been detained, some since 2021, and one staff member who died in detention during 2025." The Associated Press also [reported](#) that the raids included the offices of the World Food Programme, the World Health Organization, and UNICEF in Sana'a, and that the number of detainees had reached "at least 11."

Two weeks later, official international figures emerged confirming the expansion of the post-31 August wave. On 12 September 2025, the Security Council [issued](#) a press statement saying that its members had "strongly condemned" the Houthis' detention, "since 31 August, of at least 21 United Nations personnel," and also condemned the storming of World Food Programme and UNICEF premises and the seizure of UN property. In the UN daily briefing on the same day, a more detailed figure was given, indicating that "44 national UN staff" were being detained, and that "21 of them had been detained since the end of August," with reference also made to the detention of the UNICEF Deputy Resident Representative within the context of pressure on the UN system.

In parallel, on 16 September 2025, the World Food Programme [announced](#) that 44 humanitarian workers were "arbitrarily detained" by the de facto authorities, "including 21 WFP staff members," and added that "since 31 August 2025 alone, 21 United Nations personnel have been arbitrarily detained." On the same day, Reuters also reported that the United Nations had [moved](#) the Office of the Resident Coordinator in Yemen to Aden after the detention of "at least 18 of its personnel" in Sana'a, in a step that observers interpreted as a security/operational repositioning under the pressure of arrests.

Then another wave came in the autumn, sharply increasing the publicly announced figures. On 7 October 2025, Reuters [quoted](#) a UN spokesperson as saying that "9" additional UN staff members had been detained, bringing the number of arbitrarily

detained UN personnel to 53 since 2021. On 18 October 2025, the Associated Press [reported](#) that the Houthis had raided a UN facility in Sana'a and that a spokesperson for the Resident Coordinator's Office said that 15 international staff members had been inside the facility at the time of the raid and that they were "safe and accounted for" and had been able to contact their families.

On the following day, 19 October 2025, the Associated Press [reported](#) that the Houthis had detained "around 20" UN staff members and confiscated communications equipment from a UN facility in the Hadda district of Sana'a, and that those detained included "15 internationals and 5 Yemenis," while "11" others were released after interrogation. Reuters also reported on 20 October 2025 that "15 international staff" [remained](#) "confined inside the UN compound in Sana'a" after a Houthi incursion, before the authorities later allowed them to move within the compound.



## Assassinations and Torture

This pattern stands out as an indicator of the “professionalization of violence” and the transformation of certain violations into tools of liquidation or will-breaking, rather than mere incidental violations. SAM documented (8) cases of assassination concentrated in Taiz and Amran, and the descriptions of the incidents show that the prevailing pattern was the “armed ambush” or targeting by gunfire by unknown persons or tribal gunmen, indicating an overlap between factors of security breakdown and score-settling in the absence of effective investigation.

In the file of torture, the data documented (68) cases, with the Capital Secretariat recording the highest number at (32 cases). This file represents the peak of qualitative violation because the incidents resulted in (36) deaths under torture, placing these acts among the most serious crimes, especially given that the records indicate that the cases of torture and killing under torture in this list fall within the responsibility of the Houthi group. The incidents show that torture is not practiced merely as physical violence, but as an internal system within closed detention centers, sometimes accompanied by deliberate medical neglect, making the rights to safety and dignity vulnerable to a compound violation.



## Targeting Civilians


Data from the field monitoring team at SAM/SAM team show that 2025 witnessed (316) incidents of killing, reflecting a qualitative escalation in violations of the right to life outside the logic of direct military confrontation. The Capital Secretariat ranked first with (87 cases), followed by Ibb (42), then Al-Bayda (30), a concentration indicating that killing was not confined to contact lines, but was repeated in civilian environments associated with checkpoints, raids, and local tensions.

Direct killing by gunfire stands out as the broadest pattern, as incidents recur in contexts of armed control and the management of security by force, placing these acts among serious violations of the right to life when they occur outside any legal necessity or without accountability.

By contrast, the data show that airstrikes attributed to international parties contributed to the victim toll in certain governorates, with “aerial targeting (Israeli and American)” emerging as an influential factor in a number of incidents in Al-Hudaydah/Sana’a. In the distribution of responsibility, the data attributed 205 killing incidents to the Houthi group, while 44 incidents were attributed to Israeli aircraft, which calls for—within a legal reading—emphasizing all parties’ obligations under the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution to minimize civilian harm, and the necessity of investigating incidents of an aerial nature in an independent and transparent manner.

The data also documented (170) injury incidents during the year, with Taiz ranking first with (53 cases), reflecting the continued pattern of sniping, artillery shelling, and landmines in contact-line areas and nearby neighborhoods. The records show that landmines and war remnants remain among the most prominent sources of danger to physical safety, especially in Al-Hudaydah and Al-Jawf, where the road, the farm, and the surroundings of water sources are turned into spaces of permanent threat. This pattern is understood, in a rights-based reading, as an ongoing violation, because landmines do not distinguish between wartime and truce time, nor between combatant and civilian, but keep society in a state of constant fear and continue producing victims after the fighting has ceased.

According to the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project (CIMP) [report](#), covering the period from 1 January to 31 December 2025, the total number of civilian casualties reached 2,653 killed and injured, including 732 deaths and 1,921 injuries. The data also show that child casualties reached 361 cases (108 deaths and 253 injuries), while 217 female casualties (69 deaths and 148 injuries) were recorded during the same year.



*Civilian casualty trend during 2025 marked by a sharp rise in the middle of the year - CIMP*

## Violations Related to Women

Women were subjected to a series of systematic violations documented by the team through monitoring (93) incidents of direct targeting. The forms of suffering faced by women varied between killing, injury, arrest, and other abuses affecting their fundamental rights, highlighting the scale of targeting to which women are subjected in conflict environments, thereby compounding their humanitarian and social suffering in light of these documented crimes.

Indicators for 2025 show that violations related to women in Yemen were not limited to a single pattern, but were marked by multiplicity and overlap, as forms of direct violence converged with humanitarian and economic deterioration and societal restrictions, creating a high-risk environment for women. The figures also reflect that a large portion of violations remains incompletely documented, meaning that the actual reality may be more severe and extensive than the available data indicate.

International [data](#) for 2025 indicate that women in Yemen face a sharply deteriorated environment in terms of protection and human security. The report of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) stated that 9.6 million women and girls were facing the threat of acute hunger and growing violence during the same year, within the context of a broad collapse in the health system and basic services. The report also showed that more than 1.3 million pregnant and breastfeeding women suffered from acute malnutrition, a direct indicator of the interlinkage between economic and health violations and the deterioration of women's conditions, reflecting their exposure to indirect violations affecting the rights to life and health.

In the context of gender-based violence, 2025 data [document](#) that thousands of women were subjected to direct violations, as UN-supported protection programs recorded that more than 19,000 women and girls who survived gender-based violence received support services and case management between January and September 2025. This figure reflects the scale of the phenomenon, though not necessarily its entirety, in light of underreporting and fear of social stigma. Mental health services related to violence also reached more than 257,000 beneficiaries during the same period, indicating the breadth of the psychological and social impacts of the violations.

Analyses issued by UN bodies specializing in gender also [confirm](#) that 2025 witnessed a rise in the risks of displacement and violence, with the displacement of no fewer than 3,013 women and girls documented between January and May 2025 as a result of the escalation of hostilities. It was also noted that a large proportion of displaced households were headed by women, increasing their exposure to exploitation, violence, and lack of protection. The data further [indicate](#) that 26% of newly displaced persons during the same period were in households headed by women, reflecting compounded vulnerability for this group.

From the angle of violations linked to direct violence, Security Council reports [show](#) that military operations during 2025 continued to cause female casualties, with at least two women killed and dozens injured in a single strike during the year, reflecting women's continued exposure to the risks of death and injury in the context of military operations, whether directly or incidentally, and confirming that threats are not confined to front lines but extend to civilian areas.

Rights analyses intersecting with SAM reports also [show](#) that gender-based violence, including sexual violence, remains among the least documented violations despite its prevalence. Studies confirm that the true scale of cases in 2025 is far greater than the announced figures due to fear of social stigma, weak reporting mechanisms, and the collapse of the justice system, indicating that violations against women take on a hidden and systematic character that worsens in the context of conflict and the absence of effective legal protection.

In a broader context, 2025 indicators [show](#) that Yemen ranked among the lowest countries globally on women-related security and justice indicators, placing among the worst-performing countries in the 2025 Women, Peace, and Security Index, reflecting a structural accumulation of violations and inequality. Women also face growing restrictions on freedom of movement, work, and public participation, which constitutes a form of long-term structural violation of their basic rights.



## Violations Related to Children

Children were subjected to serious and direct violations documented by the SAM Organization team, which monitored (122) incidents of targeting affecting this vulnerable segment of society. These violations were not limited to one type, but took multiple forms and levels, including killing, physical injury, and even arrest, reflecting a tragic reality faced by children, who are directly targeted under conditions that lack the most basic standards of humanitarian protection.

Documented data for 2025 [indicate](#) that children in Yemen remained exposed to direct violations of an increasingly violent nature. Data from international organizations showed that no fewer than 349 children were killed or injured during the year (103 children killed and 246 injured), a figure reflecting a sharp rise in the level of violence compared to the previous year, with an increase estimated at around 70%. This toll shows that the average daily violations amount to approximately one child killed or injured every day, reflecting the persistence of security risks despite the relative de-escalation. The data also indicate that airstrikes alone were responsible for at least 155 child deaths or injuries during the year, confirming that military operations remain one of the principal direct threats to children's lives.

In the context of risks linked to war remnants, SAM's data [confirm](#) that landmines and unexploded ordnance continued to claim the lives of children during 2025, with 40 child victims documented from these remnants during the same year, including cases of children killed during simple daily activities such as playing. This reflects the indiscriminate and dangerous nature of this type of violation, and confirms that children's living environment remains saturated with risks even outside areas of direct confrontation. The year 2025 also [witnessed](#) a clear continuation of the phenomenon of child recruitment, as field evidence confirms that this practice did not recede but continued as a "broad and recurring pattern" linked to poverty and interruption of education.

As for protection and the educational environment, the education system in Yemen suffered a devastating blow during 2025, depriving millions of children of their basic right to education and to building a future. According to the "Building the Future" [report](#) issued by UNICEF in 2025, the number of children who had dropped out of or been deprived of school reached about 3.2 million, as a direct result of the destruction of educational facilities, worsening extreme poverty, and ongoing displacement that forces children to leave school and turn toward the labor market to support their families. Alongside this educational collapse, the 2025 humanitarian response plans [revealed](#) that 7.4 million children were in urgent and direct need of specialized protection services, to save them from abuse, neglect, gender-based violence, and to provide urgent support to survivors of landmine incidents and explosive weapons.

## Violations Against Property

The field monitoring team at SAM/SAM team documented (379) incidents within this pattern, reflecting a strategy of “impoverishment and intimidation” as an extension of armed force into civilian space. At the geographic distribution level, Ibb recorded the highest rate of raids and looting with (117 cases), followed by the Capital Secretariat (83 cases). The descriptions of the incidents show a recurring mechanism consisting of forced entry on a flimsy pretext, followed by looting, confiscation, or destruction, turning private property into an exposed target and undermining the sense of safety inside the home itself.

Within this pattern, the phenomenon of “blowing up houses” stands out as a tool of collective punishment, especially in Al-Bayda and sometimes in Ibb, where some incidents take on the character of a “message” intended to punish the social environment and force it into submission, rather than merely neutralizing a military target. This pattern derives its seriousness from the fact that its impact does not stop at material loss, but goes beyond it to forced displacement, the dismantling of family stability, and the expansion of forced dependency on the de facto authorities.



## The Humanitarian Situation

The year 2025 witnessed the continued deterioration of humanitarian indicators in Yemen, with the scale of needs expanding against a shrinking level of funding available for response, [prompting](#) partners to “reprioritize” and focus on the most life-saving interventions.

On 13 May 2025, the 2025 plan addendum [stated](#) that the plan was funded at only 9% (about \$222 million out of \$2.5 billion), an early low level reflecting a major funding shock in the first half of the year. During 2025, humanitarian actors [moved](#) toward “hyper-prioritization” in light of the scale and speed of funding cuts in the first quarter of the year across the UN-coordinated planning system.

By the end of 2025, the United Nations [stated](#) that the response in Yemen had faced an unprecedented funding shortfall during the year, with continued impact on vital sectors (food, health, water, protection). OCHA indicated that [more](#) than 130 organizations had reached—during the first quarter of 2025—more than 4 million people on average per month through humanitarian assistance and protection, reflecting a shrinking operational capacity compared with the scale of accumulated need.

With regard to displacement, humanitarian/analytical documents in 2025 [estimated](#) that around 4.5 million people remained internally displaced (IDPs) in Yemen, with obstacles to return continuing (destruction, insecurity, lack of livelihoods). In the context of protection services, “UNICEF Bulletin - June 2025” [states](#) that 7.4 million children urgently required protection services during 2025 due to escalating risks.

The UNICEF [report](#) (HAC 2025) also points to the expansion of child protection needs and their connection to the risks of exploitation, gender-based violence, and other threats, as structural features of the crisis during the year.

On the other hand, the education sector witnessed marked deterioration. UNICEF [explained](#) that about 6.2 million children needed educational support, and that 1 in every 4 children was out of school, while citing a 44% dropout rate linked to factors such as child labor. The “Humanitarian Situation Bulletin - UNICEF, 30 June 2025” [estimated](#) that 4.5 million children were out of school in Yemen during 2025, while thousands of classrooms remained affected.

An NRC fact sheet (May 2025) [estimated](#) that nearly 3.2 million Yemeni children were not attending school, and that the education sector was among the “most neglected” sectors in the crisis, while also highlighting a funding gap in the education response.

## **The Political File: Transformations of Legitimacy and the Entrenchment of De Facto Rule.. The Struggle of Balances and State-Building**

The Yemeni political scene in 2025 reflects a profound shift from open military confrontation to a complex struggle over the structure of the state and the definition of sovereignty. While the legitimate government seeks to reassemble its fragmented authority amid changing regional balances and varying internal pressures, de facto forces continue to strengthen their parallel institutions, exploiting the state of division to impose a new political and economic reality. This stage is not merely a redistribution of influence, but a real test of the official institutions' ability to withstand multiple models of authority, in an environment redrawing its strategic priorities on the basis of newly emerging balances of power on the ground.

### **The Legitimate Government During 2025 - Reconstituting the State Under the Pressure of Balances**

A reading of the state's trajectory in Yemen indicates the continuation of divided authority as the product of a complex interaction between internal and regional dynamics that gradually redistributed centers of influence. Since the transfer of power to the Presidential Leadership Council in April 2022, an attempt has emerged to rebuild a political center capable of unifying military and security decision-making. However, the consensual formula on which the Council was built carried within it fragile balances among forces with divergent political projects, causing the process of reshaping the state to proceed in parallel with an undeclared struggle over its definition and limits.

At the internal level, the disagreements between Council President Rashad Al-Alimi and Southern Transitional Council President Aidarous Al-Zubaidi constituted an early indicator of competition extending beyond personal considerations to the very nature of authority itself. This divergence reflected two visions for the future of the state: one inclined toward restoring centralized decision-making within a unified national framework, and the other pushing toward entrenching a political reality that grants the south an independent or semi-independent negotiating position. These divergences were reflected in the slow pace of military integration processes, the continuation of multiple security reference authorities, and disparities in resource management, all of which contributed to entrenching a pattern of "fragmented sovereignty" within the governmental sphere.

These dynamics were not isolated from their regional environment. Since 2015, the relationship between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates has formed a principal pillar in the structure of authority within areas under government control. However, the transition of the war from broad military confrontation to a stage of managing influence revealed growing divergence in the priorities of the two states. Saudi Arabia moved toward supporting a central authority capable of controlling the security sphere and entering into political settlements, while the UAE continued to support local actors who strengthened their presence in ports and coastal areas, leading to the emergence of a multi-layered security structure.

These transformations were reflected in practical indicators, including growing debate over restructuring military and security forces in the southern governorates, and attempts to integrate some formations into the Ministries of Defense and Interior with the aim of strengthening the official chain of command and reducing the autonomy of units linked to external backers. Revisions also emerged in the mechanisms for overseeing ports and vital entry points, carrying indications of a trend toward reconnecting sovereign resources to central institutions. These steps were accompanied by changes in administrative and security positions and a redistribution of powers between local authorities and the center, in an attempt to regulate the executive sphere and reduce duality in decision-making.

However, the most consequential shift appeared in December 2025, when Saudi-Emirati relations witnessed sharp escalation that revealed an actual redrawing of the equation of influence within the government camp. The movement of UAE-backed forces in strategic areas in the east of the country, without coordination with the government or the coalition, led to unprecedented tension, followed by a direct Saudi response aimed at preventing the entrenchment of a military reality outside the framework of the recognized authority. This was accompanied by exceptional political and security decisions aimed at re-establishing the center of decision-making, including a review of joint defense arrangements and the declaration of emergency measures.

Although these developments led to a decline in the UAE's direct military presence, its indirect influence through local allies remained in place, leaving a complex strategic legacy before both Saudi Arabia and the government. This scene reflects a divergence in visions regarding Yemen's future: between an approach focused on state unity and building a coherent political center, and another inclined toward managing influence through local forces with relative autonomy.

Within the context of the reshaping of balances of power highlighted by the developments of December 2025, Hadramawt emerged as a new structural variable in the equation of authority within the legitimacy camp. The decline of direct Emirati influence helped open space for the rise of Hadrami forces that repositioned themselves within a framework closer to the government and with Saudi backing, resulting in a redistribution of political weight within the south. The governorate was no longer read as a geographic periphery, but as an emerging center capable of influencing decision-making balances and regulating the relationship among competing components. The growing Hadrami presence limited the monopolization of southern representation and created a balancing power center that helped reduce the sharpness of polarization.

It also strengthened opportunities to reconnect resources and entry points with official institutions. In this framework, the push toward a south-south conference reflected a growing realization that the stability of the government camp had become conditional on broadening the base of representation and moving from a model of unilateral dominance to a more pluralistic formula. Thus, Hadramawt shifted from being an arena

of regional competition to a potential lever for reorganizing the internal house of legitimacy, and a factor that could support the path of building a more balanced authority, provided that this rise is managed within an institutional framework that prevents its slipping into a new pattern of parallel power centers.

These transformations pushed the government into a phase of political reconfiguration, not merely through a formal change in its structure, but through a redefinition of the relationship among its components and a determination of who possesses final decision-making power within the legitimacy camp. The external factor intertwined with internal fragility, turning the state into an entity under continuous negotiation rather than a stable framework of governance. This phase can be understood as an attempt to transition from a “distributed influence system” to a “more centralized authority system,” but the success of this transition remained dependent on institutions’ ability to fill any vacuum created by the retreat of Semi-governmental actors, since the absence of institutional alternatives raises the likelihood of security disorder and local competition.

## **Second: The Houthis During 2025 - Entrenching De Facto Authority and Expanding the Sphere of Influence**

By contrast, the divisions within the government camp provided an operational environment that allowed the Houthi group to strengthen its relative position, not only by consolidating field control, but by maximizing its political and economic gains. The preoccupation of its opponents with rearranging their internal balances reduced the likelihood of broad military operations, giving the group time to reorganize its forces, develop its missile and drone capabilities, and strengthen its defense systems, thus helping to entrench the state of “non-resolution,” which usually serves the more centralized and disciplined party.

Economically, the group benefited from the continued monetary and institutional division, strengthening levy systems, expanding the scope of fees, and tightening control over markets and import chains, thereby providing a stable source of income that maintained its administrative and security apparatus at a time when the government was facing mounting financial pressures.

Administratively, the group exploited the decline in the state’s ability to function as a unifying framework, expanding its bureaucratic presence by appointing supervisors, restructuring institutions, and imposing stricter patterns of social control, thus turning military control into a form of daily governance and strengthening the image of an authority capable of imposing order.

Politically, the divergence in the positions of the forces supporting the government enabled the group to improve its negotiating position; the less cohesive the opposing camp appeared, the greater its ability to impose its conditions or slow negotiation tracks without significant political cost, turning division among its adversaries into an indirect resource of power.

Regionally, the group's involvement in tensions linked to the security of navigation in the Red Sea marked a qualitative turning point, as its presence went beyond the local sphere to become part of the equations of maritime security and international trade, reintroducing it into regional deterrence calculations and strengthening its capacity for maneuver.

The dynamics of 2025 reveal a transition of the conflict from direct military confrontation to a contest over the shape of the state and who has the authority to define it. The government retains the legitimacy of international recognition, but faces the test of institutional effectiveness, while the Houthis continue building a de facto authority based on centralization and local resources. The future trajectory of the state depends on whether the rearrangement of relations within the government camp will turn into an institutional project that rebuilds the center of the state, or whether it will remain merely a redistribution of influence within a political structure whose conditions for stability have not been completed, thereby entrenching a long-term pattern of plural authority within a single national framework.




## The Military File: International Operations in Yemen.. The Struggle of Strategies and the Escalating Human Cost

International military operations in Yemen during 2025 represent a new chapter in strategic escalation, as intensive airstrikes intersected with the efforts of major powers to secure international shipping lanes. These confrontations were not limited to military targets, but extended to infrastructure and civilian facilities, provoking broad legal and human rights controversy over violations of the principles of civilian protection in conflict. With material and human attrition continuing, the path shifted toward diplomacy in search of political understandings, within a complex field reality that demonstrates the difficulty of unilateral military solutions in confronting compounded crises.

### Israeli Attacks

On 10 September 2025, Yemen witnessed a dangerous military escalation with Israeli airstrikes targeting Sana'a and Al-Jawf Governorate, amid cross-referenced reports of a major rise in civilian casualties. Reuters [quoted](#) the Houthi-run Ministry of Health as saying that the strikes "killed 35 and wounded 131" (according to their account), while noting that most of the casualties were in Sana'a. SAM also [provided](#) more detailed figures for Sana'a and Al-Jawf, attributed to the same Ministry of Health, speaking of 28 killed and 113 wounded in Sana'a and 7 killed and 18 wounded in Al-Jawf. These figures matched coverage [published](#) in international outlets citing the same source as saying that "28 were killed and 113 wounded in Sana'a... and 7 were killed and 18 wounded in Al-Jawf."

ACLED [data](#) indicate that Israel carried out no fewer than 48 military strikes [over](#) 16 separate days against targets belonging to the Houthi group inside Yemen, resulting in the deaths of more than 120 people.



The sensitivity of these strikes becomes particularly pronounced when it comes to the nature of the targets. SAM [stated](#) that the bombing struck the building of the 26 September and Al-Yemen newspapers and residential homes in Al-Tahrir District, in addition to service facilities such as a medical fueling station supplying the health sector in Sana'a and a civil status building in Al-Hazm in Al-Jawf. In the same context, Human Rights Watch [documented](#) that an Israeli strike targeted "a media center in Sana'a" on 10 September and caused deaths including journalists, as part of a wave of strikes in Sana'a and Al-Jawf that same day. The Washington Post also cited the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) as saying that a [strike](#) on a "journalists' compound" in Sana'a on 10 September killed 31 journalists and media workers (as attributed by the newspaper to the committee).

Weeks earlier, Sana'a had also witnessed Israeli [strikes](#) on 24 August 2025 in the context of reciprocal attacks linked to Houthi operations, with Reuters reporting that the strikes targeted sites that Israel said included facilities of a military/security nature as well as energy and fuel storage infrastructure, while Houthi media accounts referred to deaths and injuries. On a parallel line, SAM [stated](#) that the strikes of that day targeted "vital" civilian facilities such as an oil company station and a power station, and spoke of two killed and 35 wounded, including women and children (according to its narrative attributed to local/official sources in Houthi-controlled areas), warning against turning public service facilities into targets.

This trajectory cannot be separated from a broader pattern of targeting Yemen's economic infrastructure during 2025, most notably the American strike on Ras Isa port on 17 April 2025. Reuters reported at the time that the Houthi-run Ministry of Health said the strike [killed](#) 74 and injured 171, while Washington said the objective was to "cut off a fuel source" for the Houthis. SAM [reported](#) that four successive strikes hit the facility, killing 80 and injuring 150 according to "statistics" from the Hodeidah Health Office. Later, Reuters considered the targeting of Ras Isa a "turning point" that helped push the Houthis toward a "negotiated exit" before a de-escalation was announced through Omani mediation in May 2025.


From the perspective of international humanitarian law, the standard of protecting civilians and civilian objects remains clear in the core texts: Article 52 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions [stipulates](#) that "civilian objects shall not be the object of attack." The Rome Statute also [defines](#), within war crimes, the "intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects." At the level of public international law, Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter [provides](#) that states "shall refrain... from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence" of any state. In light of these rules, the repeated reporting of civilian casualties and the targeting of media and service facilities places the international community before a serious test of the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms and independent investigation—something SAM explicitly [called](#) for by demanding an urgent international investigation and immediate protection for civilians and civilian facilities.

## USA Attacks

On 15 March 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump [announced](#) the launch of broad strikes against the Houthis in Yemen, which Reuters described as the largest U.S. military operation in the region since his return to office. According to the coverage, it came in response to repeated Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and the disruption they caused to global trade.

In the following days and weeks, U.S. Central Command [presented](#) the campaign as an ongoing operation targeting Houthi “capabilities” linked to missiles and drones. On 27 April 2025, it reported that the operation (Operation Rough Rider) had involved more than 800 strikes/targets since its beginning, while announcing the killing of “hundreds” of Houthi fighters and some leaders, specifically officials linked to missiles and drones.


Independent reports indicate that the United States [carried out](#) more than 1,100 air and naval strikes against Houthi targets inside Yemen, according to CTC Sentinel. The targets struck included command-and-control facilities, weapons depots, air defense systems, weapons factories, storage facilities, military bases, port installations, and homes believed to contain “high-value” targets.



*American attacks on Yemen (15 March - 18 April) - Al Jazeera*


According to the [Yemen Data Project](#), the period from 15 March to 6 May 2025 constituted one of the most intense and deadly phases of aerial bombardment in Yemen since the height of the war led by the Saudi coalition. On 15 March 2025, President Donald Trump announced, around two months after the start of his second term, the launch of Operation “Rough Rider,” effectively ending the undeclared calm that had prevailed in Yemen since the Gaza ceasefire entered into force on 19 January 2025.

Yemen Data Project data indicate that these strikes resulted in the deaths of at least 238 civilians, including 24 children, and the injury of 467 other civilians, including 31 children. By comparison, Operation Poseidon Archer, which lasted twelve months, resulted in the killing of only 21 civilians—a figure that Operation Rough Rider surpassed within the first 48 hours of bombardment in March 2025.



Yemen Data Project data indicate that these strikes resulted in the deaths of at least 238 civilians, including 24 children, and the injury of 467 other civilians, including 31 children. By comparison, Operation Poseidon Archer, which lasted twelve months, resulted in the killing of only 21 civilians—a figure that Operation Rough Rider surpassed within the first 48 hours of bombardment in March 2025.

## US STRIKES TIMELINE PER MONTH



Then, on 29 April 2025, the United Kingdom openly [joined](#) in a joint strike with the United States. A statement by the British government confirmed that British forces had participated in a joint operation against a “Houthi military target,” and London linked the operation to the protection of freedom of navigation following the Houthi campaign of attacks on ships since 2023. Reuters quoted the British Ministry of Defence as saying that intelligence had [identified](#) buildings/facilities believed to be used to manufacture drones employed in attacks on shipping, and that the strike was part of a joint American-British operation, while noting the escalation of U.S. bombardment at that stage.

On 6 May 2025, Trump announced that the United States would stop bombing the Houthis after an [agreement](#), while Oman said it had mediated a ceasefire/understanding stipulating that neither side would target the other (including American ships in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab), thereby ending the phase of “intensive strikes” in the spring 2025 campaign, according to Reuters’ account.

[According](#) to The New York Times, the announcement of the suspension of the U.S. military campaign against the Houthis in May 2025 took on a more political character than a decisive military assessment, as it came after a month of intensive operations that had failed to achieve the declared objectives. According to the facts, the United States did not succeed during the first 30 days in imposing air superiority or stopping Houthi attacks, as the Houthis continued to target ships in the Red Sea and shoot down American

drones, while U.S. forces were consuming massive amounts of munitions at a cost exceeding one billion dollars in a single month.

The course of the campaign revealed a clear gap between political expectations and field reality. Despite the execution of more than a thousand airstrikes, the destruction of military facilities and weapons depots, and the killing of a number of Houthi leaders, intelligence assessments showed that the actual effect was limited to a “partial degradation” of capabilities, without decisive weakening, as the group retained the ability to reorganize its ranks, relocate its military stockpiles, and strengthen its fortifications during the bombing.

The factor of cost—human and material—played a central role in redirecting the American decision. The continuation of Houthi attacks was accompanied by significant losses, including the downing of seven MQ-9 aircraft and repeated incidents involving F/A-18 aircraft from aboard U.S. aircraft carriers, in addition to concerns within the Pentagon over the depletion of precision munition stockpiles at the expense of U.S. readiness in other strategic theaters, particularly the Asia-Pacific region.

In this context, a parallel diplomatic track emerged through Omani mediation, providing the U.S. administration with a “political exit” that would halt operations in return for a Houthi commitment to stop targeting American vessels, without a comprehensive commitment to halt attacks linked to Israel. In the absence of consensus within the U.S. national security team on extending or escalating the campaign, and with growing doubts on the part of the U.S. president himself regarding the utility of long-term military engagement, the option of declaring “success” and ending offensive operations on 5 May 2025 was adopted, according to the newspaper.

CTC Sentinel’s analysis [concludes](#) that Operation Rough Rider placed the United States in a complex political and military position; according to the report, the declared objective of ending the threat to navigation cannot be achieved except by removing the Houthis from power in northern Yemen—something that cannot be accomplished through air power alone. Instead, the campaign ended with a limited arrangement under which the Houthis would not target American ships, while the broader threat to commercial navigation remained as long as the Houthis continued to control Sana’a.

## Responsibility and Accountability

The documented violations during 2025 show that they are not merely isolated incidents, but that many of their trajectories take on a repetitive character that allows the violation to be read as “organized conduct” nourished by an environment of impunity and the erosion of justice guarantees. Based on the evidence and data documented by the field monitoring team at SAM/SAM team, responsibility is determined according to two interrelated standards: (1) direct responsibility for the act and the violation, and (2) responsibility for failure to fulfill the duty of protection, investigation, and accountability when the authority in control is able or legally obligated to do so.

### First: The De Facto Authorities in Sana’a (the Houthi Group)

According to the data, the Houthi group bears the greatest responsibility for the documented violations, accounting for 93.5% of total incidents. This responsibility appears in a broad pattern of crimes connected to non-derogable rights, foremost among them arbitrary arrest, enforced disappearance, and torture—acts that, in the incidents, are attributed to agencies, detention facilities, and implementation tools linked to an existing security structure. The data also show the group’s responsibility for patterns affecting the right to property, the right to housing, and personal security, including “blowing up houses,” violent raids, looting, and confiscation—acts that cannot be justified under the pretext of security or military necessity, and are classified as serious violations when they target civilians or cause unjustified destruction of civilian objects.

SAM considers that the repetition of these acts and their temporal and geographic consistency, coupled with the absence of independent investigations or effective internal accountability, indicates the possibility of a policy or practice tolerated at the leadership level. If the material and mental elements of each incident are established, some of these acts may amount to war crimes, particularly the intentional directing of attacks against civilians, destruction of property without military necessity, torture, and the carrying out of executions following proceedings lacking the basic guarantees of a fair trial. Arbitrary deprivation of life, whether through direct killing, death under torture, or as a result of gross medical neglect in detention, also constitutes a serious violation of the right to life and the absolute prohibition of torture.

### Second: International Parties Participating in Military Operations

SAM documented a number of incidents linked to airstrikes (1.9% of total violations attributed to Israeli aircraft and 0.6% to American aircraft), resulting in civilian casualties and destruction of civilian objects. Despite the limited number of these incidents compared to the total documented violations, their seriousness requires a precise legal assessment in light of the principles of distinction, proportionality, and taking all feasible precautions in attack, as set out in customary international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions. SAM affirms that the use of air power in the context of armed conflict remains subject to a strict obligation to select legitimate military targets and to

avoid or minimize incidental civilian losses to the greatest extent possible. If it is shown that the attacks did not respect these principles, or were carried out with prior knowledge of the likelihood of excessive civilian harm in relation to the anticipated military advantage, this may constitute a violation of international humanitarian law requiring an independent and transparent investigation and, where appropriate, determination of individual responsibility.

### **Third: The Internationally Recognized Government and Armed Entities Allied with It**

In areas under the control of the internationally recognized government or armed entities allied with it, the team documented assassination incidents, internal armed disputes, and situations of security disorder that led to civilian casualties. International human rights law imposes on authorities exercising effective control over a given territory a positive obligation to protect the right to life, take reasonable measures to prevent crimes, investigate them promptly and effectively, and prosecute those responsible.

SAM believes that the continued recording of incidents attributed to “unknown actors” or classified under “security disorder” reflects shortcomings in law enforcement and in the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. The absence of tangible results from independent investigations into a number of assassinations or armed violence incidents may also contribute to entrenching an environment of impunity and undermine the population’s trust in state institutions.

### **Fourth: Command Responsibility and Institutional Responsibility**

The team affirms that responsibility is not limited to the direct perpetrators of violations, but extends, where the legal conditions are met, to leaders who knew or should have known of the violations and failed to take the necessary measures to prevent them or punish their perpetrators. This assessment is based on the principle of command responsibility recognized in customary international law and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

The continued issuance or implementation of policies or orders that repeatedly lead to serious violations, or institutional tolerance of them, may also give rise to individual criminal responsibility and international responsibility, as the case may be. The broad scope and repeated occurrence of violations indicate the existence of a structural failure in oversight and accountability mechanisms, requiring urgent reform intervention and international support to ensure preservation of evidence, protection of victims and witnesses, and the enabling of national or international accountability pathways.

## Judicial Response and National Mechanisms

When tracing the trajectory of complaints and redress, the data indicate that the justice system did not provide a response commensurate with the scale of the violations. In Houthi-controlled areas, what may be described as the politicization of the judiciary and its transformation into a process lacking fair trial guarantees is evident, as the list recorded (18) death sentences and a number of property confiscation rulings that do not meet the minimum standards of fair procedure. In such cases, the judiciary becomes closer to an instrument of “formal legitimation” of coercive outcomes rather than a mechanism of protection and deterrence.

The incidents also show a near-total absence of deterrence and redress mechanisms; the data do not record cases of actual accountability for security officials or military leaders in connection with the monitored violations, while victims’ or their families’ complaints are met either with disregard or with referral to “tribal arbitration,” which empties justice of its legal substance and wastes victims’ right to remedy. As for the National Commission to Investigate Alleged Violations of Human Rights, despite the documentation efforts it undertakes, its recommendations do not find their way to implementation because of institutional division and weakness of executive authority, making its impact closer to documentation without transition to accountability.

In this context, the “phenomenon of impunity” emerges as a practical result of the accumulation of incapacity, complicity, and procedural dysfunction. A proportion of incidents are recorded against “unknown actors” or under “security disorder,” indicating a pattern that facilitates the loss of evidence and the dissipation of investigative pathways, especially in the gravest crimes such as assassinations and torture leading to death. In this sense, the widening accountability gap during 2025 was not a side effect, but a decisive factor in reproducing violations in a more violent form, because the perpetrator who faces no effective consequences tends to repeat the act and develop its tools.

In sum, addressing the 2025 file cannot stop at the limits of documentation alone, because the data clearly show that the judicial system in multiple contexts is either incapable of delivering redress or complicit in perpetuating violations through the absence of deterrence or the legitimation of coercive procedures. Accordingly, moving from the “documentation phase” to the “effective pressure phase” and activating accountability pathways is the realistic gateway to breaking the cycle of impunity and ensuring non-repetition.

## **The Impact of Impunity on the Repetition of Violations**

The organization concluded that the absence of effective accountability for violations committed in previous periods directly contributed to their continuation and escalation during 2025. The failure to open independent investigations, prosecute those responsible, and provide effective remedies for victims all weaken legal deterrence and encourage the repetition of the acts.

In light of this, the team affirms that addressing the current situation requires strengthening judicial independence, activating effective accountability mechanisms, and considering complementary international mechanisms to ensure that perpetrators of serious violations do not escape punishment, in line with Yemen's obligations under international law.

### **Cases: How a Pattern Turns into a Systematic Policy**

This section contains a set of documented cases that reflected during 2025 the widening impact of violations and the diversity of their forms, and the direct harms they caused to individuals, property, and the spaces of daily life. These incidents come as living evidence of the cost of the year at its various levels, from the loss of life and safety, to deprivation of liberty, to destruction, impoverishment, and collective pressure. Through presenting these cases, the features of a year whose cruelty was measured not only by what happened in it, but by the prolonged effects it left on families and local communities, and by the fragility in protection and the decline in the sense of safety that it deepened, become embodied.

#### **First: Cases That May Amount to Extrajudicial Killings and Indiscriminate Attacks**

##### **1. Al-Jawf Governorate - Killing of Mansur Naji Al-Ju'aidi**

On 9 January 2025, the civilian Mansur Naji Al-Ju'aidi was killed at a checkpoint in the "Al Ju'aid" area in Al-Jawf Governorate, an area under the control of the Houthi group. According to multiple matching sources, the victim was struck by direct gunfire fired by gunmen stationed at the checkpoint.

No information was available indicating the existence of an armed clash or imminent threat justifying the use of lethal force at the time of the incident. Sources also reported that another civilian had been killed at the same location during the previous two weeks, which may indicate a recurring pattern of excessive or unlawful use of force at checkpoints.

If these facts are established, the incident may constitute an arbitrary deprivation of the right to life, in violation of Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and may fall within the context of extrajudicial killing.

## 2. Al-Bayda Governorate - Killing of Mohammed Abdullah Al-Masoudi and Destruction of a Civilian Home

On 9 January 2025, Mohammed Abdullah Al-Masoudi was killed after shelling targeted his home in the village of “Hanka Al Masoud” in Al-Bayda Governorate during a large-scale military operation. The available information indicates the use of tank and mortar shells in a populated area, resulting in his death and the destruction of his home.

It was not possible to obtain information indicating that the house was being used for military purposes at the time it was targeted. If the target was not a legitimate military objective, the strike may constitute an attack directed against civilian objects, in violation of the principle of distinction set forth in international humanitarian law. The use of weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas may also raise suspicion of an unlawful indiscriminate attack.

## 3. Taiz Governorate - Killing of Abdulnour Mohammed Hael as a Result of a Landmine Explosion

On 26 February 2025, Abdulnour Mohammed Hael was killed in a landmine explosion in Maqbanah District in Taiz Governorate. The available information indicates that the area had witnessed previous clashes, without sufficient clearance operations or the placement of clear warning signs.

The continued fall of civilian victims due to landmines and unexploded ordnance reflects ongoing risks to the civilian population. The warring parties bear the obligation to take all feasible precautions to protect civilians, including removing, isolating, or warning against war remnants, in accordance with customary international humanitarian law.

## 4. Lahj Governorate - Killing of Ali Imad Al-Houshabi and Injury of Four Children

On 18 February 2025, Ali Imad Al-Houshabi, around 30 years old, died as a result of a landmine explosion in Al-Musaymir District in Lahj Governorate. The same explosion also seriously injured four children.

This incident highlights the disproportionate and ongoing impact of landmines in civilian areas, including on children. The failure to clear contaminated areas or take effective preventive measures constitutes a shortcoming in fulfilling obligations related to protecting the civilian population from the effects of hostilities.

## 5. Al-Dhalea Governorate - Killing of Mahmoud Mohammed Hadi by Sniper Fire

Mahmoud Mohammed Hadi was killed after being struck in the chest by gunfire fired by a sniper believed to belong to the Houthi group, while he was on his way to rescue one of his injured relatives. No information was available indicating that he was participating in hostilities at the time he was targeted.

If it is established that the victim was a civilian and was not directly participating in hostilities, his targeting may constitute a violation of the principle of distinction, and possibly a war crime consisting of intentionally directing attacks against civilians, under international humanitarian law.

#### 6. Sana'a - Killing of Journalists in Israeli Airstrikes

Among the bloodiest violations were those Israeli attacks that left a grave humanitarian impact and revealed a dangerous level of targeting affecting civilians and civilian infrastructure. On 11 September 2025, Israel launched airstrikes targeting the capital, Sana'a, resulting in the deaths of 28 civilians and the injury of 113 others in Sana'a, a clear indication of the scale of the humanitarian catastrophe. The bombing struck the building of the 26 September and Al-Yemen newspapers, and these strikes were considered serious violations of international humanitarian law and a blatant assault on the rights to life and security, requiring urgent international action, the opening of an independent international investigation, and ensuring that those responsible do not escape punishment.



## **Second: Deaths in Detention Potentially Linked to Torture or Ill-Treatment**

### **7. Saada Governorate - Death of Ahmed Baalawi During Detention**

Ahmed Baalawi, an employee of the World Food Programme, was detained while carrying out humanitarian duties, and died on 10 February 2025 after around 18 days of detention in a place under the control of the Houthi group.

According to the information collected, marks appeared on his body that are suspected to have resulted from torture or ill-treatment. The authorities in control of the detention did not announce the opening of an independent and transparent investigation into the circumstances of the death. If it is established that he was subjected to torture leading to his death, this may constitute a serious violation of the absolute prohibition of torture and may amount to a war crime or a crime against humanity if committed in the context of a widespread or systematic attack.

### **8. Sana'a - Death of Jamal Ahmed Al-Mahmoudi After His Release**

Jamal Ahmed Al-Mahmoudi was released from the Central Security prison in Sana'a and died on 18 February 2025, ten days after his release. Reliable information indicates that he was suffering from severe health deterioration as a result of torture, ill-treatment, and medical neglect during his years-long period of detention.

If a causal link between the conditions of detention and the death is established, this may constitute a violation of the right to life and a breach of the absolute prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, and would require an independent investigation identifying individual criminal responsibility, including command responsibility.

In general, 36 deaths in places of detention were documented during the period covered by the report, including the death of a humanitarian worker after 18 days of detention and the death of a former detainee shortly after release as a result of severe health deterioration. Recurring data indicate allegations of torture, ill-treatment, and deprivation of medical care. It was also observed in a number of cases that the results of independent and effective investigations were not announced.

## **Third: Arbitrary Arrest, Arbitrary Detention, and Enforced Disappearance**

### **9. Al-Bayda Governorate - Disappearance of the Child Ahmed Ahmed Al-Shami**

According to information verified from local sources, the child Ahmed Ahmed Al-Shami disappeared in Al-Bayda Governorate, before it later became clear—after an intensive search by his family—that one of the local supervisors affiliated with the Houthi group had forcibly taken him to subject him to what is known as a “cultural course” of an ideological nature, without the knowledge or consent of his family.

The detention of a child without notifying his family or enabling it to communicate with him, and in the absence of any legal basis or procedural guarantees, may amount to a case of short-term enforced disappearance and constitutes a violation of the right to liberty and personal security, and of the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, particularly those concerning the protection of children from ideological exploitation or arbitrary detention.

#### 10. Al-Bayda Governorate - Detention of Ahmed Nasser Al-Nuwairah

Matching sources reported that Ahmed Nasser Al-Nuwairah was arrested in January 2025 at a checkpoint in Al-Riyashiyah District in Al-Bayda Governorate on allegations of “incitement.” He was transferred to the district prison without the presentation of an arrest warrant issued by a competent judicial authority, and without being enabled to communicate immediately with his family or a lawyer.

If these facts are established, the detention may constitute arbitrary arrest in violation of Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, particularly in light of the absence of a clear legal basis and the failure to respect the basic guarantees of a fair trial.

#### 11. Sana'a - Abduction of the Journalist Majed Zayed

On 22 September 2025, the Houthi group abducted the writer and activist Majed Zayed in the capital, Sana'a, as part of a campaign targeting writers, journalists, and opinion activists. SAM explained that the abduction took place outside the framework of law, without the presentation of any judicial orders or any official announcement regarding the reasons for detention or the place of detention, considering the incident a serious violation of the right to liberty and personal security and an extension of a systematic policy of repression targeting freedom of opinion and expression in areas under the group's control, particularly in a context related to the anniversary of the 26 September Revolution.

#### 12. Sana'a - Disappearance of Bashir Al-Yamani

In early June 2025, Bashir Al-Yamani, a well-known sports coach, was abducted from in front of his club headquarters in the Capital Secretariat, Sana'a, by armed men believed to belong to the Houthi group. Since the date of the incident, the place of his detention has not been disclosed, and his family has received no official information regarding his legal status or whereabouts. The continued detention of Bashir in an unknown location and the deprivation of contact with his family or a lawyer fall within the elements of enforced disappearance, a serious violation that deprives the victim of legal protection and exposes him to the risks of torture and ill-treatment.

### 13. Taiz Governorate - Abduction of Abdulghani Al-Humairi

On 19 February 2025, armed elements raided the home of officer Abdulghani Al-Humairi in Sharab Al-Salam District in Taiz Governorate and took him to an unknown location on allegations of “espionage.” No formal charges were presented against him before an independent judicial authority, and the required procedural guarantees were not respected. This incident raises concerns regarding the use of vaguely worded charges of a security nature to silence influential local figures. In the absence of proper legal procedures, the detention may constitute arbitrary arrest and undermine the principle of the rule of law.

### 14. Taiz Governorate - Arrest of the Journalist Hammoud Hazza

On 16 August 2025, SAM condemned the arrest of journalist Hammoud Hazza after a raid on his home in Al-Jufainah camp in Marib. It stated that before the arrest he had posted messages indicating the presence of security personnel in front of his home, then spoke of a force he said belonged to the Fourth Security Zone that broke the door and terrorized his family, after which news of him ceased. SAM affirmed that the absence of any official explanation and the absence of judicial orders—according to its account—render the incident an arbitrary arrest, and that concealing the place of detention amounts to “enforced disappearance,” while holding the local authorities responsible for his safety and demanding the immediate disclosure of his fate and that he be enabled to contact his family and lawyer.

### 15. Hadramawt Governorate - Arrest of the Journalist Imad Al-Dini

On 20 February 2025, a security force stormed the home of journalist Imad Mahdi Al-Dini in Al-Mukalla in the morning and assaulted him in front of his children before taking him to an “unknown location” without legal basis, a model that reveals how the “raid” itself turns into a message of intimidation that targets not only the individual but also his family environment, and replaces lawful summons with public humiliation that deters others.

#### **Fourth: Destruction of Private Property, Places of Worship, and Forced Displacement**

##### 16. Al-Bayda Governorate - Destruction of Al-Qabil Mosque

On 9 January 2025, “Al-Qabil” Mosque in the village of Hanka Al Masoud in Al-Bayda Governorate was totally destroyed as a result of intense shelling during a military campaign. Information indicates that the mosque was not being used for military purposes at the time it was targeted.

The targeting of places of worship not used for military purposes constitutes a violation of the principle of protection of civilian objects and may amount to an unlawful attack under international humanitarian law.

##### 17. Al-Bayda Governorate - Blowing Up the Home of Ali Ahmed Al-Joubli

Local sources reported that the home of Ali Ahmed Al-Joubli in the village of Al Masoud was completely blown up during the same military campaign. The information indicates that the demolition took place in the context of punitive measures targeting the village as a whole.

If it is established that the destruction of the house was not justified by imperative military necessity, this may constitute unlawful destruction of private property and may fall within prohibited practices of collective punishment under international humanitarian law.

##### 18. Al-Jawf Governorate - Destruction of the Home of Faraj Hassan Shamloul

The home of Faraj Hassan Shamloul was completely destroyed as a result of a drone strike in Al-Jawf Governorate, causing him to lose his only shelter and his belongings to be damaged. No information was reported indicating the existence of a clear military target at the site of the house.

In the absence of a legitimate military target, the attack may constitute a violation of the principle of distinction and may also raise the issue of proportionality in the use of force.

#### **Fifth: Collective Restrictions and Punitive Measures of a Collective Nature**

##### 19. Amran Governorate - Imposition of a Siege on the Al-Ghoula Tribes

On 16 January 2025, a military siege was imposed on the Al-Ghoula tribes in Amran Governorate using military vehicles and armored units, after tribe members demanded the recovery of a truck said to have been looted.

The imposition of collective restrictions on the movement of an entire local community in response to a civil demand may constitute a form of collective punishment, which is prohibited under international humanitarian law, and may also violate freedom of movement and the right to livelihood.

## Sixth: Assassinations and Extrajudicial Liquidations

### 20. Al-Bayda Governorate - Killing of Abdullah Ahmed Al-Masoudi

Abdullah Ahmed Al-Masoudi was killed during an armed raid on his village in Al-Bayda Governorate. No judicial procedures or independent official investigation into his killing were recorded.

If it is established that he was not directly participating in hostilities, his killing may constitute an extrajudicial execution, in violation of the right to life.

### 21. Al-Bayda Governorate - Killing of Sheikh Jamal Mohammed Al-Shaibah

Sheikh Jamal Mohammed Al-Shaibah, a well-known tribal figure, was killed in an armed ambush targeting his car on the road between Radaa and Jibn. Preliminary information indicates that the attack was directly targeted.

If the deliberate nature of the targeting is established, the incident may constitute an assassination with tribal or political motives and falls within a broader pattern of targeted violence against influential local figures.



## Conclusion

This report places before those concerned the outcome of a year that did not so much close the crisis file as reveal its resilience and its ability to change shape without diminishing its effects. The indicators that emerge through the documented incidents are not to be read as isolated figures, but as features of a trajectory fed by institutional fragility, multiple centers of influence, and the absence of guarantees that secure a minimum level of protection for people in their daily lives.

The continuation of this reality produces not only immediate harm, but also accumulates a long-term social cost: the disintegration of trust, the erosion of local peace, and the diminishing capacity of society to recover. The longer the deadlock lasts, the wider the distance becomes between what ought to be and what people actually live, and suffering is transformed into a dangerous “normalization” that facilitates the repetition of violations and weakens their moral and legal sensitivity.

Accordingly, the practical value of this conclusion is not fulfilled by description alone, but requires a clear transition from tracking to action: protecting victims, preserving evidence, stopping ongoing violations, and activating realistic accountability pathways. Any approach seeking viable stability cannot bypass the condition of justice, nor can it rely on time alone as a solution, because time—in such contexts—may become a partner in deepening harm.



## Recommendations

### **First: The De Facto Authorities in Sana'a (the Houthi Group)**

Immediate and unconditional release of all those arbitrarily detained, disclosure of the fate of the forcibly disappeared, and enabling them to communicate with their families and lawyers.

Stopping practices of torture and ill-treatment inside places of detention, allowing independent monitoring visits, and guaranteeing healthcare for detainees.

Ending the targeting of humanitarian and UN work and providing written and public guarantees for the safety of personnel and facilities, and returning confiscated assets connected to the work of organizations.

Ending attacks on private property and stopping confiscation, looting, demolition, and destruction, while establishing a fair and transparent compensation mechanism for those affected.

Cancelling coercive measures of a mobilizational/compulsory nature in educational and employment institutions, and respecting the neutrality of schools, universities, and places of worship.

Activating independent investigations into incidents of extrajudicial killing and deaths in detention, and holding those involved accountable, including senior officials where appropriate.

### **Second: The Internationally Recognized Yemeni Government, Local Authorities, and Security Services in Areas Under Its Control**

Strengthening law enforcement, controlling security disorder, and pursuing perpetrators of assassinations and armed violence, and announcing the results of investigations to the public.

Ensuring lawful detention procedures and preventing detention outside the judicial framework, and entrenching the right of defense and judicial oversight over places of detention.

Protecting journalists, activists, and human rights defenders through clear protection mechanisms, emergency communication lines, and measures to prevent prosecution and defamation.

Strengthening the role of prosecution offices and courts and improving the efficiency of criminal investigation and evidence gathering, thereby reducing the space of “unknown actors” and limiting impunity.

Urgent institutional reforms in the security and justice sectors, including training, internal accountability, and preventing conflicts of jurisdiction among agencies.

### **Third: The United Nations, Its Agencies, and International Humanitarian Organizations**

Strengthening safety protocols and humanitarian negotiation mechanisms in ways that reduce risks to personnel, and linking any operational arrangements to verifiable protection guarantees.

Unifying positions and public messages regarding arrests and targeting, and activating diplomatic pressure tools through a collective approach that reduces isolated exposure.

Expanding support for legal protection programs for victims and the families of detainees, and funding legal aid and psychosocial support.

Improving monitoring, verification, and secure information-sharing mechanisms so as to ensure that evidence is not lost and accountability can later be pursued.

Protecting the neutrality and independence of humanitarian work and rejecting any conditions that would turn it into an extension of security services or tools of local surveillance.

### **Fourth: The Security Council, Permanent Member States, the European Union, and International Partners**

Linking any political tracks to measurable human rights guarantees (release of detainees, ending disappearance, opening monitoring corridors, stopping specific violations).

Imposing/expanding targeted measures against individuals and entities involved in serious violations, according to transparent standards and documented attribution.

Supporting and funding accountability and evidence-preservation mechanisms, including technical expertise for record preservation and witness protection.

Increasing funding for humanitarian response and protection in a way that prevents sectoral collapse (food, health, water, protection), with strict oversight of aid reaching civilians.

Practically affirming the protection of humanitarian workers through unified diplomatic positions and clear conditions in dealings with controlling parties.

## **Fifth: External Parties Carrying Out Airstrikes/Military Operations Affecting Civilians**

The immediate cessation of airstrikes and military operations inside Yemeni territory, and treating any continuation of them as escalation that heightens risks to civilians and undermines prospects for stability.

Respecting Yemen's sovereignty and territorial integrity and refraining from any military, security, or intelligence acts carried out without a clear and publicly declared legal framework consistent with the rules of international law and the United Nations Charter.

Opening independent and transparent international investigations into incidents resulting in human losses or damage to civilian objects, with the publication of findings and determination of responsibilities.

Ensuring reparation for victims through fair compensation and effective redress mechanisms, including treatment for the injured, support for the families of those killed, and rehabilitation for those affected.

Ensuring non-impunity by activating available international judicial and rights-based pathways, supporting the preservation of evidence, and enabling access to information related to targeting.

## **Sixth: Local Human Rights Organizations, Civil Society Organizations, and the Media**

Strengthening secure documentation networks and developing digital preservation standards and source protection in a manner that ensures the safety of witnesses and monitors.

Providing support pathways for victims (legal/psychological/referral to services), and linking documentation to practical protection services wherever possible.

Building professional and media alliances to counter incitement and defamation, and raising awareness of rights and digital safety procedures.

Producing focused periodic reports that highlight trends and patterns, not only incidents, in order to strengthen messages directed at decision-makers and international actors.



# The Cost of Stagnation

## 2025