

THE BIG COLLAPSE

YEMEN: 7 YEARS WITHOUT A STATE

A reading of the Most significant Events of the Yemeni War and its
Repercussions

During the Period from September 2014 to August 2021



SEPTEMBER 2021



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SUMMARY

With the anniversary of this date, September 21, Yemen is entering its seventh year while it is in the hell of war and conflict. Yemen has been suffering from the worst humanitarian crisis in the world, and its lands are being contested by local and regional parties. The Houthis' seizure of state institutions and their desire for exclusive power as a divine right according to their claim, Saleh's revenge on his people after being forced to give up power, the confusion of the Arab coalition between pursuing its interests and/or achieving the goals for which it intervenes, the flagrant inability of the Yemeni government, the bullying of many armed militias, all of this has led Yemen to the path of tragedy and disintegration.



Regional interference in Yemeni affairs continues to grind the situation and provoke war between the Yemeni parties as Iran and related groups in Iraq and Lebanon continue to provide military and logistical support to the Houthi group in fraudulent ways while the United Arab Emirates continues to provide military and political support to the Southern Transitional Council and the joint forces seeking to restore separation of southern Yemen from its north. It also controls important economic resources for Yemen, including ports and oil and gas companies. Saudi Arabia continues its confused approach between fighting the Houthis and monitoring military actions between the forces of the Yemeni government and the Transitional Council while working to draw influence and explore interests in Al-Mahra Governorate.

Yemenis are experiencing a severe human tragedy in light of limited international intervention in the food and health supply with a clear deterioration in the price of the national currency and the purchasing power of Yemenis. All parties to the conflict continue to commit more violations and acts undermining the entity of the state, looting resources and violating international humanitarian law and human rights.

The parties to the conflict have no choice but the path of dialogue, and the conclusion of a political settlement that saves the Yemenis from this catastrophic situation since the years of conflict have proven that no one can overcome the other with weapons. Adherence to the references to the solution stipulated in United Nations resolutions, most notably the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference, has become an urgent matter as these references were described as a starting point for peace and stability. That document, which the Yemenis agreed upon, was the fruitful juice of ideas for building a state of law, coexistence and acceptance of the other after decades of fragility.

Yemenis have had enough of the different kinds of humiliation and the most heinous violations as well as the tragedies and hunger they have experienced. It is time for them to enjoy peace and build their state away from guardianship and dictation. Six years of war were enough for them to live a tragedy caused by the Houthis and their ally Saleh, and behind them Iran, and the interference of the Arab coalition, the ambitions of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and the complete alienation of the internationally recognized Yemeni government increased. We point out that talking about peace without withdrawing the weapons of the Houthi group and all other armed militias in the south, west and east, as well as seriously thinking about finding a Yemeni leadership committed to its people and loyal to its homeland, is just like a plow in the sea of illusion.

The road to peace passes through the desires of the people, not the whims of the elites, nor the consent of the major players.

In light of the ongoing crimes, especially the grave ones against Yemenis, the expanding circle of violations and perpetrators, and the comprehensiveness of the areas experiencing armed conflict and/or security chaos, it is very difficult to reach all the crimes committed and the expected victims. SAM has made a lot of efforts, and during the past six years it has counted more than (5612) civilian deaths, more than (6188) wounded, and documented more than (1523) victims of mines. It also monitored more than (332) air raids of the Arab coalition countries. It recorded more than (10,251) arrests and disappearances, and more than (547) victims of torture. It also documented more than (5461) violations against children, and more than (1352) violations against women, in addition to more than (424) violations of press and human rights freedoms.

The justice and accountability system is still far from prosecuting the perpetrators of these crimes and acts, especially the leaders of the parties to the conflict and their regional supporters, and the information indicates that the judicial system in Yemen is divided against itself and is subject to the instructions of the parties to the conflict on the ground. It can't deal with cases of human rights violations and crimes of a grave nature in international humanitarian law, and it fears that it will be targeted while the protection system is disrupted while there are no serious indications from the UN Security Council to discuss the interference of the international criminal justice system in the investigation of war crimes and the grave crimes that Yemen witnessed during the past six years.

BEFORE CONTROLLING STATE INSTITUTIONS

The protests led by Yemeni youths in 2011 against the authority of former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh constituted a key to a real breakthrough in order to end the era of individual rule that characterized the Saleh regime



to practice true democracy, enter the era of political and media freedoms, and build on what is stipulated in human rights charters.

Those protests were the political opportunity that many struggled for its occurrence, so the “Gulf Cooperation” countries intervened between the Yemeni parties to come up with a road map that would establish a post-Ali Abdullah Saleh era. The political parties represented by the General People’s Congress (President Saleh’s party) and the Joint Meeting Parties (the political lever of the Yemeni opposition and many young protesters) agreed on the so-called Gulf Initiative document, which organized the political transfer of power, the distribution of political positions, and a comprehensive political dialogue.

The day after Yemeni President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi took power in

February 2012⁽¹⁾ the political situation moved towards a breakthrough, as he issued a decision to form a technical committee to prepare for the comprehensive national dialogue conference⁽²⁾ in implementation of the Gulf initiative document. The committee prepared for the convening of a national conference that included many Yemeni political, civil and armed components, including the Houthi group, and a large part of the southern protest movement. This committee approved a number of recommendations, the most important of which is an official apology to the south by the parties that participated in the 94 summer war, as well as an official apology to the people of Saada, Harf Sufian and other affected areas by the parties participating in those wars, and considering that war a historical mistake that cannot be repeated.

The Yemeni government adopted a resolution in which it formally apologized to the southerners and residents of Saada Governorate for the wars waged by the former Yemeni regime against them, with the aim of stimulating everyone's participation in the national dialogue and pushing it forward.⁽³⁾ The activities of that conference continued to discuss many urgent issues of state building. At the end of January 2014, the Yemeni president received the document of the National Dialogue Conference after signing it from its formations. That document dealt with many thorny issues, including the form of the state, which was stipulated to be federal instead of unitary, in addition to other crucial issues represented in good governance, democracy and freedoms. According to these outcomes, the Yemeni president issued a decision to form a committee to draft the new constitution in March 2014. The committee completed its work in writing a draft constitution and handed its copy to the president in January 2015.⁽⁴⁾

In parallel with the sessions of the National Dialogue Conference and the writing of the constitution, the Houthi group participating in the conference and the Constitution Drafting Committee, was mobilizing its fighters and controlling the Amran governorate in northern Yemen, starting from its stronghold in Saada, and this posed a major threat to the national dialogue and the state entity as well.

(1) France 24. Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi officially receives the presidency from Ali Abdullah Saleh. 27L2L2021 <https://bit.ly/2xh7kNM>

(2) 2 CNN Arabic. Yemen: Hadi forms the preparatory committee for the dialogue conference. July 21, 2012. http://archive.arabic.cnn.com/2012/middle_east/14/7/yemen.hadi/index.html

(3) BBC Yemen: What are the dimensions of the government's apology from the southerners and the Houthis? August 22, 2013. https://www.bbc.com/arabic/interactivity_130822/08/2013/comments_yemen_apology

(4) Comprehensive National Dialogue Conference. Draft Yemen's new constitution. <http://www.ndc.ye/>


THE OVERTHROW OF THE CAPITAL, SANA'A

In parallel with the Houthi takeover of Amran Governorate⁽¹⁾ in July 2014, the Yemeni Government of National Accord issued a decision to lift subsidies on oil derivatives. The Houthi group took this decision as a pretext to reject the government and demand its resignation. The group's supporters began to gather armed at the entrances of the capital, Sana'a to denounce the lifting of subsidies on oil derivatives, and the group's leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, called on the government to resign.⁽²⁾

The group intensified its armed presence around the capital, with the clear support of forces that owed allegiance to the former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, and limited clashes erupted between these forces on the one hand and government forces and gunmen affiliated with the Islah party on the other, until the Houthi and Saleh forces were able to defeat the governmental forces.

(1) France 24. The Houthis control the city of Amran, near Sanaa. 9.2014/7/
<https://bit.ly/3/EhLjAN>

(2) CNN Arabic. The Houthis are besieging Sanaa. Gulf warnings to the Houthis and Hadi mobilizes the «security cordon» for the tribes. August 20, 2014.
<https://arabic.cnn.com/middleeast/20/08/2014/yemen-huthi-sanaa-attack>



On the morning of Sunday, September 21, 2014, the Houthis and Saleh forces managed to storm the capital and control its civil airport and air base. They took control of the headquarters of the Armored First Division, the TV building, the central bank, and the headquarters of the Ministry of Defense, and they were able to besiege President Hadi in his home, and besiege the Prime Minister and a number of ministers and senior leaders in the state.

The siege of President Hadi lasted for two months until he was able to leave Sanaa on February 21, 2015 and arrived at the city of Aden in a mysterious way, the details of which have not been revealed until now. It is believed that foreign intelligence agencies were behind this operation. In Aden, Hadi described the Houthi takeover of the capital, Sanaa, as a coup and called on the international community to take measures to protect the political process and reject the coup.⁽³⁾

The Houthis and Saleh forces headed towards the cities of Aden, Taiz, Hodeida and other Yemeni cities to take control of them. The day after taking control of them, the Houthis were reassured of their military ability and their control over the joints of the state. In February 2015, they announced a constitutional declaration in which they announced the formation of a presidential council, a transitional national council to replace Parliament, and the formation of a government.⁽⁴⁾

After the Yemenis completed the National Dialogue Conference document and the draft constitution, the Houthis and Saleh dropped those documents, in addition to the state institutions. A phase began in which many Yemenis lost a sense of safety and the wave of displacement of many political and media opponents, and activists began on a journey that they thought would end quickly, but extends into its seventh year.

The control of the capital, Sana'a was the beginning of ruin and the gateway to access in an era described as the most heinous in terms of committing grave crimes of international humanitarian law and flagrant violations of human rights by this group and its allied forces. It was also the fuse that brought the countries of the Arab coalition, which contributed to further aggravating the situation and bringing them to the tragedy that Yemenis are experiencing.

(3) REUTERS. Hadi flees to Aden and says he is still president. February 21, 2015. <https://www.reuters.com/article/oegtp-yemen-killed-ah1-idARAKBNOLP09020150221>

(4) RT. The «constitutional declaration» of the Houthis: the dissolution of parliament, the formation of a presidential council and a two-year transitional period. 6.2015/2/ <https://bit.ly3/CdzDwY>

ANNOUNCING THE HOUTHISALEH ALLIANCE

Although the threads of alliance between the Houthi group and former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the military forces loyal to him appeared when they invaded Amran governorate, Where the report of the panel of experts described that attack as “the beginning of the alliance period between former President Saleh and the forces loyal to him and the Houthi forces and the popular committees affiliated with them,”⁽¹⁾ but they announced their alliance officially by agreeing to form a political council on July 28, 2016.⁽²⁾ However, all their political, military and media positions prior to that were mutually exclusive and confirmed that they were in one boat in their war to overthrow the capital, Sana’a and state institutions, wage war against the Yemeni government, and jointly confront the military operations of the government forces and the countries of the Arab coalition.



(1) United Nations, Human Rights Council. Report No. A/HRC/42/CRP.1. The human rights situation in Yemen, including violations and abuses committed since September 2014.
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/YemenGEE/Pages/Index.aspx>

(2) France 24. Yemen: An agreement between the Houthis and Saleh's party to establish a board of administration for the country. 7.2016/28/
<https://bit.ly2/XdMf8e>



THE ARAB COALITION, THE DECEPTION OF INTERFERENCE AND THE CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

Among the most prominent decisions taken by the Yemeni president after he was able to leave the capital, Sanaa, towards Aden, is his call for the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League to intervene to deter the Houthi aggression, and he informed the Security Council of that intervention.

Based on that call, which the president based on the principle of self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the League of Arab States and the Joint Arab Defense Treaty(1), the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia formed a coalition of ten countries, and launched a military operation called “Decisive Storm” that began its operations Actual at dawn on Wednesday, March 25, 2015.

In its beginnings, this intervention was locally and internationally acceptable to end the Houthi and Saleh forces’ control of state institutions. However, this intervention has become the subject of internal and international resentment and denunciation after six years of war. As it became clear the inability of this military coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE to achieve the goals for which they intervened, and the overlapping of interests and the policy of appropriating a number of Yemeni resources appeared publicly, as well as

(1) CNN Arabic. What did Hadi write to Gulf leaders about the Houthis, al-Qaeda and ISIS to persuade them to intervene militarily? March 26, 2015.
<https://arabic.cnn.com/middleeast/26/03/2015/hadi-letter-gulf-states>

interfering in what Yemenis call their sovereign affairs that are not divided by two. Before that, those countries violated international humanitarian law with many acts that were described as war crimes and were the subject of widespread discontent in international forums and human rights and humanitarian organizations in the world.

Six years after this military intervention, observers described the continuation of the Houthi group's military attacks, especially the drone and ballistic missile attacks, which were fired at a number of military and civilian targets inside Saudi Arabia, it is a clear deficiency of Saudi Arabia's military capabilities as the Houthi group has developed its military capabilities with the help of Iranian experts.

The UAE and Saudi Arabia built military forces on the ground opposing the Yemeni government, and these forces that formed the so-called transitional council in the city of Aden aspire to return the situation to pre-1990 and establish what it calls the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, in clear violation of UN Security Council resolutions, and it is an act that targets the unity of security, its sovereignty, safety and stability of its territories.

The Emirates also built military forces on the western coast of Yemen called the National Resistance⁽²⁾ and the Giants Forces⁽³⁾. Similarly, it built other forces in Shabwa and Hadramout, which it called the Elite. In all of these areas, it wants to usurp the decision and vital interests represented in seaports and dominate the international trade route in the Bab al-Mandab strait.

For this purpose, the Emirates also built military bases in the gas port of the Balhaf in Shabwa⁽⁴⁾ in the east, another on the Perim Island ⁽⁵⁾west, and a third on the island of Socotra in the south.⁽⁶⁾

The conflict between the UAE and the Yemeni government intensified, and the Emirati-backed forces in the city of Aden were able to expel the government and take control of the "Ma'ashiq" presidential palace and other state institutions in August 2019. The UAE air force struck a violent blow to the government forces that tried to advance to the city of Aden, and the Yemeni presidency issued a statement describing what happened as a blatant intervention by the UAE.

(2) It is led by Tariq Muhammad Abdullah Saleh, nephew of former President Saleh

(3) It is led by the Salafi cleric Abu Zaraq al-Muharrami

(4) Sputnik Arabic. Yemen calls on the UAE to restart the «Balhaf» facility

<https://bit.ly/2XjvhB8>

(5) SAM obtained a letter submitted by Yemeni parliamentarians to the Yemeni government, asking for clarification of what was reported by the Associated Press regarding the establishment of the UAE military base on the island.

(6) REUTERS. The UAE is expanding its military presence in Yemen and Somalia.

<https://cn.reuters.com/article/uae-security-yemen-somalia-mh7-idARAKBN1C1J8>

This was not the only thing that was happening on the ground. Saudi Arabia also started building a military base next to the Sultanate of Oman in the Al-Mahra Governorate in eastern Yemen, and it has consolidated its military presence there. This matter was not by chance, but rather comes in the context of the acquisition of the Yemeni decision. At a time when the Yemeni president is in self-imposed exile in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, and his government has become unable to contain this influence, and at various times, government leaders have contributed to spur the appetite of these countries with their secret positions and/or silence and condone what the two countries are doing under the influence of financial giving or maintaining their own interests.

Yemen has become exposed to the wings of interests and the play of international influence, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE arranging their interests in Yemen, and in light of the relaxation and inability of the Yemeni government to play any role, the Iranian interference in Yemeni affairs has become more evident, and its features are highlighted by political and media support. Aside from the logistical support that was proven by a number of facts mentioned in the reports of the experts of the Security Council, it was remarkable the sudden arrival of the Iranian ambassador to Sana'a without the approval of the Yemeni government. The Sultanate of Oman has also played a remarkable role in Yemeni affairs whether in terms of intensifying its mediating roles or in its presence against the Saudi presence in Al-Mahra Governorate.

POLITICAL AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

The process of political transformation had begun to move forward after the signing of the Gulf Initiative document, and it was clear after the uprising of Yemeni youth against the Saleh regime, the extent of openness to press and political freedoms as a number of newspapers and television channels emerged. Furthermore, a number of political parties were established, and civil activism was observed on a large scale widely distributed in a number of Yemeni governorates.

This climate was not favorable during the rule of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, whose reign witnessed a marked improvement in security, but it was at the expense of a significant restriction of political and civil liberties, and the confiscation of one of the pillars of public freedoms in the right of the people to choose who governs them. He, who had just ended 33 years of rule when he signed the initiative to step down from power in 2012, had worked to amend the constitution in line with his desire to continue in power, relying on a majority that owed him loyalty in the Legislative Council.

At a time when Yemen began to witness a breakthrough in the political and civil exercise of freedoms and rights, embodied in the document of the National Dialogue Conference and the draft of the new Yemeni constitution, the Houthi-Saleh alliance continued to stifle all this by overthrowing the capital and state institutions, and the disappearance of the concepts of democracy and freedoms. Political work was banned in the areas under their authority while all research centers, organizations, unions, newspapers, television channels and websites were closed and disabled except for those close to them.

The so-called “Supreme Revolutionary Committee”(1) has taken over state institutions, and the authority of this committee’s supervisors in all state facilities has the upper hand in running these institutions away from official frameworks and traditions. The Houthi group has created the Security and Intelligence Service as well as the Preventive Security Service, and through them, wiretapping operations are carried out on telephone companies, and on many of the works of their opponents.

The Houthi group seized the headquarters of political parties in the capital, Sana’a, and the governorates under its control, and media and civil liberties witnessed the biggest setback in the history of Yemen in decades. The work of activists, defenders and politicians became subject to strict control by the group. Sana’a and other cities witnessed assassinations and/or arrests and disappearances of political activists and those opposed to the group’s ideological and military tendencies.

The city of Aden, the interim capital of the Yemenis, witnessed political takeovers by the Southern Transitional Council after its control of the city, and the work of political parties and civil organizations opposed to the authority of the Transitional Council in Aden and the areas under its control became subject to restrictions and prosecution. Evidence indicates that Aden witnessed the most heinous politically motivated assassinations of opponents of the Transitional Council and those with independent ideological and political tendencies and/or against the UAE presence in Aden.

As for the areas under the authority of the Yemeni government, political and civil liberties witness a margin of action, allowing them to move and mobilize, but these areas are witnessing significant restrictions on the work of activists and human rights defenders.

(1) Headed by Muhammad Ali al-Houthi, the Houthis consider it an expression of what they called their revolution that overthrew the government of Yemeni President Abd Rabbo Mansour.

INTERNATIONAL RESOLUTIONS WITHOUT CLAWS

From 2014 to July 2021, the UN Security Council issued (15) resolutions related to the Yemeni issue, all of which did not restore the Yemenis' state, security and stability, during the six years of this conflict.

Resolution 2140 (2014) was the most significant because of imposing a sanctions regime under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and was issued to support the implementation of the outcomes of the national dialogue and reaffirm the need for the full and immediate implementation of the political transition. Under this resolution, the Security Council established a sanctions committee to impose the sanctions regime, including freezing funds and banning travel for those accused of undermining state institutions and the political transition process, and those involved in any violations of international humanitarian law and human rights. Then the decision named former President Ali Abdullah Saleh among those subject to those sanctions.

Although Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations allows the UN Security Council to take whatever actions it deems appropriate, including the use of armed forces to implement its decisions in cases of threats to peace, breach of peace and aggression, but regarding Yemen it has adopted a sanctions regime only against those who obstruct the political transition process. Events indicate this regime did not have a significant impact in order for these actions to stop and Security Council resolutions to be implemented.

Four months after Houthi and Saleh forces took control of the capital, Sana'a, the Security Council issued its resolution 2201 (2015), which was described as one of the strongest resolutions of the Council, as it strongly condemned the unilateral measures taken by the Houthis to dissolve parliament and seize government institutions... the council expressed dismay at the violence committed by the Houthis and their supporters, which undermined the political transition process in Yemen and posed a threat to Yemen's security, stability, sovereignty and unification.

Resolution 2216 (2015), which included in its preamble an indication that it was issued after the council was briefed on the letter sent by the Yemeni president to the President of the Security Council informing him that he had requested the support of Arab countries and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries by military intervention to deter the Houthi aggression against Yemen. This resolution was issued to confirm the implementation of its previous resolutions, especially resolution 2201 (2015). This resolution also subjected both Abdul-Malek Al-Houthi and Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh to the sanctions regime as they had committed acts that threaten peace, security and stability in Yemen.

The Council issued a number of other decisions in partial cases, whether with regard to Hodeida Governorate, the arms embargo, the renewal of the sanctions regime for persons included in the sanctions list, the identification of new names within the sanctions regime, or the extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts in Yemen.⁽¹⁾

The Yemeni file remained the focus of attention and consensus of the permanent members of the Security Council in the early years of the conflict in Yemen, but this consensus began to hide behind the interests and biased accounts of regional countries involved in the Yemeni conflict in one way or another. In addition to the clear government inability to influence international decision-makers, which left the Yemeni file in the hands of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, while the government and its diplomacy hid behind it, to the extent that many decision-makers and those around them are talking about the need for renewal and change in the body of Yemeni legitimacy, a proposal it has merit in light of the relaxation of Yemeni legitimacy and its relegation to itself and its characters.

(1) OSESGY. Security Council resolutions on Yemen.
<https://bit.ly/2YRrEr3>

INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATIVE MECHANISMS

Undermining the political process and state institutions carried out by the Houthi and Saleh forces after their military invasion of the capital, Sana'a on September 21, 2014, forced the international community to intervene and monitor the threats to security, peace and stability, as well as violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law by the parties to the conflict. The armed conflict in Yemen created the need to find international mechanisms to investigate these crimes.

The United Nations Security Council, in its resolution No. 2140 (2014), established a sanctions committee, one of its main tasks was to monitor the implementation of measures related to and/or search for information regarding the freezing of funds and assets and the travel ban on individuals and/or entities who engage in acts that threaten the security, peace and stability in Yemen. In addition to obstructing and undermining the process of political transition in accordance with the initiative of the Gulf Cooperation Council or impeding the implementation of the findings of the National Dialogue Conference or planning or committing any acts that constitute a violation of international humanitarian law and human rights law.

In accordance with that resolution, the Security Council formed a panel of experts to follow that committee and help it implement its mandate. That panel issued (7) reports⁽¹⁾ in which it discussed many issues related to the conflict in Yemen, and identified many of the actors. However, these reports are still static and have not played a role in punishing the perpetrators other

(1) United Nations Security Council. Sanctions Committees - Reports on Yemen. <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/2140/panel-of-experts/reports>

than exposing them, just like the reports of organizations concerned with human rights violations. It is reported in the human rights community that this mechanism, despite its paramount importance, is still not producing the effects that the Yemenis and the victims want from them, to bring the perpetrators to international criminal justice.

Among the most important international mechanisms for monitoring human rights in Yemen, the Human Rights Council issued its resolution No. 36/31 (2017) in which it requested the High Commissioner for Human Rights “to form a team of eminent international and regional experts on Yemen to monitor the human rights situation.” The mandate of the team included its mandate to investigate all alleged violations and abuses of international human rights law and other appropriate and applicable areas of international law committed by all parties to the conflict since September 2014, including the potential gender dimensions of those violations. The mandate of the Group of Experts includes establishing the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged violations and abuses and revealing those responsible, wherever possible.⁽²⁾

Until September 2021, the Group of Eminent Experts issued (4) reports summarizing what it had documented of violations by the parties to the conflict during the past six years. The parties to the conflict on the ground did not pay attention to these reports; moreover, the Houthi group does not recognize the mandate of the team and does not accept coordination with it in order to visit the areas under its control.

(2) United Nations-Human Rights-Office of the High Commissioner.
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID&26218=LangID=A>

NATIONAL INVESTIGATION MECHANISMS

The national mechanisms were no better than the international mechanisms when it comes to facing many obstacles that prevent them from performing their function professionally and independently. Among these mechanisms is the National Committee to Investigate Alleged Violations to Human Rights, which was formed by the Yemeni President in 2015. Since its formation until September 2021, the committee has issued (9) reports summarizing the human rights situation in Yemen.(1)

There are many shortcomings in the work and outputs of the committee. In addition to the manifestations of impunity which the committee can't take any executive measures regarding, it can't reach the areas under the authority of the Houthis, and it is accused by them of not being impartial. Its work is also under consideration by human rights observers. The report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights described it as "not enjoying the cooperation of all parties involved, and it can't operate in all parts of Yemen. It is therefore unable to implement its mandate in accordance with international standards."(2)

(1) the website of the National Committee to Investigate Alleged Violations to Human Rights <http://www.nciye.org/>

(2) United Nations - Office of the High Commissioner. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights calls for accountability for violations committed in Yemen. Geneva 25 August 2016. <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID&20411=LangID=A>

HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

In the summary of its third report, the Security Council's Panel of Experts on Yemen said, "After nearly three years of conflict, Yemen, as a state, is almost non-existent. Instead of one state, there are warring states, and none of them has political support or military force that enables it to reunite the country or to achieve victory on the battlefield."⁽¹⁾

(1) Report No. S/201868/. January 26, 2018

In the summary of his fifth report, the panel of experts said, “The situation in Yemen continues to deteriorate with devastating consequences for the civilian population. Three main factors contribute to this catastrophe: (a) economic profiteering by all Yemeni parties which affect human security, (b) the continuing and widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian law with impunity, and (c) the escalation of fighting and its impact on civilians, including displacement.(1)

These shocking introductions summed up the humanitarian story in Yemen although the tragedy that resulted from the armed conflict is greater than any description. SAM sensed the dangers of this humanitarian crisis from many evidence on the ground, most notably the indicators and figures of the hungry in Yemen, and indicators of severe malnutrition among children, as well as the destruction and closure of many factories and large commercial companies, the closure or bankruptcy of many medium and small companies and small traders, and the emergence of a parasitic class of merchants loyal to the parties to the conflict. Also other manifestations related to the expulsions of Yemeni expatriates in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which accommodates more than two million Yemenis, and recently the national currency exchange rates have fallen to frightening levels, in light of the presence of two financial systems in Yemen, which contributed greatly to the severity of the humanitarian crisis.

The United Nations said in a report issued in February 2021 that “Yemen is witnessing a widespread famine that threatens the lives of millions.” The report said, “As the conflict enters its seventh year, Yemen is witnessing the worst humanitarian crisis in the world...needing nearly 21 million people, i.e. More than 66% of the total population, to humanitarian aid and protection... Nearly 21 million people, i.e. more than 66% of the total population, need humanitarian assistance and protection... The number of hungry people in Yemen is expected to reach 16 million this year. Indeed, nearly 50 thousand people are close to dying of starvation with the re-emergence of famine-like conditions in some areas of Yemen for the first time in two years. Another 5 million people are just one step away from famine... About 2.3 million children under the age of five in Yemen are expected to suffer from severe malnutrition this year. Of these children, 400,000 children could die if they did not receive urgent treatment. These figures indicate the highest rates of severe acute malnutrition in Yemen since the escalation of the conflict in 2015.(2)

(1) Report No. S/202179/. January 25, 2021

(2) United Nations. United Nations News. Ten facts about Yemen: conflict, famine, lives at stake. February 2021.

Fears of the large spread of the Covid-19 virus in Yemen seem to be a matter of merit in light of the worsening humanitarian conditions, and the collapse of the health sector and its workers “The virus is still spreading in Yemen. The response to the pandemic in Yemen has been affected by the limited testing tools and health care centers in addition to the acute shortage of medical supplies, equipment prevention and personal protection.”(3)

SAM sensed the matter through its monitors’ visits to the isolation center in the city of Taiz and obtaining observational information from the community where the indications confirmed that this virus had spread widely in its second wave. There is a real danger of its spread with the emergence of a third wave of it, and there are no capabilities to face it.

“Around 20.5 million Yemenis live without safe water and sanitation, and 19.9 million people are without adequate health care. As a result, Yemen has been suffering from mass outbreaks of preventable diseases over the past few years.”(4)

It is not far from what the education sector has reached in Yemen in terms of the destruction and erosion of its identity and methodology. Evidence indicates that thousands of Yemenis have come to consider enrolling their children in educational schools a mere luxury in light of the lack of basic daily needs for survival, in addition to the lack of means, supplies and costs of education for their children. The educational infrastructure has been seriously damaged, and the parties to the conflict are using educational buildings for military operations. SAM obtained information confirming that the Houthi group has incorporated sectarian ideas it believes in into the basic education curricula and has changed many educational workers and replaced them with elements of its affiliates.

(4) The World Bank. Yemen overview. Last update: 03.2021/25/
<https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/overview>

NATIONAL CURRENCY CRISIS



The length of the conflict has affected the financial system of Yemen, as many vital facilities and public and private interests have stopped, and the parties to the conflict have controlled the resources and energy sources, each in the area under its authority, and exploited them for private accounts away from supporting the state's financial sector.

The decision to transfer the Central Bank from Sana'a to Aden, which was taken by the Yemeni government in September 2016, was a forerunner to the emergence of two financial systems in Yemen, the first affiliated with the Houthi group, and the second affiliated with the Yemeni government. After the government printed a new banknote without a foreign currency cover, the Houthi group considered this a targeting of it and that it "comes within a Saudi and American conspiracy aimed at causing an economic collapse," according to the statements of the Houthi central bank governor.(1) The Houthis had withdrawn the old paper currency from the areas under the control of the

(1) Al-Thawra newspaper in its version issued by the Houthis. The Governor of the Central Bank of Yemen, "Acting Chairman of the Supreme Economic Committee," in an interview with al-Thawra: The economic war on Yemen under the supervision of America and the printing of the currency aims to cause economic collapse. 3 July 2021. <http://althawrah.ye/archives683795/>

Yemeni government, and work began with it confined to the governorates under their control.

The Yemeni currency in circulation in the areas under the control of the Yemeni government has deteriorated significantly as the price of one dollar at the time of writing this report exceeded one thousand Yemeni riyals, and this affected the system of internal remittances. So the transfer commission for cash from government areas to Houthi areas became at a price equivalent to two-thirds of the amount transferred. All of this doubled the economic cost for Yemenis and affected the prices of food and consumer goods greatly.⁽²⁾

Economic experts point out that the sharp deterioration in the currency is due to several reasons, including the existence of two financial systems that operate in the Yemeni government and Houthi areas, in addition to the suspension of Yemeni exports and / or the seizure of important resources by the parties to the conflict. The Houthis took control of tax resources, telecommunications companies, and commercial companies, as well as full control of the fuel trade, and imposed customs duties on imports to their areas in addition to the fees that are imposed according to the law in the vital ports of Yemen such as the ports of Hodeida and Aden

The UAE and forces loyal to it control the Balhaf gas company and sea ports such as the port of Dabba, Mukalla, Mocha, Socotra and a number of other ports. While the government controls some oil fields in Shabwa, Marib, and Hadramout, and their revenues are transferred to private accounts in Saudi banks, the local authorities and military forces in these governorates have great influence over those resources.

The Yemeni population is highly dependent on imported fuel, and testimonies from the Yemeni Oil Company indicate that the companies supplying fuel to Yemen import Iranian oil in large quantities, which is a source of draining hard currency in concluding sales deals without the intervention and/or oversight of the Yemen Central Bank.

(2) Yemen Economic Forum. New customs duties imposed by the Houthi-Saleh authorities threaten to stop commercial activity. October 2, 2017.
<http://yemenief.org/News-Details.aspx?n1094=>



EXPATRIATES IN SAUDI ARABIA, A TRAGEDY THAT DOUBLED THE PAIN

Remittances of Yemeni expatriates are an important source of hard currency since the number of expatriates in different countries of the world is estimated to be 7 million, many of whom are in the Gulf and European countries, according to statistics published by the Yemeni Ministry of Expatriate Affairs in 2017 while their number increased with the displacement of thousands of Yemenis to these countries due to the war, as the Executive Unit for the Management of IDPs Camps revealed in 2017, that the number of Yemenis displaced abroad reached 312,000.(1)

Many expatriates were affected by the procedures of the job Saudization program imposed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and because of it, thousands of Yemeni expatriates were deported during the previous years. During the past two months, Saudi Arabia issued a decision to expel dozens of academics and doctors from their work in different regions. SAM and a number of Yemeni and international human rights organizations sent a letter complaining to the United Nations that Saudi Arabia laid off thousands of Yemeni workers in the south of the kingdom. (2)Media sources said that the Saudi authorities have returned some of the deportees to their jobs due to media and human rights pressures.

(1) al-Marsad News. Learn about the number of Yemeni refugees abroad due to the war. June 14, 2017. <https://www.marsad.news/news4985/>

(2) SAM for rights and Liberties. Human rights organizations, including SAM, complain to the United Nations that Saudi Arabia has laid off thousands of Yemeni workers in the south of the kingdom. 26.2021/8/ <https://samrl.org/l.php?!=a,10,A,c,1,57,63,4285,html>

There is evidence that many expatriates in Saudi Arabia owned companies, shops and large financial assets. With the measures imposed on them by the authorities there, they were subjected to major extortions that led some of them to abandon their companies and money in exchange for obtaining an exit visa. While many of them sold their financial assets at low prices and under the influence of blackmailing carried out by their Saudi sponsors. These expatriates did not find any protection from the Saudi authorities to ensure the restoration of their rights from its plunderers.

All of these measures imposed on Yemeni expatriates in Saudi Arabia have affected the economic conditions and the deterioration of the currency significantly. This has further aggravated the humanitarian situation. While Saudi Arabia promotes that it provides generous support to confront the humanitarian situation in Yemen, but on the other hand it is embarking measures that at least can be described as punitive for Yemenis residing in its territory.

YEMENI COMPANIES BETWEEN CLOSURE AND CONFISCATION

The Houthis' control of the capital, Sana'a, represented the major gate to the economic and humanitarian deterioration in the country. In addition to their acquisition of public resources and administrative institutions and operating for their benefit, they built a war economy that raised the balance of many of their loyalists in establishing companies and obtaining privileges in light of the facilities granted to them in control and acquisition of the commercial and financial market. Their appetite increased to exert restrictions on commercial companies that were operating before the war to the point of confiscating some of them and appointing managers on them or imposing exorbitant tax fees on the rest.

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In addition to their control of the Yemen Mobile Company for Governmental Communications (for example), the Houthis took over the telecommunications sector, both governmental and private, and they completely controlled the Sabaphone(1) Company, and subjected MTN and Y to their influence and management.

The group used its influence in the judiciary to file lawsuits against many companies. The courts respond to these lawsuits, and appointed judicial guards on many companies.(2) The organization obtained documents addressed to a number of parties and persons seizing the companies, assets and properties of a number of anti-Houthi parties.

In light of the apparent absence of civil influence tools in Sana'a, the Houthis have seized many associations, organizations, associations, and companies, and exploited their security clout to put many of those who oppose their actions into prisons and subjugate opponents to its approach by abuse and revenge. As part of the policy of retaliation practiced by the group against its political opponents, it seized the University of Science and Technology, one of the largest private universities in Yemen, and arrested its president, Dr. Hamid Aqlan. It is noteworthy that the Islah party invested its money in this

(1) The coup militias seized the company's assets and took control of its headquarters in Sana'a, and appointed an administrative staff affiliated with Houthi leader Saleh al-Shaer, responsible for logistical support for the Houthi militia's Defense Ministry in Sana'a. The company's website.

<https://bit.ly3/EhMKPH>

(2) Aden Newspaper. In names.. Al-Houthi seizes 8 private companies in Sana'a. August 22, 2019

<https://adenkhbr.net/85099/>.

university. Meanwhile, the group took control of commercial and oil companies that were owned by the family of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh before he was killed by the Houthis.

SAM observed the rapid and remarkable rise of commercial companies, which turned out to be members of the Houthi group, at the expense of dozens of companies that existed before the war. Economic activity in Yemen is nothing but a war economy in light of the Yemeni government's inability to protect the economic market from these crude interventions.

The situation in the areas under the authority of the Yemeni government, as well as the areas under the authority of the Southern Transitional Council and the forces loyal to the UAE, was not in a better condition. The war economy was evident in the emergence of commercial companies, businessmen and traders who invested in parasitic capital that created an inflation in the economic balance which was at the expense of Yemenis' money and their effort.

Many companies and factories were attacked by the parties to the conflict, especially the air strikes of the Arab coalition aircraft, and the indiscriminate attacks of the Houthi forces. SAM monitored many attacks on commercial and industrial facilities, and these attacks doubled the economic cost of many Yemenis who depend on these sources, and in general, this negatively affected the economic and financial movement in Yemen.



THE YEMENI GOVERNMENT.. INEFFECTIVENESS AND FRAGMENTATION OF COMPONENTS

After the Houthis and Saleh's control of the capital, Sana'a, the Yemeni government enjoyed wide support inside Yemen and the international community, which was expressed by many internal positions consistent with the Yemeni government, as well as international resolutions issued by the UN Security Council, and international reactions that condemned its actions of the Houthi and Saleh forces. None of the countries in the world recognized the actual authority of the Houthis and Saleh over the capital, Sana'a, and most of the Yemeni governorates in 2015. This was a clear expression of the international community's desire to stand behind the recognized Yemeni government.

Many evidences tell that every year that passes while Yemen is in a state of war, the presence of Yemeni legitimacy becomes less dim to the extent that its effectiveness has become non-existent in many files. The Yemeni president has only returned to Yemen four times on short visits to the city of Aden and Saiyoun, the last of which was on Friday, April 12, 2019, coming from the Saudi capital, Riyadh(1), which he has taken as his headquarters since leaving Aden in March 2015.

(1) Sputnik Arabic. The Yemeni president arrives in Saiyoun, and members of the House of Representatives flock to the meeting on Saturday. 12.2019/4/
<https://bit.ly/2Xyvd52>

The executive government did not settle in Aden except for a few months, during the past six years, and was attacked in the Ma'ashiq Palace in Aden by the forces of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council in August 2019 which forced it to leave for Riyadh while the House of Representatives was unable to hold the sessions for six years except once in the city of Saiyoun in eastern Yemen on April 13.(2)

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have contributed greatly to bringing the Yemeni government to this situation of powerlessness and inefficiency by controlling the decision, seizing the Yemeni president and his government in the Saudi Capital, Riyadh, and building military forces in the southern governorates and the western coast of Yemen parallel to the Yemeni government's forces and surpassing them in material capabilities which carried out military operation against the Yemeni government and its forces in the city of Aden in an operation described as a coup similar to the coup of the Houthis and Saleh in Sana'a, and this matter is attributed to tying the legitimate government and its inability to return to the interim capital, Aden.

On the other hand, the leadership of the Yemeni government, with its people and institutions, is now unable to influence, and no harmony is observed in it. It has left the management of Yemeni affairs in the governorates it controls to the military forces and armed groups. The official institutions represented by the authority of the presidency, the government and the House of Representatives have become out of influence from the internal and external scene, and they are already suffering from a deep division even in their view of many important issues.

The weakness in influencing the international community is due to the incompetence of those holding the Yemeni diplomatic file and the monotony of its workers to the extent that Yemeni diplomacy has always come behind Saudi and Gulf diplomacy in influencing the Yemeni file within the corridors of international organizations and capitals affecting the Yemeni issue.

Many international calls have emerged calling for the Yemeni president to be expelled and replaced with any political formula that can be accepted by the Houthi group and the Southern Transitional Council. These calls are frequent among the circles holding the Yemeni file. This prompted the head of the Yemeni Shura Council to discuss this matter publicly(3), warning against

(2) TRT Arabic. The Yemeni parliament holds its first session since 2015.
<https://bit.ly3/nPMRMv>

(3) his Facebook page August 7, 2021.
<https://bit.ly3/Co7NOL>

taking such a step, saying, “We must think a thousand times before taking any political step that would affect legitimacy. We should not do what military coups could not.”

The features of controlling the Yemeni government’s decision had begun to appear since the formation of military forces to confront the Houthis, whose mission was entrusted to the joint forces and their leader Prince Fahd bin Turki before he was dismissed from his post due to suspicious financial transactions.⁽⁴⁾ As the Yemeni decision on these forces was excluded, and many Yemeni competencies were removed at the expense of appointing those close to the decision makers and inexperienced people. The results of what we are witnessing today are the disintegration of the Yemeni government forces and their lack of connection to a source of leadership in the Yemeni government. This cost it a lot of setbacks before the Houthi group, which has a single command and control of its forces, as well as its inability to lead accountability and punishment against human rights violators, and its inaction in protecting human rights and the entity of the Yemeni state.

Many differences emerged within the body of the legitimate government, and were clearly manifested in the armed conflict between forces that were affiliated with them in the southern governorates before the formation of the Southern Transitional Council was announced, and between the security forces of the government, which has been extended for two years in Abyan and Shabwa. This dispute was also manifested in the political components involved under the body of legitimacy, especially in Taiz and Aden, and it is not hidden to those who follow the extent of the media clash and behind it the conflict of interest regarding the appointments of government positions and the expropriation of public money.

(4) BBC. Saudi Arabia refers the commander of the coalition forces in Yemen to investigation after his dismissal due to “suspicious financial transactions.” September 1, 2020
<https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast-53979857>

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

The conflict in Yemen led to the collapse of the justice system, which was a great motive for the parties to the conflict to increase brutality and exaggeration in committing crime. During the six years, the parties to the conflict committed many crimes and violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law, some of which amounted to what can be called war crimes and crimes against humanity.

For nearly three decades, Yemen has not witnessed massive and heinous crimes and violations like the ones that occurred during six years. The overthrow of state institutions and the invasion of the capital, Sana'a, by the Houthi-Saleh forces coalition was the beginning of devastation and the founder of what happened after that from all sides. The ugliness of what happened to civilians and infrastructure in Yemen is beyond description.

Since the Yemeni territory is divided over the control of a number of military parties, this was a bad factor in the increase in violations on the ground. As the Houthi group controls the governorates of northern Yemen and part of Taiz governorate, while the Yemeni government controls Shabwa, Mahra, Hadramawt, part of Marib and part of Taiz. The Emirati-backed Transitional Council controls the governorates of Aden, Lahj, Abyan and Socotra, and the joint forces under which the National Resistance Forces and the Giants fall control the western part of Taiz governorate and the southern part of Hodeida governorate.


The crimes include ground attacks, the crimes of air attacks, in addition to the crimes of arrest, torture and ill-treatment, the extrajudicial killings, the six violations against children, crimes against women, the crimes of forced displacement, the planting of mines, sexual assaults, crimes against education, crimes against public freedoms and expression, and many of the crimes that were documented by SAM and on which dozens of reports and statements were issued.

During six years, SAM monitored and documented the killing of (5612) civilians and the injury of (6188) other civilians. Although the number is much higher, but that is what SAM was able to document and obtain their data. The killing of 2,583 civilians was attributed to the attacks of Houthi and Saleh forces, while 4,355 were injured in the attacks of these forces. The attacks of the Arab coalition countries killed more than (1697) civilians, and wounded more than (925) others. Government forces killed more than 109 civilians and wounded more than 127 others. Meanwhile, SAM recorded the killing of more than (146) civilians, and the injury of more than (37) others, in the attacks of the Southern Transitional Council forces.

SAM documented the killing of (82) civilians during the past six years in US drone attacks and the injury of (8) others. It also documented the killing of more than 193 civilians by extremist organizations' attacks and the injury of 19 other. Meanwhile, SAM documented the killing of more than (792) civilians and wounding of more than (715) in the attacks of military formations, including the National Resistance Forces and the Giant Brigades on the West Coast, as well as the attacks of armed groups, some of which were classified under unknown persons, but they occurred on the occasion of the armed conflict.

With regard to the victims of anti-personnel or anti-vehicle mines, the organization documented more than (1523) victims who were killed, wounded and disabled in a number of Yemeni governorates, most of which were planted by the Houthi group, and a small part of them were planted by extremist organizations during their control of Abyan and Hadramout.

DURING THE SIX YEARS SAM OBSERVED AND DOCUMENTED:



including the National Resistance Forces and the Giant Brigades on the West Coast, as well as the attacks of armed groups, some of which were classified under unknown persons, but they occurred on the occasion of the armed conflict.

civilian
wounded
6188



4355

Wounded by Houthi-Saleh
forces attacks

925

Wounded by the attacks of the
Arab coalition countries

127

Wounded by the attacks of the
legitimate government forces

37

Wounded by the attacks of the
Southern Transitional Council forces

08

Wounded by US air strikes

19

Wounded by extremist

715

Wounded in attacks by
military formations

including the National Resistance Forces and the Giant Brigades on the West Coast, as well as the attacks of armed groups, some of which were classified under unknown persons, but they occurred on the occasion of the armed conflict.

The organization monitored more than (332) air strikes by the Arab coalition countries, in which civilians were killed, or were directed against civilian facilities and infrastructure. Although the sorties of these countries are much more than that, the organization was able to reach this number of raids and document their victims and their impact on civilian facilities.

SAM also documented the arrest, detention and disappearance of (10,251) civilians during the past six years, and documented torture against (547) victims. SAM verified the arrest and/or disappearance of more than (9810) in prisons belonging to the Houthi group, as well as the torture of (396) others. The organization documented arrests and/or disappearances of (445) civilians in government forces prisons and the torture of (22) others. It also documented the arrest and/or disappearance of (392) civilians in the prisons of the Southern Transitional Council forces and the torture of more than 122 victims. SAM recorded the arrest and/or disappearance of more than (85) civilians in prisons belonging to the National Resistance Forces and the joint forces in the West Coast, and others detained by extremist forces, and some were detained under the classification of unknown persons. The organization monitored torture and arrests of (25) victims in the prisons of the Saudi and UAE forces in Yemen.

The organization was able to document (5461) violations against childhood, including killing, injury, recruitment, torture and arrest. The Houthi group, along with Saleh's forces, was the biggest violator of children's rights. Where the organization documented more than (4,277) child victims of violations by these forces, more than (746) children victims of attacks by Arab coalition aircraft, and more than (114) children victims of violations by government forces. More than (26) children are victims of violations by the Transitional Council forces. It also has documented more than (291) child victims of violations by armed groups, extremist groups, and the National Resistance Forces. There were many violations linked to unknown persons.

The organization recorded more than (1352) violations against women, including killing, injury, arrest and trial. Among them, more than (889) women victims of attacks and violations by the Houthi group and Saleh forces. More than (314) women are victims of attacks by the Arab coalition forces, and (22) women are victims of violations by government forces. While the organization recorded more than (127) women victims of violations and attacks by various parties, including the forces of the Transitional Council and the National Resistance, armed groups, extremist organizations, and others whose perpetrators have not been identified.

The organization revealed (424) violations and attacks against press freedoms and press facilities, and more than (1,196) crimes against activists and human rights defenders during the past six years. The Houthi group was the most frequent perpetrator of these violations. Where the organization documented more than (267) violations against journalists and more than (897) violations against activists and human rights defenders committed by the Houthi and Saleh forces, more than (73) violations against journalists and (113) violations against activists and defenders were committed by government forces. More than (62) violations against journalists and (127) violations against activists and defenders were committed by the forces of the Southern Transitional Council and the National Resistance Forces backed by the UAE while more than (22) violations against journalists and (59) violations against activists and defenders were committed by armed groups and extremist organizations.

82



A civilian was killed during the past six years in US drone attacks, and (8) others were injured

332



An air strike by the aircraft of the Arab coalition countries resulted in the death of civilians or was directed against civilian facilities and infrastructure

1,523



Victims of anti-personnel or anti-vehicle mines were killed, wounded and disabled in a number of Yemeni governorates.

10,251



A case of arrest, detention and disappearance of civilians during the past six years, and torture cases were monitored against (547) victims

5,461



Violation of the right of childhood between killing, injury, recruitment, torture and arrest

1,352



Violation against women was divided between murder, injury, arrest and trial.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Yemeni Government

- Re-formulate the relationship with the Arab coalition in a way that preserves Yemen's sovereignty and entity and does not prejudice the right to manage the Yemeni sovereign affairs without interference or influence.
- Ratify Charter of the International Criminal Court in order to enable the court to intervene and investigate serious crimes against Yemenis.
- Reunify the military forces in all the governorates under its authority to ensure their commitment to preserve human rights and protect the population.
- Work to operate oil and gas companies in a manner that ensures economic and living stability for the population even if it is at a minimum level.
- Activate all oversight bodies on public spending to ensure transparency and combat corruption and money laundering.
- Refer all perpetrators of violations of human rights and humanitarian law to criminal justice to achieve accountability and punishment.
- Comply with the principles of international humanitarian law during conflict and/or conduct of hostilities against military objectives.
- Stop all forms of violations and practices against the population, and work to provide means of protection and accountability.
- Remove all those accused of committing violations of human rights and humanitarian law from the positions they hold.
- Re-form the National Investigation Committee to ensure its impartiality and enable it to work in all Yemeni governorates.
- Work to compensate civilian victims in order to ensure reparation for harm and the establishment of transitional and restorative justice.

To the Houthi Group (Ansar Allah)

- Engage seriously in the political process to ensure the restoration of the situation to the way it was before September 21, 2014.
- Enable state institutions to function normally in order to achieve the implementation of the National Dialogue Outcomes Document as it is considered a comprehensive and reference document for a peaceful and comprehensive solution.
- Cease all hostilities and human rights violations against civilians or infrastructure.
- End all manifestations of armed control over state institutions, including financial interests and institutions to ensure that the collected funds are transferred to the Central Bank in Aden and are spent in accordance with the law.
- Work seriously in order to enable expert teams and international and national investigation committees to work freely in the areas under the authority of the group, in order to ensure the documentation of human rights violations.
- End all manifestations and obstacles that hinder humanitarian work in the areas under the authority of the group.
- Return all commercial companies and institutions to their owners and work for the rule of law without interfering with the work of the judiciary and law enforcement institutions.
- Opening the entrances in the city of Taiz in order to ensure the smooth arrival of supplies and the movement of transport.
- Stop all forms of attacks and violations against the civilian population and facilities, as well as against economic facilities or civilians inside Saudi Arabia.

To the countries of the Arab coalition, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE

- Stop all actions that threaten national sovereignty and hinder the work of the Yemeni government and prevent government leaders from returning to the Yemeni interior to carry out their work.
- Respect the right of Yemenis to manage their internal affairs without placing conditions or obstacles that hinder them from achieving their interests.
- Lift their control and influence over Yemeni ports, oil companies, and all economic interests of Yemenis.
- Remove all restrictions that hinder the opening of Sana'a Airport and all other Yemeni airports, and facilitate all procedures for the work of Aden and Saiyoun airports.
- Work with the Yemeni government to integrate the armed formations with the government forces.
- Stop launching air attacks against Yemeni interests, residents, and civilian neighborhoods.
- Compensate all victims who were killed by the air and ground attacks of the Arab coalition forces, in order to achieve reparation.

To the International Community and the Security Council

- Work seriously to refer Yemen's file to the International Criminal Court to investigate all grave crimes and war crimes against the civilian population.
- Take more serious measures that compel all parties to the conflict to stop undermining the state entity or committing more crimes, especially against children, women and human rights defenders.
- Tighten the procedures for the sanctions regime against those covered by it, and expand the list of sanctions to include all leaders of the Houthi movement that works to undermine the state, as well as the leadership of the Southern Transitional Council and its regional supporters, in addition to all government leaders who committed grave human rights crimes, and all parties working to Destabilizing the security, peace and stability in Yemen, including the leaderships in Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iran.
- Expand the list of procedures for controlling and preventing the entry of weapons into Yemen.
- Increase the pace of humanitarian work in the field of food and health, and expand programs to include areas of protection and support, building economic capacities and development projects that benefit larger population groups.



THE BIG COLLAPSE

YEMEN: 7 YEARS WITHOUT A STATE



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